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Summary
File sharing has become an indispensable part of our daily lives. The shared files might
be sensitive, thus, their confidentially, integrity and availability should be protected. Such
protection might be against external threats that are initiated by unauthorised users or
insider threats that are initiated by authorised users. Our main interest in this thesis
is with insider threats. Protecting shared files against insiders is a challenging problem.
Insiders enjoy various characteristics such as being trusted and authorised, in addition to
being inside the network perimeter and having knowledge of information systems. This
makes it di cult to prevent or detect policy violation for these users. The goal of this
thesis is to protect shared files from the perspective of insider security with language-based
techniques.
In the first part of the thesis, we define what we mean by an insider and the insider
problem precisely, and propose an approach to classify the insider problem into di↵erent
categories. We then define and focus on one category that is related to file sharing. Namely,
protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the shared files against accidental misuse
by insiders. Furthermore, we classify the activity of file sharing into di↵erent categories
that describe all possible ways of performing the activity of file sharing. These categories
represent policies that describe how files should be propagated and accessed by insiders.
We show that enforcing these policies can protect the files against accidental misuse by
insiders while allowing the activity of sharing to be performed as desired. Thus our interest
can be summarised as keeping honest users safe.
In the second part of the thesis, we develop a security type system that statically
enforces information flow and access control policies in a file system. Files are associated
with security types that represent security policies, and programs are sets of operations to
be performed on files such as read, copy, move, etc. A type checker, therefore, will statically
check each operation to be performed on a file and determine whether the operation
satisfies the policy of the file. We prove that our type system is sound and develop a type
reconstruction algorithm and prove its soundness and completeness. The type system we
developed in this thesis protects the files against accidental misuse by insiders.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis, explains its rationale and describes the con-
tributions to knowledge that it makes. The overall structure of the thesis is also presented.
1.1 Introduction
With the advent of Web 2.0, Internet users have become more active than ever before.
They have changed from being passive users that consume content to active users that
produce on-line content. Web 2.0 allows Internet users’ to be producers and consumers
of on-line content at the same time. Examples of internet users content are blogs, wikis,
documents (such as Google Docs), multimedia (i.e. pictures, videos, music), and personal
bibliographical information. One of the prominent characteristics of Web 2.0 is that users
are able to generate and share content on the Web without special technical skills [118].
This characteristic has led the majority of Internet users to generate and share their
content on-line with one another. According to Mendelsohn and Mckenna [67], 75% of
people are somewhat or highly likely to share content they like on-line with friends, co-
workers or family, and 49% share content on-line at least once a week. The authors point
out that more than 30 million pieces of content (web links, news stories, blog posts, notes,
photo albums, etc.) are shared each month on Facebook alone. In this thesis we will use
the term file sharing instead of content sharing where a file can be a picture, an audio, a
video, or text, etc.
Files can be classified into commercial and non-commercial, where noncommercial files
can be further classified into confidential and non-confidential (See Figure 1.1). Commer-
cial and non-commercial but confidential files are sensitive which means that they need
to be protected from potential attacks or misuses. Such attacks might lead to unauthor-
2ised disclosure (Confidentiality attacks), unauthorised modification (Integrity attacks), or
unauthorised withholding (Availability attacks). These di↵erent types of attacks can be
performed on files while they are being transferred, stored, or used by either authorised
or unauthorised users. As a result, protections for these types of attacks stem from three
distinct fields of security which are: Communication security which is concerned with pre-
venting di↵erent types of attacks on data transmitted over a network; Perimeter security
which is concerned with preventing attacks on data stored inside a trusted internal net-
work; and Insider security which is concerned with preventing attacks on data by those
who have been authorised with access.
Figure 1.1: Types of content
This chapter discusses issues arising with protecting commercial and confidential files
from the perspective of insider security. In particular, issues arising with protecting the
shared files against attacks that are performed by users who are authorised to access the
files.
1.2 Level of Trust and Protection
The goal of protecting commercial files is di↵erent from that of protecting confidential
files. In commercial files, the goal is to prevent access to the files by users who do not
pay for access, while the goal of protecting confidential files is to prevent access to the
files by users who are not authorised by the files’ owners, whether they pay to access the
files or not. Although the two types of files might require the same type of protections
(i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and availability protections), the strength level of the re-
quired protection is di↵erent. This is due to the fact that users who are authorised to
access commercial files have di↵erent trust levels from those who are authorised to access
confidential files.
The required strength level of the protection mechanisms for commercial and confid-
ential files is determined by the level of trust that is maintained by those with whom the
file is shared. That is, low trust implies that a stronger level of protection mechanism is
3needed, whereas high trust implies a weaker level of protection mechanism. This is because
it is perceived that trusted parties will not violate the file policy, hence, protection is not
required, whereas untrusted parties might violate the file policy, hence, a strong protection
is required. Those who are neither trusted nor untrusted might require a moderate level
of protection to avoid unnecessary costs incurred by excessive protection mechanisms.
It should be noted that while low trust implies the need for a stronger protection
mechanism, the stronger the protection mechanism is, the more cost is incurred. By cost
we do not only mean the monetary cost, but also the cost of usability and privacy as
implementing a strong protection mechanism makes the usage inconvenient [120], and
might require the collection of information about the usage such as in Digital Rights
Management systems (DRM) [58] and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [56]. Figure 1.2
illustrates that the less trust there is, the stronger the security mechanism is required which
entails more cost, whereas the more trust there is, the weaker the security mechanism is
required which entails less cost.
Figure 1.2: Trust vs. Protection vs. cost
Deciding whether to implement a particular level of protection mechanism is determ-
ined by evaluating the cost of the level of the protection against the value of the content
which needs to be protected. Such evaluation helps in finding out whether the cost is
worth protecting the content or not.
Since the commercial files are shared with users based on payment, the authorised users
of commercial files are considered untrustworthy and usually referred to in the literature as
adversaries. Therefore, the strongest possible level of protection is required. On the other
4hand, confidential files are shared with users based on a certain level of trust. However,
levels of trust might range from trusted to entirely untrusted and which entails disparate
levels of protections that range from no protection to the strongest level of protection.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the various levels of trust and protection that might be required to
protect commercial and confidential files.
Figure 1.3: The optimal level of protection
As shown in Figure 1.3, the blue arrow across the area Trusted - No protection and
Untrusted - Strongest protection is used to identify the di↵erent optimal levels of protec-
tion based on di↵erent degrees of trust. The area between Untrusted - No protection and
Trusted - Strongest protection is usually perceived as to describe inappropriate levels of
protection, and therefore is omitted. For instance, providing the strongest level of protec-
tion against trusted individuals results in unnecessary costs, while providing no protection
against untrustworthy individuals is risky.
The four red points on the blue arrow indicate four levels of protection that are required
by the four levels of trust. Level A illustrates the case where individuals are trusted
and therefore no protection is required. On the other hand, level D illustrates the case
where individuals are untrusted and therefore the strongest level of protection is required.
Between level A and D, various levels of trust might exist, each requiring a particular level
of protection (e.g. level B and C). In the next section, two issues of trust and protection
are illustrated.
51.3 Problem Statement
This thesis is concerned with the problem of protecting the shared files against authorised
users in a Unix-like file system. Users in the file system manipulate files through issuing
various commands such as mv, cat, and cp. In the file system, sharing is performed through
commands that cause information to flow between files which are accessed by di↵erent
users. For example, copying a file which can only be accessed by Alice into another file
which can be accessed by Bob and Carol is considered sharing. This thesis aims to apply
a language-based technique, particularly a type system, to protect the shared files against
commands issued to manipulate them by authorised users.
Authorised users can be classified into trusted and untrusted users. In this section, we
present two issues of trust and protection. The first is concerned with protecting the shared
files against untrusted authorised users. Whereas the second is concerned with protecting
the shared files against trusted authorised users. The focus of this thesis is on protecting
the shared files against trusted authorised users. However, we first present the issue of
protection against untrusted authorised users to highlight and show the significance of the
protection against trusted authorised users. In Section 1.4 we discuss the approach taken
in this thesis to solve the above problem in detail.
1.3.1 Untrusted individuals - Strongest protection (D)
At one end of the blue arrow in Figure 1.3 are untrusted individuals where the strongest
level of protection is required. This is usually the case with commercial files and some
cases of confidential files (e.g. military and intelligence settings).
Providing a protection mechanism that completely prevents file misuse by entirely un-
trusted individuals is a dilemma. Research and history have shown that such a mechanism
does not exist and is an impossibility, as there is no system which is 100% secure against
all deliberate attacks or misuse [87, 103, 46, 94]. A brief look at the approach taken to
protect commercial content, justifies this principle. Commercial content is protected by
the use of DRM systems that dictate how the content must and must not be used by each
individual. Examples of DRM systems are Windows Media DRM [136], Apple FairPlay
[32], Adobe PDF DRM [31], and SecuRom [105], that provide protection for di↵erent types
of files such as video, music, documents, or games.
Although these systems are in place to protect the commercial files and they are sup-
posed to prevent all possible misuses, the files can still be obtained illegally in unprotected
form. This cause stems from two reasons as follows.
6Systems vulnerabilities:
Each system has its own vulnerabilities and there is no system without vulnerabilities
[103, 5]. A system’s vulnerabilities can be easy or hard to find and, of course, vulnerabilities
of DRM systems are hard to find as much e↵ort is dedicated to produce a highly secure
system. It is hard for an average user to find such vulnerabilities in DRM systems, however,
a more sophisticated and determined attacker who has the time and knowledge might
spend days, weeks, or even months to ultimately circumvent the system. Once the system
is circumvented by that sophisticated attacker, the content becomes unprotected, and can
then be provided to average users freely without protection by various means such as peer-
to-peer networks [40]. Worse, the attacker might develop an automated tool to launch his
attack and distribute it to average users so that they can circumvent their systems without
the need to learn any sophisticated technical skills [46]. In fact, DRM systems rely on
the concept of security-through-obscurity which is a principle in security engineering that
means the security of a system is provided by the secrecy of its design or implementation.
Therefore, once the sophisticated attacker has figured out the inner design of the system,
he will be able to circumvent it [114, 69, 115, 58]. Studies have shown that all DRM
systems can be circumvented [94, 12]. Various successful attacks on DRM systems are
discussed in detail in [46, 69]
The same thing is applied to other systems that are used to protect confidential files
from misuse by entirely untrusted individuals. For instance, the recent leak of more than
200,000 classified documents by the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden [133], is
evidence that regardless of the protection system in place, a determined attacker will still
be able to circumvent it.
The analog hole:
One of the easiest ways to circumvent any protection system used to protect commercial
or confidential files is by exploiting the analog hole [138]. The analog hole is the inevitable
vulnerability in any file protection system that makes the protection of content from
untrusted individuals unfeasible [115, 12]. Any digital file must eventually be converted
to human-perceptible form, which is known as the analog form, in order to be consumed
by the users. Once the digital file is converted to analog form, it will be in an unprotected
form, and thus, susceptible to unauthorised uses [40, 138].
For instance, protected music played in a computer is converted to sound waves
whereby a user can record the audio coming out of the computer speaker without any
restriction. Also, a protected video, text and photo displayed on a computer screen are
7converted to light patterns and can be video recorded, or captured by a digital camera
without any restriction. These are examples of exploiting the analog hole and include
memorising content as the human brain is able to memorise information for sometime.
Such exploitation of the analog form of protected digital files is hard or even impossible
to prevent and usually referred in the literature to as the analog hole problem [115, 138].
For these two reasons, any protection mechanism that protects files from entirely un-
trusted individuals will ultimately fail. Any commercial and confidential file has a time
value. The time value of a file might be days, weeks or months, after which the file will
lose its value. For instance, a commercial file which is sold now at a particular price will
decrease in value over time until it loses its value and becomes free. Also, a confidential
file which must be kept secret now, at later time might need to be publicly published and
thus loses its value and is no longer secret. Therefore, protection mechanisms might be
useful for protecting a file that has a short time value. This is because the time that is
needed to circumvent the protection mechanism might exceed the time value of the file.
In other words, by the time an attacker manages to circumvent the protection mechanism,
the file will have lost its value and little or no loss will be occurred if the file is misused.
However, by exploiting the analog hole, the protection mechanism can be circumvented
immediately. In case of protecting a commercial file, the quality of the content captured
in an analog form is usually degraded [12], and therefore, the media and entertainment
industry might be tolerant of such exploitation as long as there are people willing to pay
for a good quality content even if it is protected.
However, in case of protecting confidential files, degradation in the quality of the
content does not matter. What matters is the information in the file regardless of its
quality as long as it can be perceived by humans. Additionally, there exist confidential files
which have infinite time value, which means that the file will be of high value for the whole
of its lifecycle until it is destroyed. In other words, the file must be kept secret forever.
Based on the two reasons mentioned previously, protection mechanisms cannot guarantee
to protect such files that need to be protected forever. Rather, protection mechanisms can
only guarantee to make it harder for an attacker to circumvent the mechanism; perhaps
till the file loses its value. Therefore, protection mechanisms might be useful in protecting
files that have a short time value rather than content that has long or infinite time value.
Protecting confidential files that have long or infinite time value can only be achieved
by releasing the files only to trusted individuals who will not violate the content policy
deliberately.
81.3.2 Trusted individuals - No protection (A)
At the other end of the blue arrow in Figure 1.3 are trusted individuals where no protection
is required. Such individuals are entirely trusted to not violate the content policy, and
hence, no protection is usually in place. However, even if individuals are trusted to not
violate the content policy deliberately, there is a chance of their violating the policy
accidentally. According to a recent survey conducted by Infosecurity Europe and PwC
on 1,402 UK companies, 36% of the worst security breaches in the year were caused by
inadvertent human error [34]. Also, AngloSec conducted a survey on 197 network, security,
and compliance professionals, and found out that the greatest security concern of their
respondents was employees accidentally jeopardising security through data leaks or similar
errors (40.5%), followed by employees deliberately breaching the security (22.1%)[4].
Furthermore, the Ponemon Institute conducted a survey on 709 IT security practition-
ers in the United States, and found out that 78% of their respondents have experienced
a data breach as a result of negligent or malicious employees or other insiders [54]. Their
survey result shows that the root causes of data breach incidents in organisations are
loss of laptops or other mobile devices (35%), third party mishaps or flubs (32%), system
glitches (29%) mishandling of data at rest and in motion (27% and 23% respectively),
malicious employees or other insiders (22%), and external cyber attack (8%). Also, they
found out that even when misuses are unintentionally made by employees, most of these
misuses are discovered accidentally and rarely self-reported by the employees themselves.
Accidental breach in security can also occur during the activity of file sharing. For
example, a confidential file might be shared accidentally with unintended recipients, or
overwritten accidentally by irrelevant content. While such activity might not be the main
reason for the insider problem, it is considered a class of the insider the problem that must
be tackled.
Therefore, while confidential files which have long or infinite time value should only
be released to entirely trusted individuals to be fully protected, releasing confidential files
to entirely trusted individuals without any protection might result in accidental violation
of the file policy. There must be an appropriate level of protection that prevents such
accidental misuses by those trusted individuals. This appropriate level of protection should
prevent all possible violation of content policy that can happen accidentally but ignores
those who deliberately circumvent the system; this because we are dealing here with
trusted individuals, who are assumed to not violate the content policy deliberately. This
thesis focuses on this type of protection.
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be expressed as follows:
To design a language that allows owners of files to express various polices which
define access and usage restrictions on their shared files, and a system that can
enforce these polices to prevent accidental misuses of the shared files by trusted
recipients.
1.4 Approach
The problem of protecting the shared files from authorised users is considered an instance
of the insider threat problem. Therefore, we explore the problem from the perspective of
the insider threat. However, the literature on the insider threat problem shows various
definitions and understandings of the terms insider and insider threat. There is no con-
sensus among researchers regarding who is an insider and what are the insider threats. In
fact, the insider threat problem is a significant issue, and there is no single definition of
the insider and insider threat can encompass the whole problem; though most researchers
attempt to provide one. Therefore, we propose an approach to classify the insider threat
problem into di↵erent categories that can be defined, studied, and solved independently
and which later can be combined to solve the problem as a whole. Based on this approach
we define a particular category of the insider threat problem that we study and solve
throughout this thesis; namely, preventing confidentiality and integrity attacks on files by
recipients during the activity of file sharing. However, confidentiality and integrity attacks
can be performed in di↵erent ways which require di↵erent types of protections. Therefore,
we investigate the di↵erent types of misuse that can be performed by insiders during the
activity of file sharing and we characterise the protection required against them. We focus
on accidental misuse that a↵ects the confidentiality and integrity of files by trusted in-
siders. We define our category of the insider problem precisely so as to prevent accidental
misuse of confidentiality and integrity of the shared files by trusted recipients during the
activity of file sharing.
Although our category of the insider problem and the misuse we need to prevent are
precisely defined, the activity of file sharing is still ambiguous. The activity of file sharing
can be performed in di↵erent ways. Designing a protection mechanism to protect the
shared files without taking into account how the activity of file sharing is performed might
prevent users from sharing their files as desired. There is a large body of work that
investigates the activity of file sharing; however, the majority of it is focused on specific
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domains and applications. Works that investigate the activity of file sharing generally,
miss answers to two fundamental questions that lead to a better understanding of the
activity of file sharing; namely, how files can be propagated from owners to recipients
and how files can be accessed by the recipients. Therefore, we characterise the activity
of file sharing based on how files can be propagated and accessed after their propagation.
Based on this characterisation, we define a framework that classifies the activity of file
sharing into di↵erent categories. Each category specifies how files should be propagated
and accessed after their propagation. We show that these categories can be thought of
as policies that, if enforced, allow the provision of various types of protection against
accidental misuse.
We use a language-based technique to enforce these policies, particularly by the use
of a type system; developed to statically enforce information flow and access control re-
quirements of these policies in a file system. As a starting point, we focus on enforcing a
particular policy; namely, limiting the number of times a file can be read. Other policies
can be enforced similarly, as we discuss in Chapter 6. In the file systems, files are as-
sociated with security types that represent the security policies, and programs are sets
of operations to be performed on files such as read, copy, move, etc. The type system,
therefore, will statically analyse each operation to be performed on a file and determine
whether or not the operation satisfies the information flow and access control requirements
of the policy associated with the file. Therefore, a type checker which implements the type
system will intercept each operation to be performed in the file system and allow only those
operations which satisfy the policies of files the operation is performed on. In such a way,
the type checker can be thought of as a reference monitor that prevents accidental misuse
of the shared files.
1.5 Summary of Contributions
The following list summarises the contributions this research achieves.
• It provides a precise definition of the insider and the insider problem that makes
a clear distinction between insiders and outsiders, and between insider threats and
external threats, and that encompasses all classes of the insider problem.
• It proposes an approach to classify the insider threat problem into di↵erent categories
of sub-problems that can be defined, studied and solved independently, and that
enables insiders and their threats to be clearly identified in each category.
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• It defines a particular class of the insider problem that is related to file sharing and
investigates the di↵erent types of misuse of the shared files that can be performed
by di↵erent types of insider, and characterise the protection required against them.
• It characterises the activity of file sharing based on how files can be propagated and
accessed after their propagation, and defines a framework based on this character-
isation that can classify the activity of file sharing into di↵erent categories that can
describe all possible ways of how file can be shared, and that can be used to specify
policies of files to describe how files should be propagated and accessed after their
propagation.
• It develops a language that allows owners of files to express various policies which
define access and usage restrictions on their shared files, and a type system that
can enforce these policies to prevent accidental misuses of the shared files by trusted
recipients.
1.6 Thesis Organisation
The chapters of this thesis are structured in the following way.
Chapter 2: Background In this chapter, we provide the necessary background and
related work for topics discussed throughout the thesis. It is divided into three parts.
The first part is concerned with file sharing and reviews the history of file sharing and
the related work on the methods and people practices of file sharing. The second part
is concerned with security in general, and reviews the goals of information security, and
related work on communication security, perimeter security and insider security. Our focus
will be on insider security since it is relevant to our work. The third part is concerned
with language-based security, and reviews related work on access control, information flow
control and type systems that enforce information flow control and access control.
Chapter 3: The Insider Threat Problem In this chapter, we address two funda-
mental questions on the development of a protection mechanism against insider threats.
These questions are: ‘what is the insider problem?’ and ‘what is the insider misuse?’. We
propose a new approach for classifying the insider threat problem into di↵erent categories
which can be defined, studied and solved independently and which later can be combined
to solve the problem as a whole. Then, we define the insider and the insider problem pre-
cisely, and focus on one category that is related to file sharing. We investigate the di↵erent
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kinds of misuse that can be performed by insiders during the activity of file sharing, and
characterise the protection required against them. We end the chapter by defining the
class of the insider problem that we tackle throughout the thesis; namely the prevention
of accidental misuse that a↵ects the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive files during
the activity of file sharing.
Chapter 4: Characterising the Activity of File Sharing In this chapter, we char-
acterise the activity of file sharing based on two factors: how files can be propagated from
owners to recipients, and how files can be accessed by the recipients after their propaga-
tion. Based on the characterisation of the activity of file sharing, we define a framework
that classifies the activity of file sharing into di↵erent categories. These categories can be
thought of as policies that describe how files should be propagated and accessed and that
satisfy di↵erent sharing scenarios. We show how the framework can be applied to clas-
sify the activity of file sharing in an organisation and also to classify existing file sharing
methods. We end this chapter by showing how these policies, if enforced, can protect the
shared files against the accidental misuse identified in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5: Secure File System In this chapter, we start designing a language that
allows owners to specify various policies identified in Chapter 4, and a type system to
enforce these policies. As a starting point, this chapter focuses on enforcing a particular
policy; namely, limiting the number of times a file can be read. Other policies can be
similarly enforced, as we discuss in Chapter 6. We start this chapter by showing the
security types that represent the policies to be enforced, and the language syntax and
semantics. Then, we define the security errors which can be syntactical errors or type
errors; develop an algorithm for statically checking syntactical correctness and then present
our type system which will check for both syntactical errors and type errors. We prove
the soundness of our type system and provide a type reconstruction algorithm and prove
its soundness and completeness.
Chapter 6: Future Extension and Discussion In this chapter, we discuss the ex-
tensions required to specify and enforce the other policies identified in Chapter 4. Firstly,
we extend our security types in Chapter 5 with additional security types that represent
policies for the di↵erent access types, and extend our type system accordingly to per-
form additional checks to enforce these policies. We then show how the label structure of
the Decentralised Label Model can be adopted, with a slight modification, to incorporate
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our security types to specify the various policies and how they can be enforced by our
type system. We end this chapter by comparing our approach with others existing in the
literature. Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Background and related work
This chapter discusses related work and provides an overview of file sharing, communic-
ation security, perimeter security, insider threats, access control and information flow
control.
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we review topics and related work discussed throughout this thesis. We
consider three research areas which are related to our work: (a) research that discusses
the activity of file sharing; (b) research that discusses insider threats and (c) research that
discusses access control and information flow control, in particular type-based approaches
for information flow control.
Our aim in this thesis is to protect the shared files against users who are authorised
to access them. Such authorised users are referred to as insiders in the literature. We
investigate research that focuses on the activity of file sharing to analyse how the sharing
activity is performed by di↵erent individuals. Such analysis is useful to consider when
designing a protection mechanism that will not interfere with people’s practices of file
sharing. We show that, despite the valuable answers the previous work provided to funda-
mental questions such as with whom the file is shared, what type of file is shared and how
the file is shared and protected, they do not provide an answer to a significant question,
which is how files can be propagated and accessed after propagation. Answering this ques-
tion leads to better understanding of the activity of file sharing, and thus, to designing a
protection mechanism that will not prevent users from sharing their files as they desire.
Chapter 4 characterises the activity of file sharing based on the answer to this question.
We investigate research that focuses on insider threats in order to analyse the threats
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imposed by insiders during the activity of file sharing; as it is such threats that we are
aiming to prevent in this thesis. The literature on security is divided into three fields:
communication security, perimeter security, and insider security. We define each field;
present the protection mechanisms developed for it and show that the literature on insider
security is lacking a clear definition of what an insider is and what the insider threats are.
Consequently, we propose a classification of the insider problem in Chapter 3. Based on
the proposed classification, we define the insider and the insider problem, and focus on
one category that is related to file sharing.
Protection mechanisms to counter insider threats can generally be divided into detec-
tion and prevention approaches. Our interest is in prevention approaches which can be in
the form of access control or information flow control. We review the literature on these
approaches and focus on a type-based approach for information flow control which is the
approach that we adopt to tackle our particular class of insider problem in Chapter 5.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 2.2 we give an overview
of file sharing. We provide a definition of the activity of file sharing, show the history of
evolving file sharing methods and review previous work that investigate people’s practices
of file sharing. In Section 2.3 we give an overview of information security. We show the
security goals, services, and mechanisms of information security and discuss the security
tools developed to secure information in communication, perimeter, and insider security.
In Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 we give an overview of access control and information flow
control respectively, and focus on a type-based approach for information flow control.
Finally the chapter is summarised in Section 2.6.
2.2 File sharing
Most of the existing research on file sharing is focused on specific domains and applications
while little research has studied file sharing more broadly [130]. Despite the fact that file
sharing is a common activity, few studies of file sharing practices exist in the literature
[124]. The majority of research is focused on peer-to-peer file sharing [18, 38] and role-
based access control of shared resources [124], while others are focused on personal file
sharing, particularly, in the domains of music [123] or photography [3, 71], or professional
collaborations in corporations [26].
However, the term file sharing has been rarely defined in the literature, and where
defined, the definition is tailored to a specific method of sharing; in other words, the
activity of file sharing is often defined implicitly by defining the method of sharing under
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consideration. For examples, in [3, 71] the activity of file sharing is defined implicitly
by defining Flicker, a popular photo-sharing website, in [123] by defining iTunes, a digital
jukebox software for organising, sharing and listening to music, in [18] by defining Napster,
a popular peer-to-peer application for sharing music and in [38] by defining Kazaa, a
popular peer-to-peer application for sharing di↵erent types of files. However, in these
papers and many others, a comprehensive definition of the activity of file sharing that is
not related to a particular method of sharing does not exist.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines file sharing as “the practice of making computer
files available to other users of a network, in particular the illicit sharing of music and video
via the Internet”. Although this definition describes the activity of file sharing clearly, it
is not completely comprehensive, as it confines the activity of sharing files to those carried
out by sharing methods that allow the sharing of files via the Internet and excludes other
physical methods of sharing files such as USB.
We are only aware of one study that defined file sharing comprehensively without
reference to any specific sharing method. The study is by Whalen et al. [130] who defined
file sharing as “the activity of making specified file(s) available to an individual or group,
with the option of granting specific right (e.g., ability to view, edit, delete) over those
files”. The authors identified four key elements in this definition which are the parties
who are sharing files (individuals and groups); the files themselves; the means of making
files available; and the rights over those files.
Although this definition is more general than the previous one, it has the following
drawbacks. Firstly, it confines the type of recipient in the file sharing activity to be either
an individual or group, whereas it could be several groups or an unbounded group (i.e.
all Internet users). Secondly, this definition makes no distinction between the physical
and digital activities of file sharing. However, such a distinction is of great importance
as each of these activities constitutes a unique field that has its own methods of sharing
and security tools and techniques. Thirdly, this definition makes no distinction between
sharing a file by lending a device which contains the file to others and sharing a file by
lending the file itself, which is then accessed by others using their devices. The former is
considered device sharing rather than file sharing as the device could contain software and
hardware to be shared with the file. The latter is considered file sharing as only the file
itself is shared.
The general definition of file sharing that we seek, should satisfy the following three
properties: Firstly, a clear distinction between physical and digital sharing should be made
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in the definition. Secondly, the definition should not be restricted to a particular method of
sharing files. Thirdly, the definition should not restrict the type of recipient. Fourthly, the
definition should exclude those sharing activities performed by sharing the device which
contains the files with others. Therefore, we refined the definition by Whalen et al. [130]
to satisfy these four properties and define file sharing as follows:
Definition 2.2.1. File sharing is the activity of making specified digitally stored file(s),
(e.g. text, photo, video, audio or software) in a particular device available to others (e.g.
an individual, group, groups, or the public) to be accessed by their devices with the option
of granting specific rights (e.g. viewing, editing, deleting) over those files.
This definition excludes sharing files by lending a device which contains the files to
be shared with others as well as the sharing of physical files. However, it includes all the
methods of sharing digital files, as well as the di↵erent types of files and recipients. The
person who makes the files available to others will be referred to as the sender who is in
most cases the owner of the files; while the others, who the files are made available for,
will be referred to as the recipients. The methods that allow the sender to make the files
available to the recipients will be referred to as the file sharing methods which can be of
various types.
In the next section, we look at the history of file sharing and how the activity of file
sharing has been increased over the years by the rapid evolution of file sharing methods.
2.2.1 The history of file sharing
Sharing files is an activity that has been around almost since the infancy of computers.
The prevalence of file sharing activity nowadays is attributed to the existence of a variety
of methods that simplified this activity. These methods have gone through several stages
until they reached maturity at the present time to become fundamental to any Internet
user.
Initially, no actual storage media existed; and the only way to transfer information
from one computer to another was to type it in manually. Afterwards, the first magnetic
storage media which could contain data emerged; however, moving around this magnetic
storage was very di cult [24]. The first time file sharing became an easy task to perform
was in 1971 when the 8-inch floppy disk was developed by IBM [53, 111, 79, 134]. Although
this method of sharing allowed files to be shared easily, the spreading of files went slowly, as
the files had to be moved physically from one place to another. In 1978 Ward Christensen
created a new method of file sharing which was the first online bulletin board system
18
(BBS) which allowed users to share files online by utilising their phone lines [134, 135].
A year later in 1979, Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and Duke University created another file sharing method which was Usenet.
The main goal of creating Usenet was to facilitate focused discussion threads within topical
categories (Usenet newsgroups); however, the transfer of files was a feature of Usenet that
users took advantage of [134, 135, 62]. Usenet is considered to be the first network in
which users could share files with many other, unknown users [24].
Six years later in 1985, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), which allows files to be e ciently
uploaded and downloaded from a central server, was standardised. FTP is still used today
as one of the most popular methods of file sharing among individuals and corporations
[111, 134, 135]. This was followed by the creation of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) in 1988
by Jarkko Oikarinen which allows users to chat in real-time as well as exchanging files via
a Direct Client-to-Client protocol.
A milestone in file sharing occurred in 1990 when the World Wide Web was formally
proposed by Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau [134]. During the nineties the World
Wide Web grew to become the largest file sharing network ever created [111]. In 1995,
Mosaic which is a graphical internet browser was created and brought more users to
the Internet through exciting visuals. Consequently, more information was published,
accessed and shared. In 1996, the Multi-Purpose Interment Mail Extensions (MIME) was
standardised which allows users to exchange files with each other via email [137]. In 1999,
Napster was created by Shawn Fanning and quickly became one of the most popular file
sharing methods in the history of computing. Napster is an unstructured centralised peer-
to-peer system and is generally cited as the first peer-to-peer file sharing system. However,
in 2001 Napster was shut down due to copyright infringement [24, 111, 79, 134, 135].
From 2000 up to the present time, a wide variety of peer-to-peer file sharing systems
emerged such as Guntella, eDonkey 2000, Kazaa, BitTorrent as well as web-based file
sharing services such as Dropbox, GoogleDocs, youSENDit, Streamfile, Wikisend, 4shared
and social networking sites such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Flickr.
In the next section, we look at the previous studies that investigated people’s practices
of file sharing in order to find answers to several fundamental questions; such as what file
sharing methods people utilise, who people share files with, what type of files people share
and how people protect their shared files.
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2.2.2 Methods of file sharing and people’s practices
There are a wide variety of file sharing methods that exist today, each of which has
particular features which make them suitable for specific purposes. In other words, based
on the features of the methods, a user selects the appropriate one for his sharing situation.
These methods range from peer-to-peer sharing applications like Napster, Guntella, and
cKaZaA to email, the web, various shared folder systems, application-oriented tools like
iTunes and Groove, and web-based sharing tools like BSCW, Wikis and Flicker. Although,
many methods exist for sharing files, they all perform the same basic process that requires
the users to specify the following information: what should be shared, with whom it should
be shared, and how that sharing will take place. However, they di↵er from one another in
the ways of allowing the users to control the what, how, and with whom to share [124].
Olson et al. [82, 81] conducted a pilot study and a more formal survey to explore prefer-
ences for general information sharing by investigating what information people are willing
to share and with whom. Their findings indicated that people’s willingness to share di↵ers
from one another, and it depends on who they are sharing the information with; therefore,
a one-size-fits-all permission structure for sharing is inappropriate. The authors found
that people deal with particular types of information similarly when assessing whether
or not to share it with others (examples of categories include, work email and telephone
number, pregnancy, health information, email content and credit card number). Also,
they found that people deal with particular types of individuals similarly when assessing
whether or not to share information with them (examples of categories include, spouse,
manager, trusted co-worker, the public and competitors).
The authors believe that their findings can provide guidance on the design of access
control and interfaces, that could simplify the policy specification process to the end user.
For example, users could be allowed by a preference-specification tool to specify their
permissions generally per category of person (e.g., the public, high level people in your
organization, co-workers, your family, your manager, your spouse, etc.), while making
an exception for one particular person or a particular information type. Furthermore,
augmenting such preference-specification tool with some content analysis to detect people’s
email addresses, social security numbers, or personal facts in the documents, will allow
the appropriate permission to be set automatically. For example, people requesting access
to a file will be identified by the tool and then based on who they are or which category
they belong to they might be denied or granted access.
Voida et al. [124] conducted a survey and follow-up interviews at a medium-sized
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research organisation to explore users’ current practices and needs around file sharing. The
authors stated that the understanding the what, with whom and how of sharing will lead
us to understand users’ current file sharing practices. The results of their study indicated
that almost a third of the respondents shared files with groups or classes of individuals,
and in many cases these classes mapped directly onto the categories identified by Olson
et al. [82, 81]. Also, their survey respondents reported sharing files at work regularly
with an average of 7 individuals or groups. With respect to the types of files shared,
their respondents reported they shared 34 di↵erent types of file or electronic information,
which ranged from business documents and paper drafts to music, ideas, schedules, and
TV shows. In terms of how the sharing took place, they found that email was the most
common method used for sharing files by their respondents (43% of all responses), followed
by shared network folder (16%), followed by posting content to a website (11%).
Additionally, the authors point out that all of their survey respondents expect to
apply read or full control privileges to their shared files, except for cases where the sharing
method o↵ers a set of particular privileges (e.g., iTunes allows sharing recipients to use but
not duplicate shared music). Also, their findings indicated that there are three main classes
of di culties and breakdowns that people encounter in sharing, which are: forgetting
what file had been shared with who; di culties in selecting a sharing method with desired
features that was also available to all sharing participants; and problems in knowing when
new content was made available. Their respondents usually fell back on using the most
universal method, which is email, in order to share their files when they were uncertain
about the tools available to their intended recipients.
Based on their findings, they identified a number of critical characteristics of file sharing
methods including universality, addressing, visibility, notification, and the di↵erentiation
between push-and-pull-oriented sharing. Push-oriented sharing is described as actively
pushing the file from the sender to the recipient (e.g. email), while pull-oriented sharing
is described by simply making the file available for it to be retrieved or pulled at the
recipient’s convenience (e.g. a shared folder). The authors also developed a prototype
of a set of user interface features called a sharing palette which provides a platform for
exploration and experimentation with new modalities of sharing. The sharing palette
provides a simple and fast way for users to specify the visibility of and permissions for files
without the need to maintain access control lists. Also, it provides a various notifications
features, which are designed to promote users’ awareness of the files they have shared with
others.
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Whalen et al. [129] conducted an online survey and follow up interviews at a medium-
sized industrial research laboratory to address the issue of users’ experience of file sharing
and access control by gathering information on how and why people share files; the type of
information shared; and how, when and why people limit access to those files. The results
of the survey showed that email attachments were the most commonly used method for
sharing files (98% of all responses), followed by network files sharing (55%), followed
by commercial content management system (25%) and removable media (25%). Also
their results indicated that 37% of respondents protect their shared files from friends and
colleagues, and the methods used for restricting access to their sensitive files are: pass-
words; permissions/access control lists; physical controls (e.g.,safeguard in o ce or on
person); encryption; obscurity (e. g, giving files innocuous names and hidden directories);
and deleting/relocating sensitive files. Based on the results of the study, the authors
suggest guidelines to improve methods for appropriate content protection (Table 2.1).
Whalen et al. [130] conducted a web-based survey at a medium-size university to invest-
igate the fundamental issues regarding how files are shared and the di culties encountered
when managing files in collaborative environments. They explored the problem by sur-
veying a group of people regarding the extent of their file sharing, their use of di↵erent
sharing methods, and the problems they encountered with file sharing in their personal
and professional lives. From the results of their survey, they found that file sharing is a
common activity, with over 70% of respondents sharing professional and personal files at
least once per week. The file sharing methods used by their respondents were email at-
tachments, physical devices (e.g., USB token, CD), networks file share, instant messenger
(e.g., MSN, Yahoo), Web server (e.g., webpage, wiki), peer-to-peer (e.g., KaZaa) and file
copy protocols (e.g., scp,ftp). The most commonly used file sharing method was email
(42.7%) followed by network file share (14.7%) followed by peer-to-peer and file copy pro-
tocols (10.3%). This corresponds with the findings of Voida et al. [124] and those of their
previous study [129].
Their results also show that there are a number of positive and negative factors that
have an impact on people’s choice of file sharing methods. The positive factors are: the
convenience and the ease of use of the method, the widespread availability of the method in
order to reach all recipients and the suitability of the method for the organisation or task
at hand. The negative factors are: the limit on file space or file size, lack of access control
or security features and the inability to reach all recipients. Furthermore, the results show
that the majority of respondents share files between two and four groups, and 80% of
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respondents have sensitive files. These sensitive files were shared as the results indicated
that 44% of respondents shared sensitive professional files and 11% of respondents shared
sensitive personal files such as financial or medical information. The authors found that
people utilise various methods to control access to their sensitive files, some are technical
(passwords, permissions) and others are socially controlled, such as hiding files.
Unlike the study of Voida et al. [124] and Whalen et al. [130, 129] which focused on
subjects within a single organisation, all of whom had access to similar, established file
sharing methods. Dalal et al. [26] conducted in-depth interviews with respondents across
various domains in their homes, home o ces, or in cafes where people worked to examine
how file sharing and access controls are used, not used or circumvented in order to get
work done. The results of their study show that 80% of respondents shared files with
overseas collaborators or clients in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region and 100% shared
files with colleagues across the US. Their results also showed di↵erences between personal
and professional sharing, as they found that in professional sharing, people concentrate
on sharing files that are related to project work, such as shared documents including
technical specifications, meeting minutes and action items, proposals and reports. On
the other hand, they found that in personal sharing, people concentrate on sharing their
experiences with others, and the content being shared (primarily multimedia) is relational
in nature, such as sharing photographs with family members who live overseas. Email was
used by all respondents in their survey, and 80% of them used various social software such
as wiki, blogs, social networking sites (including MySpace and Facebook), public websites
for sharing images and multimedia files (including Flickr and YouTube), and online forums
and games.
Moreover, their respondents made distinctions between two types of sharing, namely
sharing with oneself and sharing with others. Sharing files with oneself is very useful as it
allows the individual to synchronise activities regardless of location, accessibility, or what
devices are at hand. They found that USB drives and email are considered convenient
and are the preferred methods for sharing with oneself. Based on their analysis of their
results, they derived a set of design criteria for a more e↵ective file sharing system (Table
2.1) [26].
In contrast to previous studies which have focused on asking users themselves to report
on how they share and protect files, Smetters and Good [110] conducted an automated
survey of access control in a medium-sized corporation to collect behavioural data over
time by analysing digital records of actual user behaviour as they believe that users’ self-
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descriptions of their own behaviour can be incomplete or inaccurate. They used automated
data mining to examine how users in a medium-sized corporation utilised two common ac-
cess control features: the definition of access control groups, and the permissions settings,
or ACLs, that users set on folders and documents. They found that access control policies
which are applied by users to their content are quite complex. Based on the results of
their study, they derived a number of suggestions for the design of both access control
systems themselves, and the interfaces used to manage them (Table 2.1) [110].
Mazurek et al. [65] conducted semi-structured interviews with 33 non-technical com-
puter users in 15 households to examine the current practices, needs and attitudes to
access control of home users when they share files inside and outside their homes. They
found that people utilise a wide range of measures to restrict access to their files, some of
them are standard access-control tools while others are ad-hoc tools. These tools are the
same as those reported in [129] which are user accounts, passwords, encryption, limiting
physical access to devices, and hiding and deleting sensitive files. Also, They found that
people have complex policies that change continuously over time, and which are inad-
equately addressed in current file sharing and access control methods; a finding supported
by Olson et al. [82, 81], Whalen et al. [129, 130], and Voida et al. [124]. Based on the
results of their study, the authors have generated several guidelines for developers of access
control systems aimed at home users (Table 2.1).
Hart et al. [45] surveyed 23 blogging and social networking sites such as Blogger,
Facebook, Flickr ,YouTube, and MySpace to determine what access control and privacy
features are currently available. They found that a lot of content-sharing sites provide
primitive access control mechanisms which make a file entirely private or public while oth-
ers allow more flexible control by o↵ering a private/friends/public access control model.
The authors asserted that these models failed to support people’s needs, and thus, pro-
posed a method of access control for content-sharing sites that specify access control polices
in terms of the content being mediated. For example, “Blog posts about my home-town
are visible to my high school friends”. Therefore, based on the posts’ contents, the system
should automatically specify the policy rules for that post. The authors advocate policy
rules that can be applied automatically.
Whalen et al. [131] pointed out that a potential solution for file sharing problems,
such as exposing sensitive files accidentally, is to provide the user with clear information
about file sharing settings and activities. Therefore, they explored existing research on
awareness in collaborative environments, and used it to develop a framework for file sharing
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awareness. The authors used this awareness framework to develop a prototype for a file
manager that facilitates file sharing by making sharing activity and settings more visible
to the user. The file manager displays file sharing activities such as sends and accesses
as icons with files details and permissions. Also, it includes a sharing console that allows
users to view more detailed sharing information about a specific file, to search for files
matching certain criteria, and to set and view alerts on shared files.
Table 2.1 summarises the recommendations of the previous studies for the design of
access control systems. These recommendations generally fall into three categories, which
are visibility, usability, and suitability recommendations as shown in Table 2.2.
Authors Guidelines and Recommendations for Access Control System Design
Whalen et al.
[129]
1. Fit access control management into the user’s task. 2. Make access control decisions visible.
3. Make the controls themselves simple to manage. 4. Support, rather than replace, social
controls. 5. Design for sharing across organisational and file system boundaries. 6. Allow
users to choose from a palette of sharing and security tools.
Dalal et al. [26] 1. No impedance matching: (a) The system should work for all types and sizes of data.
(b) Responders in particular should be required to have no more than minimal, readily avail-
able tools (e.g. email and a web browser). 2. Support ad-hoc sharing: (a) Use universal
identifiers, such as email addresses; people should be able to share with anyone, inside or
outside of their organisation, with equal facility. (b) Minimise setup e↵ort as users will not
know upfront whether they will share with a particular group or use a specific mechanism
enough times to make the e↵ort worthwhile. (c) Require no a priori preparation by respon-
der. 3. No oversharing: (a) Content shared only with intended recipients. (b) Transient
access management. 4. Simple and self-contained: (a) Interactions should be lightweight and
familiar. (b) One-step sharing (i.e. additional coordination, such as follow-up emails should
not be necessary).
Smetters and
Good [110]
- Simplify access control models: 1. Only allow positive grants of access. 2. Simplify the
inheritance model for access control changes 3. Limit the types of permissions that can be
granted. 4. Group Definitions. -Improve Tools For Managing Access: 1. Tools for group
management that reduce redundancy and error in group definitions, and track the intended
relationship between groups 2. Tools for ACL management that maximise the use of groups,
and help generate concise ACL statements granting only necessary rights. 3. Tools for admin-
istrators to manage access policy, directly focused on “cleaning up” outdated users, groups
and permissions. 4. Activity-based folksonomies of groups and users to help users choose the
right principals with whom to share among potentially similar groups, and make old groups
“fade away” naturally. 5. Visualisations to enable users to see who has access to the content
they are sharing, and what content is impacted by a change in policy.
Mazurek et al.
[65]
1. Allow fine-grained control. 2. Plan for lending devices. 3. Include reactive policy cre-
ation. 4. Include logs. 5. Reduce or eliminate up-front complexity. 6. Acknowledge social
conventions. 7. Support iterative policy specification. 8. Account for users’ mental models.
Table 2.1: Recommendations for the design of access control systems
Visibility recommendations such as making access control decisions visible to users, is
a very useful concept design for access control systems. It promotes users’ awareness of the
sharing activities, and thus reducing the possibility of accidental exposure of sensitive files
as indicated by Whalen et al. [131]. One of the main classes of di culties people encounter
in sharing, pointed out by Voida et al. [124], is forgetting what file had been shared with
who. Therefore, by making the activity of file sharing visible, mistakes made during
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the activity of file sharing can be identified easily and rectified immediately (e.g. revoke
permissions granted to unauthorised users accidentally). Usability recommendations such
as minimise setup e↵ort and reduce or eliminate up-front complexity is another concept
design for access control systems, which contribute to the availability of the method. This
is because one of the positive factors which have an impact on people’s choice of file
sharing methods is the convenience and ease of use [130]. Therefore, complicated methods
will be less preferred to be used by users, and thus its availability will be reduced among
participants. Suitability recommendations such as design for sharing across organisational
and file system boundaries, and content shared only with intended recipients is the third
concept design for access control systems, which also contribute to the availability of the
method. A method is suitable if the method provides people with all the desired features
they need to accomplish their tasks. These features can be divided into features that
facilitate information sharing such as allowing files to be shared across organisational
boundaries, and features that secure information sharing such as disallowing files to be
shared with unintended recipients. Both kinds of features must be considered by the
sharing method to be suitable. For example, lack of the former features lead to a file
sharing method that is secure but does not allow files to be shared as people prefer, while
lack of the latter features lead to a file sharing method that allows files to be shared as
people prefer but is not secure. Therefore, considering one kind of features and ignoring
the other will result in a file sharing method that is not suitable.
Although the three categories of recommendations mentioned above are equally im-
portant and must be considered when designing access control systems, in this thesis we
are only concerned with the suitability of the method for the task of sharing. This is
because our aim is to protect the shared files, and thus we must ensure such mechanism
is suitable for di↵erent tasks of sharing and does not interfere with people’s practices of
the activity of file sharing. However, the suitability recommendations shown in Table 2.2
are quite general. For example, fitting access control management into the user’s task and
content should be shared only with intended recipients require the task and recipients to
be known in advance. To design a suitable protection mechanism, we need to investigate
people’s practices of the activity of file sharing. Such investigation is a very useful step
towards characterising the activity of file sharing into di↵erent categories. These categor-
ies can be thought of as policies that must be enforced. In this way, the enforcement
mechanism will not only protect the shared files, but also allow users to share their files
as desired.
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Recommendations
Visibility 1. Make access control decisions visible. 2. Visualisations to enable users to see who has
access to the content they are sharing, and what content is impacted by a change in policy.
3. Include logs.
Usability 1. Make the controls themselves simple to manage. 2. Use universal identifiers, such as email
addresses; people should be able to share with anyone, inside or outside of their organisation,
with equal facility. 3. Responders in particular should be required to have no more than
minimal, readily available tools (e.g. email and a web browser). 4. Minimise setup e↵ort as
users will not know upfront whether they will share with a particular group or use a specific
mechanism enough times to make the e↵ort worthwhile. 5. Require no a priori prepara-
tion by responder. 6. Interactions should be lightweight and familiar. 7. One-step sharing
(i.e. additional coordination, such as follow-up emails should not be necessary). 8. Only
allow positive grants of access. 9. Simplify the inheritance model for access control changes
10. Limit the types of permissions that can be granted. 11. Group Definitions. 12. Tools for
group management that reduce redundancy and error in group definitions, and track the in-
tended relationship between groups 13. Tools for ACL management that maximise the use of
groups, and help generate concise ACL statements granting only necessary rights. 14. Tools
for administrators to manage access policy, directly focused on “cleaning up” outdated users,
groups and permissions. 15. Activity-based folksonomies of groups and users to help users
choose the right principals with whom to share among potentially similar groups, and make
old groups “fade away” naturally. 16. Reduce or eliminate up-front complexity.
Suitability 1. Fit access control management into the user’s task. 2. Design for sharing across organ-
isational and file system boundaries. 3. Allow users to choose from a palette of sharing and
security tools. 4. The system should work for all types and sizes of data. 5. Content shared
only with intended recipients. 6. Support, rather than replace, social controls. 7. Transient
access management. 8. Allow fine-grained control. 9. Plan for lending devices. 10. Account
for users’ mental models. 11. Support iterative policy specification. 12. Include reactive
policy creation. 13. Acknowledge social conventions.
Table 2.2: Categories of recommendations
Previous studies reviewed in this section provided valuable answers to fundamental
questions that could lead to unsderstand the activity of file sharing, such as: with whom
is the file shared, what type of file is shared, and how the file is shared and protected
(Table 2.3). They found comprehensive results in terms of knowing with whom people
share their files, what type of files they share, and how they protect their shared files.
However, we believe that the question of how the file is shared has not been answered or
has not been answered properly. They merely answered the question of how people share
their files by enumerating the methods of sharing files that people utilised. Such an answer
applies only to the question of what methods people utilise to share their files rather than
how the files are shared.
Therefore, in Chapter 4, we investigate the question of how people share their files by
characterising the activity of file sharing based on two factors: how files are propagated,
and how files are accessed after their propagation. Our characterisation of the activity of
file sharing results in di↵erent categories of sharing activity that can describe all possible
ways of how users share files with each other.
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With whom the file is
shared
What type of file is
shared
How the file is shared How the file is protec-
ted
Olson
et al.
[82]
-The public, co-
workers, managers and
trusted co-workers,
family and spouse.
-Email content, credit
card number, trans-
gression, work related
documents, work email
and desk phone num-
ber.
- -
Voida
et al.
[124]
-Similar to Olson et.
Al.-With an average of
7 individuals or group
-34 di↵erent types of
files e.g. business doc-
uments, paper drafts,
music, ideas, schedules,
and TV show
-Email (43%), shared
network folders (16%)
and posting content to
a web site (11%)
-
Whalen
et al.
[130]
-Over 69% shared with
two to four groups such
as friends, family, re-
search group, general
public and colleagues.
-25% shared with five
to twenty groups.
-Only focused on
sensitive files, such
as email, personal
financial or medical in-
formation, professional
data or documents
of an organisation,
professional data or
documents governed
by law.
-Email (42%), shared
network folders
(14.7%), peer-to-
peer program (10.3%)
and file copy protocol
(10.3%)
Various methods to
control access to their
sensitive files, some
are technical (pass-
words, permissions)
and others are socially-
controlled such as
hiding files.
Whalen
et al.
[129]
- - -Email (98%), shared
network folder (55%),
commercial content
management systems
(25%) and portable
devices (25%)
Passwords; permis-
sions/ access control
lists; physical controls
(e.g., safeguard in
o ce or on person);
encryption; obscur-
ity (e.g., given files
innocuous names, hid-
den directories); and
deleting/relocating
sensitive files.
Dalal
et al.
[26]
-With employees in
professional sharing
-With friends and
family in personal
sharing.
-In professional shar-
ing: revolve around
project work such
as technical spe-
cifications, meeting
minutes, and action
items, proposals,
reports.-In personal
sharing: revolve
around multimedia
relational in nature
such photograph and
video.
Email (100%), - 80%
used a wide variety of
social software, such
as wikis, blogs, social
networking sites (in-
cluding MySpace and
Facebook) hosted ser-
vices (such as Yahoo!
Briefcase) public web-
sites for sharing image
and multimedia files
(including Flickr and
YouTube) and online
forums and games.
-
Mazurek
et al.
[65]
-Family, friends, co-
workers and strangers.
-Music, photo, video,
private documents,
school work, work files,
and other personal
documents.
- -User accounts, pass-
word, encryption, lim-
iting physical access to
devices, and hide and
delete sensitive files.
Table 2.3: Summary of previous studies on file sharing
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2.3 Security
Due to the widespread sharing of digital information and the rise in threats associated
with it, the security of digital information has become one of the biggest concerns for
governments, corporations and ordinary individuals; each of which is searching for tools to
protect their sensitive information. As a result, the field of information security has become
one of the hottest topics in the recent past. However, information security is much more
than just protecting digital information sharing, it means “protecting information and
information systems from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability” [101]. Therefore,
information security is not only concerned with protecting the information itself, but
also with protecting each component of the information system. The components of an
information system are the entire set of software, hardware, data, people, procedures, and
networks [132]. Di↵erent components may require di↵erent types of protection which can
be divided into technical protection, physical protection, and awareness-based protection.
For instance, software, data, and networks are protected by technical protection such
as encryption and firewall. Hardware is protected by physical protection such as locks
and keys that restrict access to the area where the hardware components are located.
People and procedures are protected by awareness-based protection such as educating and
training individuals to prevent them from accidental abuse of information; alternatively,
they could be protected by technical protection to prevent individuals from intentionally
misusing information.
Hence, in order to protect digital information, each component of the information sys-
tem must also be protected as well by a combination of physical, technical and awareness-
based protections. However, in this thesis we are only concerned with technical protections.
In the next section, we look at the goals of information security and the security services.
2.3.1 The goals of information security
As mentioned above, the goals and the concept that underlie information security are to
achieve confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Confidentiality means pre-
venting unauthorised disclosure of information. Integrity means preventing unauthorised
modification of information. Availability means preventing unauthorised withholding of
information so that information should be accessible and usable upon appropriate demand
by an authorised user. It can be seen that each goal is met by allowing only authorised
people to perform the action while disallowing the actions of unauthorised people. For in-
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stance, confidentiality is met if only authorised people can view or access the information;
integrity is met if only authorised people can modify the information; and availability is
met if only authorised people can withhold the information. Hence, in order to achieve
these goals, there must be a method to di↵erentiate authorised from unauthorised people.
To solve this issue, three steps must be performed as follows: Firstly, each person must
have a unique identity to identify him/herself to the system; this step is known as iden-
tification. Secondly, each person must prove that he/she is really who they claim to be
to the system; this step is known as authentication. Finally, the system must define what
the authenticated person can or cannot do with the information; this step is known as
authorisation. These three steps constitute what is called access control which in turn
provides the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information. Access control
is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.
The three main goals of information security which are confidentiality, integrity, and
availability along with authentication, authorisation (or access control), and non-repudiation
(which means preventing a person from denying later that he/she participated in a trans-
action) are security services that are defined by ITU-T Recommendation X.800 [19]. X.800
defines a security service as “a service provided by a protocol layer of communicating open
systems, which ensures adequate security of the systems or of data transfers”. A clearer
definition is found in RFC 2828, which defines a security service as “processing or commu-
nication service that is provided by a system to give a specific kind of protection to system
resources; security services implement security policies, and are implemented by security
mechanisms” [106]. Security mechanisms are techniques designed to detect, prevent, or
recover from a security attack. The aforementioned security services are implemented
through various security mechanisms as there is no a single security mechanism that can
provide all the security services.
There are a wide variety of security mechanisms, that each of which provides di↵erent
security services, and many of which are based on cryptographic techniques. For instance,
encryption is used to achieve information confidentiality, whereas hash algorithms are used
to achieve information integrity. A digital signature, based on public key cryptography, is
used to achieve non-repudiation by identifying the source of the information. Authentic-
ation can be achieved through public key cryptography, where the public key of the key
pair can be signed by a trusted third party, often called the Certificate Authority (CA),
and becomes an electronic authenticated identity for a specific person or organisation. Al-
though authenticating identities over networks, which can be seen as machine-to-machine
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authentication, is necessary; human-to-machine authentication is of great importance as
well. This type of authentication can be achieved by various mechanisms which range
from something the user knows (such as password), and something the user has (such as
token devices and smart cards) to something the user is (such as biometrics).
Despite the fact that each security mechanism provides one or a few security ser-
vices, real world scenarios often require combination of multiple security services working
together to meet specific security goals. Consequently, available security tools seek to
combine several security mechanisms to provide multiple security services that satisfy
particular requirements. One example of this is access control. The term access control
is often used as a synonym for authorisation. However, in this thesis, we define access
control broadly as a tool that requires multiple security services which are implemented
by several security mechanisms to satisfy a particular goal which is controlling access to
and interaction with system resources. The security services required by access control
are confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorisation, and occasionally
non-repudiation. As a result, many mechanisms are used in access control to achieve these
security services. Other examples of such security tools are cryptographic protocols, in-
trusion detection systems, and firewalls. It must be taken into account that these tools
can be divided into either intrusion prevention or intrusion detection tools. The former
are tools that prevent an attack while the latter are tools that detect an attack; and they
complement rather than replace each other. For instance, once an intrusion prevention
tool fails to prevent an attack, an intrusion detection tool comes in to play an important
role in detecting the attack and taking another action.
The wide range of security tools that exist today is the result of extensive e↵orts in the
security literature to counter various attacks. Generally speaking, the literature on security
can be divided into three fields which are (i) communication security, (ii) perimeter
security, and (iii) insider security. Each of these fields has developed security tools to
counter particular types of attack. In the next sections, we review each field and focus
on insider security as it is the most relevant to our work. Figure 2.1 illustrates the three
fields of security and their domains.
2.3.2 Communication security
The literature on communication security is concerned with preventing di↵erent types of
attacks on data transmitted over a network. In other words, the field of communication se-
curity deals with attacks that target the communication link between two entities that are
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Figure 2.1: Security fields
sending and receiving data. The purpose of these attacks is to violate the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data transmitted over networks.
Most of the work in communication security is dedicated to developing tools to pro-
tect the transmission of data over a network [108, 41, 57, 36, 104]. Such tools are known
as cryptographic protocols which utilise di↵erent cryptographic mechanisms to provide
security services which in turn counter the di↵erent security attacks. Cryptographic pro-
tocols (also known as security protocols) are implemented at di↵erent layers of the network
architecture. For instance, PGP [140],S/MIME [93] and Kerberos [10] are cryptographic
protocols at the application layer; SSL/TLS [36] at the transport layer; IPsec [57] at
the network layer; PPTP [41] at the data link layer, to name but a few. The reason
behind implementing cryptographic protocols at di↵erent layers of the network architec-
ture is that cryptographic protocols at one layer o↵er di↵erent degrees of protection from
cryptographic protocols at another layer [127]. As a consequence, there exist many cryp-
tographic protocols implemented at di↵erent layers in order to protect network resources
from di↵erent types of attacks [78, 39].
The cryptographic protocols implemented at the di↵erent layers of the network, play
an important role in protecting the shared files. Due to the speed and ease of use, most
of the file sharing activity is performed through networks; hence, for a file to be shared, it
must be transmitted over the network to the recipients. Therefore, while the shared file is
transmitted, it will be susceptible to attacks if none of the aforementioned cryptographic
protocols is implemented. Furthermore, for files sharing activities that are not performed
through networks, for example through removable devices, the shared files will be sus-
ceptible to loss or theft. Therefore, encryption mechanisms can be of great importance
in such situations, so that only authorised users can decrypt the file rather than any one
who possesses the removable device. To summarise, these protocols are needed to provide
protection to the shared files when they are moved from one location to another.
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2.3.3 Perimeter security
The literature on perimeter security is concerned with protecting the data while it is
being stored. Unlike the field of communication security which is focused on protecting
data transmitted over an untrusted network, the field of perimeter security is focused on
protecting data stored in a trusted internal network. In the literature, perimeter is defined
as “the fortified boundary of the network” [80], and it is understood as a way of protecting
internal networks, which are considered safe, from attacks coming from external networks
such as the Internet which is considered unsafe.
Therefore, most of the work in perimeter security is dedicated to developing tools to
protect the boundary of the internal network where most of the valuable resources reside,
so that attackers cannot get into the internal network and violate the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of the stored data. Such tools are Firewall, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS).
Firewall
A firewall is the most widely used security tool to protect an internal network from
external attacks. It is placed between the internal network and the external network as
a barrier to determine what tra c can get into or out of the internal network. Firewalls
can be seen as an access control for networks that can be used to protect Local Area Net-
works (LANs), Personal Area Networks (PANs), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs),
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) or even a single host. According to [116], even though
there is no standard firewall terminology, there are three main types of firewalls, each of
which examines data up to a specific layer in the OSI reference model. These types are as
follows (i) A packet filter is a firewall that operates at the network layer. (ii) A stateful
packet filter is a firewall that operates at the transport layer. (iii) An application proxy is,
as the name suggests, a firewall that operates at the application layer where it functions
as a proxy. Each type has its own advantages and disadvantages. More details about the
di↵erent types can be found in [113, 127, 116]
IDS
IDS are the second line of defence that protects the internal network from attackers who
have already managed to pass through the firewall. As the firewall works at the boundary
of the internal network, it cannot prevent malicious activities inside the internal network.
Hence, an IDS plays an important role in detecting such attacks that the firewall is not
able to prevent. It is usually used as a complementary tool to the firewall such that if the
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firewall fails to identify or prevent an attack, the IDS will detect the attack and report it
to the network administrators. There are two types of IDS which are Host-based IDS and
Network-based IDS. The former operates on a single host and monitors tra c at that host
by utilising the resources of its host to detect attacks. The latter operates as a stand-alone
devices on a network and monitors tra c on the network to detect attacks [116, 80, 56].
Additionally, IDS utilises two methods for detecting attacks which are Signature-based
IDS and Anomaly-based IDS. The former detects attacks based on known signatures
or patterns which is similar to signature-based virus detection. The latter defines the
normal behaviour of a system and reports attack whenever the system behaves abnormally
[116, 80, 56].
IPS
IPS is similar to IDS except that IPS is not only able to detect attacks and report it to
administrators, but also able to block those attacks when they have been detected without
direct involvement of the administrators. Therefore, such tools combine the functionality
of a firewall and an IDS to o↵er detective and preventive solution that block actions which
have been detected as an attack [80].
Eventually the shared files will be stored in a location (e.g. a recipient device or central
server) to facilitate access to them by the recipients. Such a location will be a target for
attacks from the outside. Therefore, the security tools reviewed in this section, can be
used to protect the shared files in such situations.
2.3.4 Insider security
The literature on insider security is the most relevant to our work. It is concerned with
preventing attacks performed inside the perimeter of the trusted internal network. Al-
though perimeter security prevents network attacks on stored data, other attacks can be
performed without using a network connection by gaining access to a local device to view,
modify, or destroy the stored data. Also, viruses and Trojan horses can be introduced to
a local machine by inserting an a↵ected optical disc into it without the need to propagate
them through the networks. Therefore, protecting stored data is an area where network
security and computer security overlap [113].
In contrast to communication and perimeter security which deal with attacks per-
formed by external attackers, insider security deals with attacks performed internally by
those who are authorised to access the data. The features of being inside the perimeter of
the internal network and an authorised person di↵erentiate insider attacks from external
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attacks and make such attacks di cult to tackle.
According to the 2011 CyberSecurity Watch Survey, conducted by the U.S. Secret
Service, the CERT Insider Threat Center, CSO Magazine, and Deloitte [55], 58% of the
attacks are caused by outsiders (those who are unauthorised to access network systems
or data) while 21% of the attacks are caused by insiders (those who are authorised to
access network systems or data), and 21% are from unknown sources. Even though the
percentage of insider attacks is less than the external attacks, the consequences of insider
attacks can be more severe. The survey indicated that 33% of respondents consider insider
attacks to be more costly and damaging. Consequently, insider attacks are a serious danger
and should be paid similar attention to that paid to external attacks.
Hunker [50] indicated that there exists a large body of work in the literature to address
the insider threats problem; however, a little progress has been made to reduce the insider
threat problem. The author attributed the slow progress in the field to the absence of clear
answers to fundamental questions. One of these questions is “What is an insider threat?”.
The author noted that “if we cannot rigorously define the problem we are seeking to solve,
then how can we approach it? or even know when the problem has been solved” [50].
The terms insider and insider threat have been defined in many di↵erent contexts by
di↵erent authors. Some authors have focused on the trust relationship when defining the
term insider. For instance, the RAND report [6] defined the insider as “an already trusted
person with access to sensitive information and information systems”. Bishop [14] defined
the insider as “a trusted entity that is given the power to violate one or more rules in a
given security policy”. Other authors have focused on the abuse of given access privileges.
For instance, Chinchani et al. [22] defined the insiders as “legitimate users who abuse
their privileges”. The CERT report [68] defined the insider as “individuals who were, or
previously had been, authorised to use the information systems they eventually employed
to perpetrate harm”.
Others defined the insider very broadly. For instance, Predd et al. [88] defined the
insider as “someone with legitimate access to an organisation’s computers and networks”.
The RAND report [6] defined the insider again as “anyone with access, privilege, or know-
ledge of information system and services”. The former definition might include masquer-
aders who stole the credentials of a legitimate user to get access to the computer or the
network. The latter definition eliminates the need for trust and includes those who have
knowledge of the system or the service even if they do not have access privileges.
In 2008, a cross-disciplinary workshop on “Countering Insider Threats” [89] concluded
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that
“an insider is a person that has been legitimately empowered with the right
to access, represent, or decide about one or more assets of the organisation’s
structure”
With regard to insider threat, Predd et al. [88] defined insider threat as “an insider’s
action that puts an organisation or its resources at risk”. The RAND report [6] defined it
as “malevolent (or possibly inadvertent) actions by an already trusted person with access
to sensitive information and information systems”. Hunker and Probst [51] defined it as
follows “an insider threat is [posed by] an individual with privileges who misuses them or
whose access results in misuse”. The CERT Insider Threat Center’s current definition of
insider threats is as follows:
“A malicious insider threat to an organization is a current or former em-
ployee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access
to an organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or
misused that access in a manner that negatively a↵ected the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information sys-
tems”. [20]
The CERT definition of insider threats is focused on intentional misuse and excludes
accidental misuse. It can be clearly seen that there exists a wide variety of definitions
of insider and insider threat. Bishop et al. [15] and Bishop and Gates [16] point out
that each author who discussed the insider problem, has made his/her own definition of
the insider or the insider threat. This matter has complicated the research in insider
threats as one solution to the insider problem might not be applicable to another insider
problem. The authors also point out that di culty in defining the term insider stems from
the fact that the perimeter of the organisation network can be defined as well, such that
anyone inside the perimeter is therefore an insider. However, with the increased usage of
mobile computing, outsourcing and contracting, the concept of a distinct border around
an organisation has become blurred.
Due to the di↵erences and contradictory definitions of insider and insider threats that
complicate the problem to be solved, many authors are urging the community to establish
a framework or taxonomy for distinguishing among di↵erent types of insider threats [89,
51, 90]. They mentioned that each determining factor for an insider can be used for a
taxonomy, for example based on distinctions between:
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• Malicious and accidental threats;
• Doing something intentionally (for malicious or good reasons which nonetheless may
result in damage) versus events that occur accidentally.
• Obvious and stealthy acts.
• Acts by masqueraders (e.g, an individual with a stolen password), traitors (malicious
legitimate users) and naive or accidental use that results in harm.
• A combination of factors such as access types; aim or intentionality or reason for
misuse; level of technical and the system consequences of insiders threats. [89, 51, 90]
Bellovin [11] identified three di↵erent types of insider attack which are misuse of access,
defence bypass, and access control failure.
• Misuse of access: the insider missuses the system’s resources through the privileges
he/she was given. This form of attack is the hardest to detect or prevent by purely
technical means as the insider already has legitimate access. The best solution is
to monitor unusual patterns or quantities of requests, detailed logging can be used
when a person falls under suspicion for other reasons.
• Defence bypass: insiders are generally inside the perimeter which means that they
are already past some layers of defence. This makes the insider able to commit
mischief to the system’s resources easily compared to external attackers who need
to pass several layers of defence. Also, this form of attack is hard to conceive
of in purely technical means. Reliance on technical or non-technical detection of
anomalous behaviour or actual attacks is required.
• Access control failure: the insider should not have access to specified system re-
sources. Unlike misuse of access and defence bypass attacks, access control failure
attack is a technical problem. While prevention is straightforward, detection of
access-control failures is di cult for the same reasons as with access-control misuse
[11].
It can be seen that not all of the attacks can be countered by purely technical means;
thus, other non-technical means are important to solve the insider threat problem. Hunker
and Probst [51] identified three di↵erent approaches to solve the insider threat problem
and which current works in the field scattered among them. These approaches are the
technical approach, the socio-technical approach, and the sociological approach. The
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authors note that technical approaches are focused on policy languages, access control
and monitoring, while socio-technical approaches are focused on policy, monitoring and
profiling, prediction, forensics and response work. Sociological approaches are focused on
motivation, organisational culture, human factors and privacy and legal aspects.
Silowash et al. [107] analysed cases of insider threat from the CERT insider threat
database, which contains more than 700 cases of insider threat, and observed that malicious
insider activities can be classified into four classes as follows.
• IT sabotage: an insider’s use of IT to direct specific harm at an organisation or an
individual. Examples of this are destroying critical data, or planting a logical bomb
to delete data at critical times, etc.
• Theft of Intellectual Property (IP): an insider’s use of IT to steal IP from the organ-
isation. This category includes industrial espionage involving outsiders. Examples
of usually stolen IP assets are proprietary software, business plans, product details,
and customer information.
• Fraud: an insider’s use of IT for the unauthorised modification, addition, or deletion
of an organisation’s data (not programs or systems) for personal gain, or theft of
information that leads to an identity crime (e.g., identity theft or credit card fraud).
• Miscellaneous: cases in which the insider’s activity was not for IP theft, fraud, or
IT sabotage.
Technical approaches for encountering insider threats can be divided into detection or
prevention tools. The former is based on monitoring while the latter is based on access
control. Sinclair and Smith [109] note that most of the work on insider threat space is
focused on detection tools. The reason behind this, is that most of the authors believe that
insider attacks cannot be prevented as those insiders are operating within their privileges,
but rather it is feasible to observe the patterns of information use to detect attacks and
respond to them. For instance, with regard to the two types of insider attacks which are
misused of access and defence bypass; such attacks are di cult to prevent due to the fact
that the insider is not using more than just the privileges he/she has legitimately acquired
to perform the attack. However, it is easier to detect anomalous insider behaviour or to
monitor an already suspected insider.
Nevertheless, detection tools su↵er from several drawbacks similar to those of intru-
sion detection systems, because insider detection tools utilise the same method of detection
(e.g, signature-based and anomaly-based) but with extensions to counter insider threats.
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For instance, signature-based detection tools can only detect attacks if their signatures
are already known, otherwise the attacks go undetected. Anomaly-based detection tools
may lack accurate descriptions of normal behaviours which will be used to define anom-
alous behaviours. Also, if an attack occurred during the phase of monitoring the normal
behaviour, the attack will not be detected later as it will be assumed to be a normal
behaviour. Hunker and Probst [51] indicated that the lack of data about insider attacks,
made it hard to find out whether monitoring is e↵ective in this space or not. They noted
that monitoring is beneficial if an insider attack is already suspected.
Access control as a prevention tool is rarely discussed in the literature to address the
insider threat problem. It is usually mentioned to illustrate its drawbacks and to promote
detection tools in the insider threat space. However, Sinclair and Smith [109] stated that
“better prevention can simplify the problem space that detection must address”. The
authors surveyed existing research and development in access control, focusing on the
applicability of this work in preventing insider attacks in large organisation environments.
Although they found that the theory behind access control and the systems that implement
it seem to be well-developed, the insider threat problem is still there. Consequently,
they raised several challenging questions in terms of access control and the insider threat
problem. Such questions are: “Have the basic principles of access control overlooked
something?”; “Would a practically correct access control system even reduce the incidence
of insider attack?” “Is such an access control system possible?”; “Can all insider threat
be prevented with well-designed access control mechanisms?”.
From our perspective, the problem is not with the prevention tool, but rather with
the ambiguous definitions of the insider problem and threats. For prevention tools to
be used e↵ectively to tackle the insider problem, the problem and the threats must be
defined precisely. However, a single definition for the insider problem and its threats as
attempted by previous work is not suitable. We suggest that the insider problem should
be divided into smaller problems that can be defined, studied and solved independently.
Consequently, in Chapter 3 we propose a classification of the insider threat problem,
and focus on one category that is related to file sharing. We define the threats that are
imposed by insiders in this category; as in this thesis we are concerned to prevent threats
such as these. Since the threats are precisely defined, we follow a prevention approach to
preventing such threats rather than a detection approach.
Generally, a prevention approach falls into two forms which are access control and
information flow control. Our interest in this thesis is with information flow control,
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particularly type-based approach to information flow control. This is because software is
the major cause of many breaches in security, and a promising approach to create a secure
software is to write it in a typesafe programming language. Therefore, we take a type-
based approach to enforce information flow policies which is a language-based technique
to provide security in programs. However, information flow control is a complementary
approach to access control, since the latter restrict the release of information whereas the
former restrict its propagation. Therefore, in the next sections we give a brief overview
of access control by showing its components and the advantages and disadvantages of
well-known access control models. Then, we focus on type-based information flow control
which is the approach that we adopt to tackle our particular class of insider problem in
this thesis.
2.4 Access control
Access control regulates access to resources, and has become one of the central themes
of security. The major function of access control is to manage the access rights of users
when fully sharing the system’s resources, and to ensure that illegal uses and access to
the network resources cannot occur. Access control limits the access of the subject to the
object and controls the subject’s access according to its identity authentication. Qing-hai
and Ying [92] indicate that access control is an important measure in providing protection
for the system’s resources; and it is considered the most important security mechanism in
a computer system; and one of the most important measures to achieving confidentiality
and integrity of data. In the this section, the components of access control are described
first, and then di↵erent models of access control are discussed in detail.
2.4.1 Access control components
Access control is comprised of three important components, which are identification, au-
thentication and authorisation. Each of which complements the others, and which must be
implemented in order. For instance, a subject must first be identified then authenticated
and finally authorised to access an object [43]. It is worth taking into consideration that
authentication and authorisation techniques play an important role in defining the level
of security in an application. Therefore, on the basis of the security level required for each
application type, authentication and authorisation techniques must be selected carefully
in order to reach the desired level of security. In the following subsections, each of the
access control components is discussed in more detail.
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2.4.2 Identification
Identification is the first step in access control. Stewart et al. [117] defined identification
as “The process by which a subject professes an identity and accountability is initiated”.
Hence, the identification process is established when a user provides a user-name, a log-on
ID, a personal identification number (PIN), or smart card. Once a subject has identified
himself, his identity will be accountable for further actions undertaken by him. Identifica-
tion is about providing a public piece of information (user-name, account number), and it
might be known by a subject’s friends or family [43]. Thus, identification does not play an
important role in making the application more or less secure. However, it is only the first
step and the starter point that facilitates, introduces, and is relied on by the two most
important steps which are authentication and authorisation.
2.4.3 Authentication
Authentication is the second step in access control, and it relies on the identification step.
While identification is about providing a public piece of information, authentication is
about providing a private piece of information that is known solely by a certain subject
[43]. Stewart et al. [117] defined authentication as “the process of verifying or testing that
a claimed identity is valid”. They state that in the authentication step, additional inform-
ation is needed from a subject and it must correspond exactly to the identity professed.
A well-known example of authentication is a password.
Harris [43] argues that authentication techniques can be classified intro three types
based on their characteristics as follows: Type 1: subject must prove something he knows
(e.g. password). Type 2: subject must prove something he has (e.g. smart card). Type
3: subject must prove something he is (e.g. fingerprint). He indicates that authentication
techniques having just one of these characteristics are referred to as one-factor authen-
tication. Authentication techniques having two of these characteristics are referred to
as two-factor authentication, whereas authentication techniques having all three of the
characteristics are referred to as three-factor authentication. Therefore, in order to have
a strong authentication process, the authentication should utilise at least two-factors or
more. An example of utilising two-factors is when a subject uses a debit card at a shop;
he must swipe the card (something he has) and enter a PIN (something he knows) to
complete the transaction.
It is worth mentioning that more than one technique can be associated with a one-
factor approach of the same type. For instance, in type 3, where a subject must prove
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something he is, there are several techniques used to achieve the authentication process
such as a fingerprint, finger scan, palm scan, retina scan, iris scan and so on. Also, it should
be borne in mind that these techniques provide various levels of security, which means that
some of them are more reliable, secure and accurate than others. Therefore, the level of
security in an application is not only determined by the number of authentication factors
used, but also by the techniques used in each type of the authentication process.
2.4.4 Authorisation
Authorisation is the third and final step of access control, it is performed after a subject
has been identified and authenticated. Harris [43] defined authorisation as “A process
of assigning authenticated subjects access and the right to carry out specific operations,
depending upon their preconfigured access rights and permissions outlined in an access
criteria”. It must be noted that not every identified and authenticated subject can use all
resources; and after a subject is identified and authenticated, the subject must be checked
to find out what accesses and operations he can perform. In other words, by performing
the authorisation step, we can determine what an identified and authenticated subject can
actually access and what operations can be carried out.
According to Harris [43] and Stewart et al. [117] authorisation is provided by a system
through access control models which manage the type and extent of the subjects’ access
to objects. An access control model is “A framework that dictates access control using
various access control technologies” [91]. Harris [43] indicates that the main objective
of access control models is to enforce the rules and objectives of certain security policies
and to dictate how objects must be accessed by subjects. There are di↵erent types of
access control models, and each model has its own advantages and disadvantages. Each of
the existing access control models serves di↵erent organisational needs, according to their
culture, the nature of business, security policy, and so on [91, 117]. Access control models
can be broadly categorised into three main categories; namely, traditional access control
models, the trust management model and the Digital Rights Management (DRM) model.
In the following sections, we briefly review these three categories.
2.4.5 Traditional access control models
Traditionally, access control came into existence to address the needs of two major fields:
the military and the commercial. The former focuses on confidentiality of data, whereas
the latter focuses on flexible models for data integrity [25]. These two needs have led to the
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emergence of two distinct access control models which are mandatory and discretionary
access control models. However, the limitations of these two models of access control has
led to further research in this area that has resulted in the emergence of role-based and
task-based access control models [98].
The mandatory access control model (MAC), discretionary access control model (DAC),
and role-based access control model (RBAC) are regarded as the most widely accepted
access control models [92, 8]. Therefore, they are covered in this section.
Mandatory access control In mandatory access control models, each object is at-
tached to a security label and each user is assigned to a security clearance. Access restric-
tion in this model is based on the security clearance of users and security labels of objects.
In order for a subject to access an object, the subject’s clearance level must be equal to
or greater than the object’s label level. For instance, if an object in an organisation is
considered very confidential and it has been assigned a “Very confidential” security level,
a subject who has been assigned the security level “Confidential”, cannot access the ob-
ject as his/her security level is lower than that of the object. As the name of this model
suggests, it does not allow a subject or a program of the subject to modify the security
levels, instead they are enforced by the system and only the administrators of the system
can modify them. This has led this model to be stricter and more secure than DAC but
neither as flexible nor as scalable; and also made this model suitable for applications that
require a high level of security to protect the confidentiality of their data, as in military
applications [98, 91, 92, 43, 117].
Discretionary access control In contrast to MAC, DAC gives the owner or the creator
of an object the freedom to specify who can access the object and what operations can be
performed on the object. For instance, if a subject creates a file on his system and wants
to share it with other subjects, the subject can control and specify who can access the
file. In other words, the access control is based on the discretion or the decision of the
owner. DAC is often implemented using access control list (ACL) for objects, where each
ACL defines the types of access granted or restricted to individuals or groups of subjects
[60]. Unlike MAC, DAC is suitable for applications that do not require the high level of
protection that MAC provides and enforces [43, 117]. In DAC, a subject is permitted to
access an object based on the identity of the subject and some subjects can also delegate
their own access authorities to other subjects. This is regarded as one main di↵erence
between DAC and MAC; whereby in DAC a subject with a particular access permission
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is able to pass that permission to other subjects. However, this has led this model to be
complex as well as flexible [92, 91, 60].
In building operating systems, the decision to select MAC or DAC depends on what
functionality an operating system intends to provide. For instance, windows-based plat-
forms provide DAC access structures rather than MAC. However, specially developed
operating systems such as those created for government agencies and the military, provide
a MAC access structure to enforce the level of security needed [43, 117]. Many operating
systems such as Linux, Unix and windows NT/SERVER use a DAC access structure [92].
Role-based access control Ferraiolo and Kuhn [35] proposed the RBAC model to
overcome the complexity problem associated with the previous two models. In this model,
access to objects is restricted based on the business function or role that subjects perform.
Unlike DAC, access permissions in RBAC are assigned to roles rather than to subjects’
identifiers [98]. In this model, groups of users are created by the administrators who then
assign access rights and permissions to the groups; and a user in a group will be able
to utilise the access rights and permissions of the group they are placed in [43]. This
model is more appropriate for large organisations that are required to change the access
rights and permissions more often. This because of the fact that this model allows the
administrators to add a subject, an object, or can change access rights and permissions
very easily by altering centralised roles without having to manipulate any subject or object
in the system. For instance, in a company the administrator can add a new employee to
a role rather than creating access rights and permissions for every person who joins the
company [43, 117].
All the three models described above, can control access to objects in closed systems
but cannot control access to objects in open distributed systems. Salim et al. [98] indicate
that the failure of MAC, DAC, and RBAC models to control access to objects in open
distributed systems stems from several factors. Firstly, these models require that subjects
and objects must already be known before access is granted. Secondly, these models
rely on an access control list (ACL) to express policies which are usually stored in a
central server under the control of a trusted administrator. Thirdly, users in distributed
systems need their rights to be delegated to other users in order for tasks to be shared
and accomplished. Finally, the trustworthiness of clients’ software/hardware in traditional
access control models is questionable.
In order to solve these problems, many studies have been carried out and have resulted
in the emergence of newer access control models which are trust management and DRM
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models. These models are discussed in the following sections.
2.4.6 Trust management model
Generally, this model is intended to solve the problem of traditional access control models
that require subjects and objects to be previously known and before access is granted.
Hence, this model allows administrators to authorise previously unknown users by the use
of PKI and credential based systems [98]. The main di↵erence between traditional access
control models and the trust management model is that traditional access control models
are centralised and operate under a closed system, where all the parties are known; whereas
trust management systems operate in open distributed systems where some parties could
be unknown[128]. In the trust management model, each subject is bound to authorisations
referred to as credentials which help in determining and judging the capabilities of subjects
based on the relevance of subjects’ credentials to the local policy of objects’ provider.
Each subject in the trust management model can be an authoriser, a credential issuer, or
a requester [98].
Although the trust management model addresses the problem of dealing with previ-
ously unknown subjects in distributed systems, it fails to control access to objects that are
sent from the authoriser domain to the requester domain. This is due to the fact that the
trust management model, like other traditional access control models, operates on objects
within server systems and does not control access to objects that are locally stored at the
client-side. Therefore, studies in solving this problem have led to the emergence of the
DRM model.
2.4.7 Digital Rights Management (DRM) model
All the access control models that are mentioned so far focus on controlling access to
objects within a defined boundary that is either a system or an organisation. However,
the DRM model focuses on controlling access to objects regardless of their location which
means across systems and organisations. In other words, the DRM model provides an
access control mechanism for objects that are already sent from the authoriser domain
to the requester domain and which are locally stored in the requester’s machine. DRM
is commercially-oriented as the authorisation process is based on payment, in the sense
that a subject will be authorised to use an object if the subject has paid for it, other-
wise the authorisation will be denied. In fact, DRM has emerged to eliminate copyright
infringement that caused a huge revenue loss to the owners of copyrighted content.
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Liu et al. [64] defined DRM as “A system to protect high-value digital assets and
control the distribution and usage of those digital assets”. Harinarayana et al. [42] state
that DRM refers to the “technologies and processes that are applied to describe the digital
content and to identify the user. Further it refers to the application and enforcement of
usage rules in a secure manner”. Hence, DRM may look similar to traditional access
control. However, Safavi-Naini and Sheppard [97] assert that unlike traditional access
control, DRM protects the content beyond the boundary of systems that controlled by the
content owner. Thus, they defined DRM as “persistent access control” to distinguish it
from traditional access control models which are unable to prevent users from conforming
to any particular usage policy once they have gained access to the content.
DRM systems are a promising solution to prevent copyright infringement, they allow
an owner of a digital content to choose who will be consuming the content and how the
content will be consumed. More importantly, DRM systems have made the owners of
digital content able to control their content in such a way that is impossible to do in
physical contents. For instance, an owner of a digital music file can use many restrictions
over the music file such as a number of times the music can be played, include an expiry
date in which the music file will not operate when it reaches a particular time, prevent
copying or allow copying but for a limited number etc. These controls have impressed
content owners and introduced a wide range of new business models such as pay-per-
download, subscription, pay-per-play, try-before-you-buy and rental.
A DRM protected content is useless by itself. In order to make use of it, consumers
must obtain a licence that makes the content operable. Safavi-Naini and Sheppard [97]
state that DRM systems associate a content with a license which sets out all rights that
is granted to a user by the content owner. The licenses are in a machine-readable and
machine-enforceable fashion. The user can only access the content by using hardware and
software which are trusted to the content owner, and which will only allow the user to
make use of the content according to the rights granted by a license.
In spite of the fact that all DRM systems rely on the approach of associating a license
with each content, they have di↵erent architectures [42, 9, 86]. Liu et al. [64] point out
that although each DRM vendor has di↵erent DRM implementation, names and ways
to specify the content usage rules from one another, the basic DRM process is the same
which often composed of four parties: the content provider, the distributor, the clearing-
house (license issuer) and the consumer (see Figure 2.2). Safavi-Naini and Sheppard [97]
illustrate DRM architecture as follows: a provider creates content and then sends it to
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a user in an encrypted form via some distribution channels. The user obtains a license
from a license issuer to be able to access the protected content. Licenses are written by
Right Expression Language that is a machine-readable and it is used to set out the terms
of use of the content and the information required to access the protected content. One
of the most important security requirements for a DRM system is that the hardware and
the software which the user utilise to access protected content must be guaranteed by its
manufacturer to behave in accordance with licenses. However, consumer’s device is not
trustworthy and this is the major problem of DRM systems and it is apparent since the aim
of the DRM system is to prevent consumers from violating copyrighted contents [112]. As
a result, each DRM system uses its own proprietary player applications to protect digital
contents, which leads to the problem of interoperability.
Figure 2.2: The common DRM architecture [adopted from 64]
It is worth taking into consideration that each of the access control models mentioned
earlier has focused on their targeted issues. For instance, traditional access control models
have focused on controlling access to objects within a closed system that knows the identity
and the attributes of the users or processes in advance. The trust management model has
also focused on controlling access to objects within a closed system, but it authorises
unknown users based on their capabilities and properties. DRM models have focused
on controlling access to and usage of objects even after the objects are disseminated.
However, as the DRM model is a promising solution for commercial industry, all current
DRM systems focus on controlling payment-based dissemination.
As a result, Park and Sandhu [84] defined a model called Usage Control that encom-
passes traditional access control models, the trust management model and DRM model
and goes beyond in its definition and scope. “Usage Control (UCON) is a conceptual
framework that covers these areas in a systematic manner to provide a general-purpose,
unified framework for protecting digital resources” [85, 83]. In UCON, subjects and ob-
jects are associated with attributes which can be updated as a result of subjects’ actions
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on objects. Examples of a subject’s attributes are user identity, security clearance or role,
whilst object’s attributes are security labels, owner id, classification or cost. Subjects’ and
objects’ attributes can be updated before usage starts (pre-update), during the usage (on-
update), and after the usage is terminated or usage right is revoked (post-update). Access
decisions can be evaluated before the requested right is exercised or continuously while
the usage right is being exercised. The ability of updating attributes at di↵erent stages
and evaluating access decisions before or during exercising the usage right make UCON
model more expressive than other access control models. However, the UCON model is a
conceptional general purpose model that provides no explicit enforcement mechanisms.
The main problem with access control in general is that access rights of programs are
only verified at the point of access. At the access point, a program might be denied or
granted access to information. Once a program is granted access to information, no further
steps are taken to ensure that this program which is given access to information is going to
handle the accessed information correctly and securely. Unlike access control, information
flow control ensures that a program which is given access to information is going to handle
the accessed information securely by tracking how information propagates through the
program during execution. In the next section we give an overview of information flow
control and focus on type-based approach to information flow control.
2.5 Information flow control
The most widely used technique to prevent information leakage is access control such
as Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [60, 44] and Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
[100]. Although access control is useful to specify who can access which information, it
cannot protect sensitive information against legitimate users. Access control is concerned
with the release of information but not its propagation. It provides a guarantee that
information is released only to authorised users. However, once information is released
to authorised users, it might be leaked maliciously or accidentally to unauthorised users
without any further control.
Information flow control is a promising complementary approach to access control to
prevent information leakage. It tracks how information propagates through a program
during execution to ensure the program does not leak sensitive information. There are
various language-based techniques to enforce information flow control statically or dynam-
ically. The former analyses information flow within a program prior to execution while the
latter analyses information during execution. Each type of analysis has its own strengths
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and weaknesses. For example, dynamic analysis has the benefit of permissiveness but
incurs run-time overheads, while static analysis has the benefit of reducing run-time over-
heads but might reject programs that are safe. Detailed discussion about the strength
and weakness of both approaches, and suggestions for a hybrid approach can be found
in [33]. This thesis focuses on static analysis for secure information flow by the use of
type systems. Therefore, the remaining part of this chapter briefly reviews various type
systems that are developed to statically analyse information flow in programs. Such type
systems are well-known as security type systems which enforce information flow policies.
A comprehensive survey of the large body of work on language-based information flow
control, can be found in [95].
2.5.1 Security type systems
Denning [29] pioneered the use of static analysis to identify if the information flow of a
program satisfies an application-specific confidentiality policy. Following their work, many
security type systems have been developed [1, 52, 139] beginning with Volpano et al. [125]
and Volpano and Smith [126] who were the first to formulate Denning’s secure information
flow analysis [28, 29] as a type system and prove its soundness. The intuition is that secure
information flow is guaranteed for a program if the program is type-checked correctly.
In security type systems each variable in a program is associated with a security level
that represents a flow policy on the use of the value stored in the variable. The security
levels associated with programs’ variables form a lattice structure, ordered by , following
an early influential work by Denning [28] who proposed a lattice model of secure inform-
ation flow. In the lattice model, an information flow policy is defined by a lattice (SC,)
where SC is a finite set of security classes partially ordered by . For example, security
classes for confidentiality can be low and high where low  high, and for integrity can
be trusted and untrusted where trusted  untrusted. Information is allowed only to flow
upwards in the lattice. That is information flow from variable x to variable y is allowed
if lx  ly. Security type systems enforce such conditions through type checking where
the compiler type-checks a program, which contains variables associated with security
levels, before execution and ensures that the type-checked program will not violate the
information flow policy at run-time.
Information flow in a program might be explicit or implicit [28, 29]. Explicit flow results
from assignment operations that assign a variable to another variable. For example, the
assignment statement (x =: y) contains an explicit flow of information from y to x. On the
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other hand, implicit flow results from the control structure of a program. For example,
the following if-statement (if x = 0 then y := 0 else y := 1) contains an implicit flow
from x to y, since after executing the statement the value of y determines whether the
value of x is 0 or not. Other kinds of information flows might arise in a program through
covert channels [61] such as termination channels, timing channels, probabilistic channels,
resource exhaustion channels, and power channels [95]. Such channels are quite di cult
to secure since it requires much knowledge of the underlying system and hardware.
A major advantage of security type systems, and static analysis in general, is that it
not only controls explicit flows, but also controls implicit flows precisely in all possible
execution paths including paths that are not taken at run-time. The typing rules of
security type systems control explicit and implicit flows as follows. To control explicit
flows as in the example above, the typing rule for assignments requires that ly v lx, which
means that the security level of variable x must be at least as restrictive as the security
level of variable y. To control implicit flows, program-counter, written as pc, which tracks
the security levels of control flow paths is introduced. In the implicit flow example above,
the branch taken depends on the value of x, therefore, the pc in the then and else clauses
will be joined with lx, written pc t lx, and the assignment to y is only allowed if pc v ly.
The majority of security type systems focus on enforcing a property known as non-
interference [37, 125, 95, 66]. Non-interference for confidentiality requires that public out-
put is independent from secret input, and for integrity requires that trusted output is inde-
pendent from untrusted input. Various flavours of non-interference exist in the literature to
deal with the di↵erent powers an attacker might have such as termination-insensitive non-
interference, termination-sensitive non-interference, progress-insensitive non-interference,
and progress-sensitive non-interference [47]. However, non-interference is a very restrictive
property that is hard to meet in practice. This is because non-interference does not allow
downgrading of security levels from high to low. In fact, declassifying security levels is
needed in many applications. Consequently, various approaches to declassification of in-
formation are investigated in the literature. These approaches are surveyed in [96], based
on what, where, when, and by whom information can be released. Furthermore, enfor-
cing non-interference can only control how information flows from one security level to
another; but cannot control how information at a particular security level is manipulated
[63, 13]. For example, regardless of the security level assigned to a variable, the variable
can be read, concatenated with itself and saved back as long as these operations only
manipulate the variable at the same security level assigned to it. An alternative notion
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to non-interference based on a security error that can be enforced by a type system as a
safety property is proposed in [17].
Broadly, two kinds of information flow policies can be enforced, based on whether the
type system is flow-insensitive or flow-sensitive. In flow-insensitive type systems, such as
in [125], variables are assigned fixed security levels. Information can flow from variable y
to variable x if and only if ly v lx, that is the security level of x is at least as restrictive
as the security level of y. Illegal implicit flows are avoided by the use of pc as described
above, such that assignments to x that occur in loops and conditional branches is allowed
if and only if pc v lx. On the other hand, in flow-sensitive type systems [52], information
can flow from variable y to variable x without the restriction ly v lx. However, the
security level of x must be changed to be the same as the security level of y after the
flow of information. The lattice structure of security types in flow-sensitive type systems
is used to avoid illegal implicit information flow. For example, an assignment from y to
x that occurs in loops and conditional branches must cause the security level of x to be
changed to pc t ly. The flexibility of allowing variables to change their security levels at
di↵erent points of the program, makes flow-sensitive type systems more permissive, yet
secure, than flow-insensitive type systems. This is because flow-sensitive type systems
accept more programs, that otherwise would be rejected by flow-insensitive type systems,
without jeopardising security.
Myers and Liskov [75, 76, 74, 77] developed a decentralised model for information flow
known as the decentralised label model (DLM) which was implemented as the language
JFlow [73]. Programs written in JFlow can be type-checked statically by its complier to
eliminate illegal information flow. The model improves on earlier approaches to controlling
the flow of information. The DLM allows users to control the flow of their information by
defining their own security policies. In DLM, information is owned by, updated by, and
released to principals who are the users of the system. The security policies of principals
are expressed in labels. Each label consists of a set of components that express the security
policies by various principals. Each component has two parts, an owner and a set of
readers, and is written in the form owner: readers. The readers of a component are the
principals who this component permits to read the data. Thus, the owner is a source of
data whereas the readers are possible destinations for the data. An example of a label is
l = {o1 : r1, r2; o2 : r2, r3}. Here, o1, o2, r1, r2 denote principals. Semicolons separate two
policies (components) within the label l. The owners of these policies are o1 and o2, and
the reader sets of the policies are {r1, r2} and {r2, r3}, respectively. However, only r2 can
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read the data because it is allowed by both policies of the label l. Therefore, information
can be released to a destination if every policy in the label of the information allows the
information to be released to the destination. That is all policies in the label must agree
to release the information to that destination.
In DLM every variable has a label, when a value is read from a variable it acquires the
label of the variable. However, when a value is stored into a variable, the label of the value
is forgotten and it acquires the label of that variable. Therefore, the assignment of a value
to a variable results in a relabeling of the copy of the value that is assigned. DLM allows
relabeling if it is a restriction, that is the new label must remove readers, add owners, or
both. More formally, a relabeling from l1 to l2 is a restriction, written as l1 v l2 if and
only if:
owners(l1) ✓ owners(l2) ^ 8O 2 owners(l1), readers(l1, O) ◆ readers(l2, O)
which means that all the policies in label l1 are guaranteed to be enforced in label l2.
Based on this, the following relabelings are restrictions:
{A : B,C} v {A : B}
{A : B} v {A :;D : E}
{A : B,C} v {A : B;A : C}
Another kind of relabeling can be performed through declassification which relaxes
overly restrictive policies. DLM allows declassification only by a process which is author-
ised to act on behalf of a principal whose policy is to be relaxed. Since principals can only
relax their own policies, other policies owned by other principals in a label will be safe.
Furthermore, DLM enforces all the policies of derived values that occur during computa-
tion. For example, when combining two values labeled l1 and l2, respectively, the result
must have the least restrictive label that maintains all the flow restrictions specified by
l1 and l2. Since a label is simply a set of policies, the least restrictive set of policies that
enforces all the policies in l1 and l2 is simply the union of the two sets of policies. This
least restrictive label is the least upper bound or join of l1 and l2, written as l1 t l2. For
example, the join of the labels: {A : B} and {C : A} is {A : B;C : A}. More details about
DLM can be found in [74].
Chothia et al. [23] introduced the Key-Based Decentralised Label Model (KDLM) for
distributed access control that combines a weak notion of information flow control with
cryptographic operations. They developed a type system to enforce access control in a
distributed environment while allowing applications to secure themselves by the use of
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cryptographic techniques. KDLM is di↵erent from DLM in that it includes the notion of
key names. Unlike DLM where policies are enforced based on principals, KDLM enforces
policies based on key names. To reflect the notion of key names, the label format in KDLM
is di↵erent from DLM. Their approach is motivated by linking type-based approach for
confidentiality and integrity of information to the safe use of cryptographic operations.
The basic idea of KDLM is the addition of key names to the type system. Key names
are associated with types, similar to labels in DLM, that identify owners and sets of
principals that can access protected data. A key name might be either for encryption or
for signing. An example of encryption key name K that is generated by the principal P
and is accessible to principals P1 . . . Pm has the kind: K : EKeyF (P : P1 . . . Pm). Each
key name is associated with public-private pair of cryptographic keys. The type of the key
name constrains which principals can access the private key for that key name, whereas
the private key in turn has a secrecy label that cannot allow access to any principals
outside those listed in the key name’s ACL. It is assumed that each encryption or signing
key has exactly one other corresponding key that is used for decryption or authentication,
respectively. The notations a+ and a  are used to denote the public and private parts of
such a key pair, respectively. Then, for the encryption key name K above, we have the
typings:
a+ : [EncKey(K)]L1,L
0
1 , a  : [DecKey(K)]L2,L
0
2
The kind of the key name K enforces the restriction that the secrecy label L2 of the
private key a  cannot allow any principal outside of P1 . . . Pm to access the key. The
authors combined two ideas which are the notion of type-based cryptographic operations
to statically check some properties of those operation, and the notion of decentralised
labels that combine access control and some form of information flow control. However,
their interest was in access control aspect of decentralised labels.
Je↵rey and Zdancewic [122] used a variant of DLM and developed the language SImp
with primitive to enforce information flow policies with cryptographic operations. They
demonstrated that programs written in their language satisfy the standard non-interference
property. Their goal was to incorporate cryptographic operations with language-based in-
formation flow security. They asserted that little e↵orts has been made to develop a theory
to incorporate cryptography and information flow mechanisms. They pointed out that it
is essential to understand the relationship between cryptography and information flow,
particularly when protected data must leave the managed environment provided by the
language runtime.
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The authors designed a programming language that meets the following three goals.
Firstly, the model of the programming language must have suitable abstractions for en-
forcing information flow policies specified in security labels cryptographically. Secondly,
the language should free the programmer from the burden of manually managing keys
and information flow policy labels. Thirdly, programs written in the language should be
proved to satisfy the standard noninterference properties.
Abadi [1] developed a type system for concurrent language, the spi calculus, to protect
the secrecy of data in security protocols. In his approach, each data and channel is
associated with a label which can be secret or public. Data associated with a secret
label should not be transmitted on channels that are associated with a public label; and
channels associated with a secret label should not be made available indiscriminately. The
type system provides a guarantee that secret inputs will not be leaked if the protocol is
type-checked.
The author mentioned that principles and rules developed in his work is not necessary
since, like most practical static typechecking disciplines, they are incomplete. Also, they
are not su cient since they only focus on secrecy and ignore all other security issues.
However, they provide useful guidelines, and the typing rules are tractable and precise
which allow him study them in detail and to prove secrecy properties. In such a way the
author was able to establish the correctness of the informal principles within a formal
model.
Chaudhuri and Abadi [21] developed a type system for a pi calculus with file system
constructs to check access control and limit the dissemination of file names and content
in a fairly standard file system. They associate types with file names and with groups of
clients which represent the reach of the type. The reach of the type is the group of clients
that is allowed to share file names and contents among themselves. The type system
guarantees that file names and contents will not be leaked to anyone outside the reach of
their types.
For example, assume there is a client C1 who creates a secret m that must not be
shared with anyone. Then, if C1 writes m to a public file and another client C2 attempts
to read this public file, then m would not be secret to C1. This is because the public
file will contain the secret m. The authors approach is to analyse such a system and it
will only typecheck if C2 does not have read access to that file. More interestingly, it is
possible for such system to typecheck if C2 does not attempt to read the public file, even
if C2 has read access. The authors illustrate various examples which indicate that their
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type system is fairly permissive. However, their type system will fail to typecheck any
process that violates secrecy intentions.
Takeuchi et al. [119] and Honda et al. [48] were the first to propose a formalism
to structure interaction and statically analyse communication protocols known as session
types. In session types, communication protocols are expressed as types to specify the
topic of conversation, the sequence, and the direction of the communicated messages.
The type system then statically analyses whether agents exchanging messages observe the
correct protocols or not.
Vasconcelos [121] presented an example of how session types can specify the interaction
in simplified distributed auction system with three players who are sellers that want to sell
items, auctioneers that sell items on their behalf, and bidders that bid for an item being
auctioned. The protocol for sellers is as follows: sellers can invoke only one operation on an
auctioneer which is selling. In invoking this operation, they must provide the auctioneer
with a description of the item to be sold (a string), and the minimum price they are willing
to sell the item for. This protocol can be specified as follows, where   denotes the choice
available to sellers, and ! denotes the output of a value.
 {selling : !String.!Price . . .}
Now, sellers should wait the outcome of their request, where two things can happen.
Firstly, the item was sold, and secondly, the item was not sold. The protocol continues as
follows, where & denotes the range of alternatives o↵ered by the seller at this point, and
? denotes input.
&{sold : ?Price . . . , notSold : . . .}
In both cases the protocols should halt. This is indicated by the mark end. The
complete protocol as seen by the seller can be concisely described.
 {selling : !String.!Price.& {sold : ?Price.end, notSold : end}}
The protocol for auctioneers is as follows: we know that auctioneers must o↵er a selling
alternative, and if such alternative is taken, then they must accept a string (the item be
sold) followed by the price the seller is asking.
&{selling : ?String.?Price . . .}
The auctioneer then puts the item on sale, and gets back to the seller with one of the
possible outcomes: sold or notSold.
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 {sold : !Price . . . , notSold : . . .}
Putting everything together we have two session types, the first for the seller, the
second for the auctioneer.
 {selling : !String.!Price.& {sold : ?Price.end, notSold : end}}
&{selling : ?String.?Price.  {sold : !Price.end, notSold : end}}
The above description leads to safe interaction between sellers and auctioneers. It is
clear by the session types of the two partners that when seller selects the selling choice,
the auctioneer o↵ers that exact choice, and conversely for choices sold and notSold. Fur-
thermore, when the seller outputs a value, the auctioneer inputs a value of the same type,
and when the seller ends the protocol, so does the auctioneer. Such two session types is
said to be dual, a notion central to session types. A large body of work on session types
followed [119, 48]. For a good overview on session types and a survey of recent work we
refer to [30].
There are many security type systems exist in the literature to control the access to
and flow of information in programs, or to analyse security protocols. They are applied
in di↵erent problem domains to ensure di↵erent security properties in programs. Our aim
is not extend these type systems, but rather is to apply such static analysis technique to
our problem domain. In particular, we apply such static analysis technique to analyse
commands manipulating files in a Unix-like file system. We statically analyse these com-
mands before execution to protect shared files against possible misuse. Misuse of shared
files occur by commands that violate files policies. The novelty of our approach is to use a
type system which is a static analysis technique in a highly dynamic environment which is
a file system. Files policies are not static and they might change overtime. The dynamic
nature of files policies should be considered by the type system to prevent any possible
misuse.
Our type system enforces access control and information flow requirements. It enforces
access control by restricting commands to be issued on files based on files permissions.
That is, a command can be issued on a file only if the permission of that file allow such
command to be issued. It enforces information flow by restricting information in source
files to flow to destination files if and only if the permissions of the destination files are
the same or more restrictive than the permissions of the source files. In this way, we can
ensure that access control requirements are not violated by information flow between files.
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In Chapter 5 we present our type system which can be thought of as a reference
monitor that check commands before execution, and only allow those commands which
do not cause misuse of files. We postpone discussion about our approach to the end of
Chapter 6, once concepts and techniques used in our approach have been clarified.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we provided the necessary background and related work for topics discussed
throughout the thesis. We defined the activity of file sharing and showed the evolving
history of file sharing methods. Previous studies that investigate people’s practices of the
activity of file sharing were reviewed, and we showed that while previous studies provided
valuable answers to fundamental questions that could lead to better design of file sharing
methods and access control models, they ignore a significant question, namely how files
can be propagated and accessed after their propagation. Characterising the activity of file
sharing based on how files can be propagated and accessed leads to better understanding
of how the activity of file sharing is performed. From such characterisation, various classes
of the activities of file sharing can be deduced, which can be thought of as policies for the
sharing activities. A protection mechanism enforces these policies, therefore, will not only
protect the shared files but also allows users to share their files as desired. In Chapter 4
we provide a characterisation of the activity of file sharing based on these two factors.
Policies can be enforced to counter various kinds of attack. We divided these attacks
into communication, perimeter and insider attacks. We defined each kind of attack and
reviewed the protection mechanisms developed to counter each of them. Our interest is to
protect the shared files from authorised users; therefore, the literature on insider threats is
the most relevant to our work. We showed that the literature on insider threats is lacking
a clear definition of what an insider is and of insider threats. This has complicated the
problem to be solved; and we believe that the slow progress in the field to counter the
insider threat is caused by the single definitions of the insider problem and its threats, as
attempted in previous work. We suggest that the insider problem should be divided into
smaller problems that can be defined, studied and solved independently. In Chapter 3 we
propose a classification of the insider threat problem; focus on one category that is related
to file sharing and define the threats imposed by insiders in this category. It is threats such
as these that we are concerned to prevent in this thesis. Since the threats are precisely
defined, we follow a prevention approach rather than a detection approach. Generally,
the prevention approach falls into two forms, namely: access control and information flow
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control. We reviewed the literature on these approaches and focused on a type-based
approach for information flow control; which is the approach that we adopt to tackle our
particular class of insider problem in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
The Insider threat problem
This chapter proposes an approach to classify the insider problem, and provides precise
definitions of the insider and the insider problem. Based on the proposed classification, it
defines and focuses on one class of the insider problem that is related to file sharing.
3.1 Introduction
Protecting the shared files from the perspective of insider security is a challenging problem.
It has always been recognised that preventing policy violation by authorised users is more
challenging than those who are not. Authorised users have access privileges that make it
hard to prevent or detect policy violation. Providing a mechanism to protect the shared
files from insiders requires an investigation into two fundamental questions, which we
address in this chapter.
• Firstly: What is the insider problem?
The problem with the insider security literature is that there is no widely accepted
definition of what is an insider; and there is no clear distinction between insiders and
outsiders. Who is considered an insider by someone might be an outsider for someone else.
Therefore, protecting the shared files from insiders without knowing who constitutes that
insider is meaningless. By surveying the previous work on insider security, we argue that
the insider problem is significant and that no single definition can encompass the problem
as a whole, which is what most researchers have attempted to do. Researchers approach
the problem of insider security by defining two terms which are insider and insider threats.
In the literature, insiders have always been defined and di↵erentiated from outsiders by
either being inside the network perimeter, trusted, authorised, or knowledgeable about
the information system, or possibly all of these. Definitions based on these factors are
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either ambiguous or insu cient. For instance, definitions based on trust exclude those
untrusted insiders who might be authorised to access an organisation’s assets; definitions
based on the network perimeter exclude those outsourced organisations and contractors
who might be authorised to access the internal network remotely; definitions based on
authorisation exclude those who illegitimately acquire authorisation credentials in order
to access an organisation’s assets as if they were authorised insiders and definitions based
on knowledge include previous insiders who are no longer working for the organisation.
Defining the insider is not as useful as defining the threats that an insider can pose for
an organisation. Definitions of insider in the literature attempt to di↵erentiate insider
attacks from outsider attacks. However, such di↵erentiation cannot be recognised by the
trust, knowledge or authorisation that the insider might have but rather by the types of
attacks and misuse of a particular asset of an organisation.
Definitions of insider threat in the literature have always relied on the definition of the
insider; as the insider threat is seen as the damage caused to an organisation by an insider.
However, the insider problem is huge and defining the insider threat based on all possible
attacks or misuse that insiders might perform in an organisation is rather complicated and
ambiguous. This approach to defining the insider problem based on a strict definition of
the insider and a broad definition of the insider threat is only helpful to get an idea about
the field, but will never help to solve the insider problem.
To make progress in the field and find a solution to the insider problem, we suggest
that the problem should be classified into several categories which can be defined, studied
and solved independently and which later can be combined to solve the problem as a
whole. The authors in [89, 51, 90] identified di↵erent factors for an insider that can be
used for defining a taxonomy of insider threats. One of these factors is the distinction
between the acts of masqueraders (e.g, an individual with a stolen password), traitors
(malicious legitimate users) and naive or accidental use that results in harm. Although
such distinction is useful in classifying types of insider based on their intentionality or
characteristics, it does not help in classifying the insider problem or di↵erentiating insider
from outsider attacks. However, such classification can be of great value if di↵erent types
of attacks and misuse are associated with each type of insider.
We believe that the classification of insider attacks by Silowash et al. [107] is the first
step towards a useful study of the insider problem. However, such classifications are rather
general and should be further classified into more details. For instance, IT sabotage can
be performed by an insider who initiates a Denial of Services Attack, deleting critical data
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from an application he is authorised to use by his machine, planting a logical bomb in
software that other employees are using to delete data or making the software inoperable at
critical times etc. Also, theft of IP can be performed by an insider who accesses a database
in a server illegitimately in order to download IP or sensitive files to his machine; writes
down or memorises customers’ information that is rendered by an application which the
insider is using; or it can be the result of sharing IP and sensitive files with the insider
legitimately. Therefore, each class of attack indicated by Silowash et al. [107] should be
further classified into di↵erent categories that can be studied independently because it is
impossible to provide a single solution for all insider IT sabotage attacks.
• Secondly: What is the insider misuse?
Defining the insider problem and the insider precisely is the first step towards pro-
tecting shared files from insiders. What is more important is identifying the misuse that
can be performed by insiders. Misuse is any action taken by the insider that violates the
confidentiality, integrity or availability of a particular asset. By knowing the misuse that
the insider can perform on the shared files, we can derive the di↵erent types of protection
that are required to protect those shared files.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 3.2 we propose an approach
to classifying the insider problem, provide a precise definition of the insider and the insider
problem, and identify the class of insider problem we are concerned with in this thesis.
In Section 3.3 we investigate the di↵erent types of misuse that give rise to our class of
insider problem and characterise the protection requirements against them. We precisely
define the class of insider problem that we tackle throughout this thesis. In Section 3.4
we summarise this chapter.
3.2 Classifying the insider threat problem
There are three factors which play an important role in classifying the insider problem
which are: the type of activity that deals with an asset in an organisation; the type of
asset that needs to be protected; and the type of attack that targets the asset. Figure 3.1
illustrates how each factor helps us to classify the insider problem.
The activity: Activities are identified by the organisation for its partners, contractors,
and employees to perform a particular job, and might be di↵erent from one organisation
to another. Each activity will di↵erentiate insiders from outsiders, as an insider will be a
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Figure 3.1: Classifying the insider problem
person who is legitimately given an activity by an organisation to perform a particular job.
Therefore, the activity will lead to identifying who is the insider and what that insider
is doing. The type of activity that insiders perform in an organisation are various and
organisation-specific. Examples of activities that are given to insiders are file sharing,
updating customer information, installing software onto an organisation’s devices, setting
up an organisation’s network or provisioning authorisation credentials for an organisation’s
employees, etc.
The asset: The assets that need to be protected are identified by an organisation based
on a clear description of activities in the organisation, such that each activity will involve
one or more assets to be dealt with. For example, if an activity in an organisation is em-
ployees sharing files with each other, the asset will be the file being shared, which contains
sensitive information. Other examples of activities and assets are: an IT administrator
who provisions authorisation credentials for an organisation’s employees, where the asset
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is the authorisation credential; a software developer who writes software scripts for an
organisation’s computer, where the asset can be the software itself or the computers that
run the scripts; or, a network administrator who sets up the organisation’s network and
maintains it, where the asset is the network. Generally, the assets can be of three types
which are the network which connects devices together, the devices which contain the
data, or the data itself.
The attack. The attacks that target the asset can generally be of three types, which
are: availability attacks, confidentiality attacks and integrity attacks; each of which can
be performed in di↵erent ways which might require either physical security or IT security.
Choosing which type of attack to prevent is determined by the type of protection required
for the chosen asset. For instance, if the asset is the network which needs to be available all
the time, availability attacks should be prevented. On the other hand, if the asset is data
that needs to be secret, confidentiality attacks should be prevented and so on. Therefore,
the asset will determine which type of attack should be prevented.
Based on these three factors, we define the insider and the insider problem precisely
as follows.
Definition 3.2.1. An insider is a person who is legitimately given an activity by an
organisation that entails dealing with that organisation’s assets.
Definition 3.2.2. The insider problem is particular types of attack that are performed by
insiders on particular types of assets of an organisation during particular types of activity.
Therefore, we can classify the insider problem into several categories based on these
three factors such that each particular type of attack by insiders on a particular type of
asset of an organisation during a particular type of an activity will result in a unique class
of the insider problem which can be defined, studied and solved independently. For example,
one class of the insider problem is preventing confidentiality attacks on sensitive files by
employees when they share them with one another. Another class might be preventing
availability attacks on an organisation’s network by IT administrators when they maintain
it, or preventing integrity attacks on customers’ information by employees when they
update them etc.
Our concern in this thesis is not to classify the insider problem thoroughly; rather we
have provided an approach for such classification. However, we are interested in one class
of insider problem which is related to file sharing. The activity in this class of problem is
thus file sharing; the asset is the file being shared; and the attacks we are concerned with
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are confidentiality and integrity attacks. Since file sharing is not only an activity that
is performed by an organisation’s employees but also one that can be performed among
friends, family members or colleagues; we will look at this class of insider problem from a
broader perspective to include any individuals performing such activity. In other words,
the insiders in our class will be the recipients, whether they are employees, friends or
family members.
3.3 Protecting the shared files
Although we defined our class of insider problem in the previous section, the attacks we are
concerned with (i.e. confidentiality and integrity attacks) are still vague. These attacks
can be performed in di↵erent ways, which in turn require di↵erent types of protection.
Claiming that a particular protection mechanism can protect the confidentiality of the
files is not enough. Instead, one should claim that a particular protection mechanism
can protect the confidentiality of the files under specific kinds of attack. Therefore, in
order to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the shared files from insiders (i.e.
recipients), the di↵erent attacks and misuse that a↵ect the confidentiality and the integrity
of shared files must be identified. Generally, protection of the shared files can be realised
from two di↵erent angles: protecting the shared files while in transit, and protecting the
shared files when they are received by the recipients. In this section, we characterise the
protection required by the shared files against di↵erent types of attack and misuse that
can occur during the activity of file sharing.
3.3.1 Protecting the shared files in transit
This type of protection prevents attacks on the file while it is being transferred from the
owner to the recipients. We divided these attacks into confidentiality attacks and integrity
attacks as follows:
Confidentiality attacks. These attacks lead to the disclosure of the shared files to
unauthorised users and can occur in two ways. Firstly, someone eavesdrops or monitors
the communication between the owner and the recipient to obtain knowledge about the
files. We refer to such an attacker as an interceptor. Secondly, someone pretends to be
the original recipient in order to deceive the owner and obtain the files. We refer to
such an attacker as a masquerader. Therefore, there should be two types of protection
to prevent unauthorised disclosure of the shared files in transit as follows: Protecting the
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confidentiality of files from interceptors; and protecting the confidentiality of files from
masqueraders.
Integrity attacks. These attacks lead to unauthorised modification of the shared files
by unauthorised users. The attacker in such attacks pretends to be the original owner to
deceive the recipient by sending them files as if they came from the original owner. These
files can either be entirely new files or a modified version of the original files. We refer
to such an attacker as a masquerader. Therefore, there should be one type of protection
to prevent unauthorised modification of shared files in transit which is protecting the
integrity of files from masqueraders.
3.3.2 Protecting the shared files at the recipient
This type of protection prevents misuse of the file after it has been received by legitimate
recipients. This misuse can a↵ect the confidentiality and integrity of the files; and can be
committed by three di↵erent entities which are: malicious recipients, naive recipients or
masqueraders. Below we define these three entities and describe the di↵erences between
them.
Definition 3.3.1. Malicious recipients are untrusted legitimate recipients who deliber-
ately misuse the shared files.
Definition 3.3.2. Naive recipients are trusted legitimate recipients who accidentally mis-
use the shared files.
Definition 3.3.3. Masqueraders are unauthorised users who claim to be legitimate re-
cipients to acquire their devices which contain the shared files and misuse these files.
The reason behind di↵erentiating these three entities is that files should be protected
against each of them di↵erently. For example, protecting the shared files against malicious
and naive recipients is di↵erent from protecting them against masqueraders. Malicious and
naive recipients are legitimate recipients who might or might not be allowed to view or
edit the files. However, masqueraders are unauthorised users who must not be allowed to
view or edit the files at all. Moreover, protecting the shared files against naive recipients
is di↵erent from protecting them against malicious recipients. The former are trusted to
not manipulate files in an unauthorised manner, while the latter are untrusted, and might
strive to circumvent any protection to misuse the files.
It should be noted that by definition masqueraders are not insiders, since they are
not legitimate recipients. However, from the system point of view they are considered
65
insiders, since they gain access to the system as if they were legitimate recipients. That
is, they claim legitimate recipients identities to deceive the system, and thus the system
cannot di↵erentiate them from legitimate recipients (i.e. insiders). However, masqueraders
usually present a vague area where insider and external attacks overlap. It is reasonable to
classify masqueraders misuse as external attacks, since they are not legitimate recipients
or more precisely they are not legitimately given an activity. Similarly, it is reasonable to
classify their misuse as insider attacks, since they gain access with identities of legitimate
recipients and the system will perceive them as legitimate recipients.
We eliminate this vague area by classifying the attacks of such unauthorised users
into attacks they perform to become masqueraders, and attacks they perform when they
have become masqueraders. The former attacks are performed to obtain the credentials
of legitimate recipients to claim their identities to the system, and thus perform the latter
attacks. These attacks are considered external attacks which can be in the form of fishing,
social engineering, brute-force, and spoofing attacks, to name a few. Once such attacks
are performed successfully, the attacker will become a masquerader and can perform the
latter attacks. The latter attacks are performed to misuse the privileges of the claimed
identities of legitimate recipients. These attacks are considered insider attacks since the
attacker will be recognised by the system as a legitimate recipient with the same privileges
as the victim legitimate recipient.
Since we are concerned with insider attacks we focus on the latter kind of attacks, and
thus, it is essential to remember that masqueraders have already obtained credentials to
access the system as legitimate recipients. We are only interested in whether that cre-
dentials are obtained with or without legitimate recipients cooperation. This is because
protecting the shared files against masqueraders who are cooperating with legitimate re-
cipients is di↵erent from those who are not. Therefore, we di↵erentiate between two kinds
of masqueraders, those who obtain credentials with legitimate recipients cooperation, and
those who obtain credentials without legitimate recipients cooperation. Based on this, we
classify masqueraders misuse into accidental misuse and deliberate misuse. Masqueraders
misuse is accidental if credentials are obtained without legitimate users cooperation. For
example, an unauthorised user stealing a legitimate user password will result in accidental
misuse since such misuse is unintended by the legitimate user. On the other hand, mas-
queraders misuse is deliberate if credentials are obtained with legitimate users cooperation.
For example, a legitimate user passing his passwords directly to an unauthorised user will
result in deliberate misuse since such misuse is intended by the legitimate user.
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We assume that devices of legitimate recipients have unique identifiers that cannot
be forged, and shared files can only be accessed through legitimate recipients devices.
Therefore, the only way for unauthorised users to become masqueraders is through physical
acquisition of legitimate recipients devices. We divide misuse which can be committed by
the three entities defined above into confidentiality misuse and integrity misuse as follows:
Confidentiality misuse. Confidentiality misuse is that which leads to the disclosure
of the shared files to unauthorised users, and which can be done in the following way:
Firstly, the shared files can be viewed by a legitimate recipient who is not allowed to
view the files. The files can be viewed accidentally by a naive recipient or deliberately
by a malicious recipient. Secondly, the device of a legitimate recipient which contains
the shared file can be acquired by an unauthorised user, which we refer to here as a
masquerader, who discloses the shared files. Such acquisition can be either accidental, as
when an unauthorised user steals the device of a naive recipient; or deliberate, as when
a malicious recipient lends his device to an authorised user. Thirdly, the shared files
can be sent from a recipient device through a file sharing method to unauthorised users
who view the files. In this case, the file can be redistributed either accidentally by a naive
recipient, deliberately by a malicious recipient or accidentally by a masquerader who found
a legitimate recipient’s device unattended.
In view of this, there should be seven di↵erent types of protection to prevent unauthor-
ised disclosure of the shared files by the recipients as follows: Protecting the confidentiality
of files from accidental disclosure to a naive recipient; protecting the confidentiality of files
from deliberate disclosure to a malicious recipient; protecting the confidentiality of files
from accidental redistribution by a naive recipient; protecting the confidentiality of files
from accidental redistribution by a masquerader; protecting the confidentiality of files
from deliberate redistribution by a malicious recipient; protecting the confidentiality of
files from accidental disclosure by a naive recipient to a masquerader; and protecting the
confidentiality of files from deliberate disclosure by a malicious recipient to a masquerader.
Since the last two types of protection have a similar impact, which is disclosing the file to
masqueraders, we refer to them as protecting the confidentiality of files from accidental or
deliberate disclosure to a masquerader.
Integrity misuses. Integrity misuses are those misuses which lead to unauthorised
modification of the shared files. Such unauthorised modification can be either modify-
ing shared files that do not allow any modification; or modifying shared files that allow
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partial modification, in an unauthorised manner. In both cases, the file can be modified in
three ways. Firstly, the file can be modified accidentally by a naive recipient. Secondly, the
file can be modified deliberately by a malicious recipient. Thirdly, the file can be modified
accidentally by a masquerader who finds a legitimate recipient’s device unattended.
Therefore, there should be three di↵erent types of protection to prevent unauthorised
modification of the shared files by the recipients as follows. Protecting the integrity of
files from accidental modification by a naive recipient; protecting the integrity of files
from accidental modification by a masquerader; and protecting the integrity of files from
deliberate modification by a malicious recipient.
Below we classify the aforementioned protections into two types; namely, protection of
files in transit and protection of the files at the recipients.
Protection of files in transit: This can be further divided into confidentiality
protection and integrity protection.
• Confidentiality protection
– Protecting the confidentiality of files in transit from interceptors
– Protecting the confidentiality of files in transit from masqueraders
• Integrity protection
– Protecting the integrity of files in transit from masqueraders
Protection of files at the recipients: This can be further divided into protection
against accidental misuse when sharing with trusted recipients and protection against
deliberate misuse when sharing with untrusted recipients.
Accidental misuse: this can be further divided into accidental misuse of confiden-
tiality and accidental misuse of integrity.
• Accidental misuse of confidentiality:
– Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from accidental disclosure
to a naive
– Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from accidental disclosure
to a masquerader
– Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from accidental redistri-
bution by a naive
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– Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from accidental redistri-
bution by a masquerader
• Accidental misuse of integrity:
– Protecting the integrity of files at the recipients from accidental modification
by a naive
– Protecting the integrity of files at the recipients from accidental modification
by a masquerader
Deliberate misuse: this can be further divided into deliberate misuse of confidenti-
ality and deliberate misuse of integrity
• Deliberate misuse of confidentiality:
– Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from deliberate disclosure
to a malicious
– Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from deliberate disclosure
to a masquerader
– Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from deliberate redistri-
bution by a malicious
• Deliberate misuse of integrity:
– Protecting the integrity of files at the recipients from deliberate modification
by a malicious
Figure 3.2 illustrates 13 types of protections that might be required to protect the files
in transit and at recipients. The protection of files in transit is concerned with preventing
external attacks, while the protection of files at the recipients is concerned with preventing
insider attacks.
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The characterisation of the protections required by the shared files at recipients, illus-
trates the di↵erent ways files can be misused by di↵erent types of insider. This character-
isation makes it clear which type of insider misuse needs to be prevented in a particular
sharing scenario. For instance, misuse by a masquerader does not need to be prevented if
the machine containing the file resides in a locked room which unauthorised users cannot
access. Also, deliberate misuse by malicious insiders does not need to be prevented if the
file is shared with trusted recipients. A major advantage of this characterisation is the
avoidance of the chaos that exists in the literature with respect to distinguishing insider
attacks from external attacks, and between types of insider attacks.
The focus of this thesis is on accidental misuse that a↵ects the confidentiality and
integrity of sensitive files during the activity of file sharing. Therefore, the class of insider
problem which we investigate in this thesis can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.4. Our class of insider problem is to protect sensitive files against acci-
dental misuse of confidentiality and integrity by trusted recipients during the activity of
file sharing.
Our approach to protect files against accidental misuse is through controlling opera-
tions to be performed on them in a Unix-like file system, where users manipulate files by
issuing various commands such as cp, mv, and cat. Commands issued to manipulate files
are controlled by checking them before execution, and only those commands which do not
misuse the files are allowed to be executed. However, commands that misuse files cannot
be identified unless there are policies dictate what are and are not allowed to do with the
files. For example, such policies can dictate that a command which reads a file can only
be issued on a file that can be read, whereas a command which writes into a file can only
be issued on a file that can be written into. Then, issuing a read command on a file that
is not allowed to be read is consider misuse. Therefore, commands that misuse files are
those which violate files policies.
In the next chapter, we characterise the activity of file sharing, and from such char-
acterisation we derive a set of policies that is useful in practice. Such policies should
be enforced to prevent accidental misuse of shared files. In Chapter 5, we present our
approach to enforce these policies in a Unix-like file system. We focus on enforcing one
particular policy and discuss extensions to enforce other policies in Chapter 6.
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter we have studied one category of insider threat problem that is concerned
with file sharing; in particular, protecting the shared files against insider misuse. We
investigated two fundamental questions for the design of a protection mechanism against
insider misuse. Since the insider problem is not well-defined in the literature and the insider
is not clearly identified, we have proposed a classification of the insider threat problem
and defined the insider and the insider threat problem more precisely. Defining the insider
problem and identifying the insider precisely are the first steps towards protecting shared
files against insiders. More importantly, misuse that insiders might perform on the shared
files should be identified. We have looked at di↵erent insider misuse of shared files and
characterised the protection requirements of the shared files against each of these. The
focus of this thesis is on the accidental misuse of shared files; in particular, protecting
shared files against accidental disclosure, distribution and modification by recipients.
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Chapter 4
Characterising the activity of file
sharing
This chapter characterises the activity of file sharing based on how files can be propagated
and accessed after their propagation. It defines a framework based on this characterisation
that can be used to classify the activity of file sharing and available file sharing methods.
It shows how the di↵erent classes of the activity of file sharing can be enforced to avoid
the di↵erent types of accidental misuse identified in the previous chapter.
4.1 Introduction
Although the di↵erent types of misuse of the shared files and the protection requirements
are identified in the previous chapter, the activity of file sharing is still ambiguous. Some
people conceive the activity of file sharing as sending an email attachment, while others
conceive of it as making files available to others through peer-to-peer networks. Designing
a mechanism that provides the various types of protection without taking into account
how the activity of file sharing is performed, is not very useful. This is pointed out by
previous studies, which showed that some people might avoid secure methods of file sharing
and utilise insecure methods because they were more suitable for the task of sharing, even
though security was a concern for them. For instance, employees in organisations might be
forced to utilise particular sharing methods because they are secure. However, since these
methods have been built with only security in mind, they might not be suitable for the
task of sharing that employees need to get their job done. Hence, employees usually tend
to utilise other sharing methods that might be insecure to avoid obstacles found in secure
methods, and hence, putting the organisation’s confidential files at risk. To avoid such
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issues, the di↵erent ways of file sharing should be considered when designing a protection
mechanism, so that it will not only protect the shared files, but also allow various sharing
tasks to be performed.
The activity of file sharing is performed by individuals for various purposes, be they
professional or personal. The purpose of performing the activity of sharing makes it
obvious with whom the files are to be shared (e.g. family, friends, colleagues, or anyone);
which type of file is to be shared (e.g. music, photo, video, business documents, etc.); and
which method of sharing is to be utilised as the most suitable for that sharing purpose
(e.g. secure, convenient, available to everyone etc.). These factors are discussed in the
literature and summarised in Table 2.3 in Chapter 2.
However, there are two factors that are clearly a↵ected by the purpose of sharing and
which have been overlooked by previous studies. These factors are file propagation and
access, which can be di↵erent according to sharing purpose. To the best of our knowledge,
we are not aware of any work that characterises the activity of file sharing based on these
two factors. Therefore, in this chapter we characterise the activity of file sharing according
to how files can be propagated and how files can be accessed after their propagation. Based
on this characterisation, we define a framework to classify the activity of file sharing into
di↵erent categories. We show that enforcing these categories, which can be thought of as
policies, can prevent various forms of accidental misuse of shared files, which are identified
in the previous chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 4.2 we present the di↵erent
ways of how files can be propagated. In Section 4.3 we present the di↵erent ways of
how files can be accessed after their propagation. In Section 4.4 we define a framework
which can be used to classify both the activity of file sharing and the available file sharing
methods. We discuss the proposed framework in Section 4.5 and summarise this chapter
in Section 4.6.
4.2 How files are propagated
4.2.1 Publish vs. Share:
Files can be propagated in two main ways depending on their sensitivity. Confidential
files are only released to selected individuals while non-confidential files are released to
everyone. Available file sharing methods can either allow people to share files with selected
individuals (suitable for confidential files) or allow people to share files with everyone
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(suitable for non-confidential files). A few file sharing methods provide both options. We
will use the term share to refer to a file that is released to selected individuals and the term
publish to a file that is released to everyone. Publishing or sharing files can be performed
in di↵erent scenarios.
In general, files can be released either to a person, a group of people or everyone, we
refer to them as One, Group, and Many respectively. However, the files received by the
recipients who can be One, Group and/or Many, might belong to One, Group or Many.
Therefore, including Group as a category of sharing we have 9 di↵erent categories that
can describe all the possible ways of how files are shared or published and are described
below.
1. OneToOne: This describes a situation when a particular owner of files wants to share
them with a particular recipient who is known in advance. For example, Alice wants
to share her file only with Bob.
2. OneToGroup: This describes a situation when a particular owner of files wants
to share them with a set of recipients whose number and identities are known in
advance, and who receive the same copies of the shared files. For example, Alice
wants to share her file only with her colleagues Bob, Carol, and Dave.
3. OneToMany: This describes a situation when a particular owner of files wants to
share them with a set of recipients whose number and identities are not known, and
who receive identical copies of the shared files. For example, Alice wants to share
her file with everyone on the Internet, regardless of who they are.
4. Group: This describes a situation when owners of files whose number and identities
are known in advance want to share their files with each other. For example, Alice,
Bob, and Carol want to share their files only with each other.
5. GroupToOne: This describes a situation when a set of owners of files whose number
and identities are known in advance, and who share their files with each other, want
to share these with a particular recipient who is known in advance. For example,
Alice, Bob and Carol who are sharing their files with each other want to share them
only with their colleague Dave.
6. GroupToGroup: This describes a situation when a set of owners of files whose number
and identities are known in advance and who share their files with each other, want
to share them with a set of recipients whose number and identities are known in
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advance, and who receive identical copies of the shared files. For example, Alice,
Bob and Carol who are sharing their files with each other want to share them only
with colleagues in the same department.
7. GroupToMany: This describes a situation when a set of owners of files whose number
and identities are known in advance and who share their files with each other, want
to share them with a set of recipients whose number and identities are not known
and who receive identical copies of the shared files. For example, Alice, Bob and
Carol who are sharing their files with each other want to share them with everyone
on the Internet, regardless of who they are.
8. ManyToOne: This describes a situation when a set of owners of files whose number
and identities are not known in advance and who do not share their files with each
other, want to share them with a particular recipient who is known in advance. For
example, applicants for a particular job want to share their document files only with
Alice, who is the employer.
9. ManyToGroup: This describes a situation when a set of owners of files whose number
and identities are not known in advance, and who do not share their files with each
other, want to share them with a set of recipients whose number and identities are
known in advance, and who receive identical copies of the shared files. For example,
applicants for a particular job want to share their document files only with Alice,
Bob and Carol, who are the employees responsible for recruiting new sta↵.
Figure 4.1 illustrates these categories and classifies them into either publish or share.
Note that we exclude one situation that does not make sense which is M 0 !M , since any
of the owners can be one of the recipients and vice versa.
4.2.2 Static vs. Dynamic vs. Transfer mode
In any of the categories of file propagation described above, files can be moved from an
owner to a recipient in di↵erent ways. For instance, the original file can be moved physically
as an object in the real world, leaving no copies behind; or a copy of the original file can
be moved to the recipient. In the latter case, the moved copy can be either dynamic or
static. Below we describe each one of them.
Publishing or sharing in Static Mode: This describes a scenario where independent
copies of the original file are moved from the owner to the recipients. Any changes made
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ManyToOne
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Figure 4.1: How files can be published and shared
to the copies of the original file by the recipients or to the original file by the owner do not
reflect on one another. It is useful when the owner of the file does not want to receive a
new version of the published or shared files from the recipients or update the copies that
the recipients have. An example of a method that allows sharing in a static mode is an
email attachment, where neither the owner nor the recipients can observe changes made
on the copies of the shared files by others.
Publishing or sharing in Dynamic Mode: This describes a scenario where copies
of the original file (that are linked to the original file) are moved from the owner to the
recipients. Therefore, any changes made to the copies of the original file by the recipients
or by the owner do reflect on one another. This is useful for a collaborative project where
a group of members may work on a set of documents collectively. An example of a method
that allows sharing in a dynamic mode is Dropbox where a file can be shared and updated
by the owner or the recipients, such that both can observe changes made to the copies of
the shared files.
Publishing or sharing in Transfer Mode: This describes a scenario where the ori-
ginal file is moved, leaving no copies behind, from the owner to the recipients. The file is
treated as a real world object that cannot exist in two places at the same time. Hence, in
this mode, releasing a file to more than one recipient requires the file to be held by one
recipient at a time. We are not aware of any method that meets this mode of publishing
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or sharing.
4.2.3 Distributed Memory vs. Shared Memory
Files can be moved from the owner to the recipients directly to their devices or indirectly
to a location where recipients can access them (e.g. server). We refer to the former as
sharing or publishing in distributed memory (DM), and the latter as sharing or publishing
in shared memory (SM). Each of these is described below:
Publishing or sharing in Distributed Memory: A file that is shared or published
in DM, will be stored in each recipient’s device, allowing them to access the file when they
are o↵-line. DM can be suitable for all sharing or publishing modes (i.e. static, dynamic,
and transfer). In the static mode, independent copies of the original files are moved to the
recipients’ devices, while in the transfer mode, the original file is moved to one recipient’s
device at a time. In the case of a dynamic mode, copies of the original files are also moved
to the recipients’ devices; however, the moved copies are linked to the original file, so that
any changes made on them will be communicated to other copies.
Publishing or sharing in Shared Memory: A file that is shared or published in SM,
will be stored in a central location which recipients must access each time they need to
access the file. Thus, unlike DM, a file in a SM requires the recipients to be online to
get access to the file. Similar to DM, SM can be suitable for all sharing or publishing
modes (i.e. static, dynamic, and transfer). Since the shared or published file is stored in a
location which the recipients can access, SM is best for situations where all recipients need
to access the same file rather than copies of it. Therefore, in the static mode only a single
independent copy of the original file is stored in a location that all recipients can access.
In the dynamic mode, a single copy that is linked to the original file is stored in a location
that all recipients can access. In the transfer mode, the original file is stored in a location
that all recipients can access. Since recipients have access to the same file, changes made
to that file will be observed by all recipients without the need to move copies of the file
with the new changes to them.
Table 4.1 illustrates 27 types of file propagation. Each cell in the table marked with
letter T indicates a way of propagating a file. For example, OneToOne sharing can be
performed in static (DM or SM), dynamic (DM or SM) or transfer (DM or SM) mode.
In other words, an independent copy of the original file can be moved to one particular
recipient’s device (static-DM), or to a location that one particular recipient can access
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Types of propagation Static (DM or SM) Dynamic (DM or SM) Transfer (DM or SM)
OneToOne T T T
OneToGroup T T T
OneToMany T T T
Group T T T
GroupToOne T T T
GroupToGroup T T T
GroupToMany T T T
ManyToOne T T T
ManyToGroup T T T
Table 4.1: Types of file propagation
(static-SM). A linked copy to the original file can be moved to one particular recipient’s
device (dynamic-DM), or to a location that one particular recipient can access (dynamic-
SM). The original file is moved to one particular recipient’s device rather than a copy
(transfer-DM), or moved to a location that one particular recipient can access (transfer-
SM).
4.3 How files are accessed
Once files are propagated, recipients need to access them. An owner might need to grant
the recipients various types of access based on the sharing or publishing purposes. Fur-
thermore, the owner might need to place restrictions on the granted access for further
control. In this section we describe the di↵erent types of access that might be needed and
how each can be restricted.
4.3.1 Types of access
The type of access given to recipients determines the permissibility of two critical oper-
ations, which are read and write. An owner might need to disallow the recipients’ read
operation to protect the confidentiality of a file, or disallow the recipients’ write operation
to protect the integrity of a file. The owner might also need to allow both operations if
the confidentiality and integrity of a file need not to be protected from the recipients, or
to disallow both of them. Furthermore, the write operation is performed to edit a file by
either appending a new content to it, or removing content from it. Therefore, an owner
might need to allow editing of the file by appending but not removing content from it,
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or allow both editing of the file by appending and removing content from it. Below we
describe six types of access that might be useful in di↵erent sharing or publishing scenarios
to protect either the confidentiality and/or the integrity of a file.
RO: This type of access allows the recipients of a file to view its content but not to edit
it. Therefore, only the read operation can be performed, but not the write operation, and
hence, only the integrity of the file is protected from the recipients.
WO : This type of access allows the recipients of a file to edit its content by appending
and removing content from it, but not to view it. Therefore, only the write operation can
be performed, but not the read operation, and hence, only the confidentiality of the file is
protected from the recipients.
WO+: This type of access allows the recipients of a file to edit the content of the file
by appending content to it but not to remove content from it or view it. Therefore, only
the write operation can be performed, but not the read operation, and hence, only the
confidentiality of the file is protected from the recipients.
RW : This type of access allows the recipients of a file to view and edit the content of
the file by appending and removing content from it. Therefore, both the read and write
operations can be performed, and hence, neither the confidentiality nor the integrity of
the file are protected from the recipients.
RW+: This type of access allows the recipients of a file to view and edit the content
of the file by appending but not removing content from it. Therefore, both the read and
write operations can be performed, and hence, neither the confidentiality nor the integrity
of the file are protected from the recipients.
NRW: This type of access does not allow the recipients of a file to view or edit the file,
but only to hold it. This type of access is useful, for example, when sharing a file with
cloud-storage providers. It should be noted that there is a di↵erence between having no
type of access at all and having an NRW type of access. The former disallows holding the
file, while the latter allows holding the file, but not viewing or editing it.
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4.3.2 Restriction on access types
The di↵erent types of access described in the previous section might need to be further
controlled by an owner, such that an access type granted to the recipients can only be
exercised if certain conditions are satisfied. These conditions can be seen as restrictions
on the type of access granted to the recipients. We describe four restrictions that can be
placed on the granted access type for finer control as follows:
Limited number of times (Ln): This restriction allows the type of access to be exer-
cised for a limited number times. For example, an owner might grant the recipients RO
type of access and restrict it to be exercised only for 3 times, after which the file cannot
be viewed anymore.
Limited period of time (Lp): This restriction allows the type of access to be exercised
for a limited period of time. For example, an owner might grant the recipients RO type
of access and restrict it to be exercised only for three days, after which the file cannot be
viewed anymore.
Specific time (St): This restriction allows the type of access to be exercised only at
a specific time. For example, an owner might grant the recipients RO type of access and
restrict it to be exercised only on Monday from 9am to 3pm, but not on any other day or
time.
Specific location (Sl): This restriction allows the type of access to be exercised only
at a specific location. For example, an owner might grant the recipients RO type of access
and restrict it to be exercised only by sta↵ when they are in their o ces, but not anywhere
else.
Although there might be other types of restriction that can be used to restrict the
di↵erent types of access, we focused on the minimum set of restrictions that meet the
purpose of using them. The purpose of restricting the types of access is not to protect
the files against the recipients, since such protection can be realised by the di↵erent types
of access and propagation mentioned earlier. However, the purpose of such restriction is
to protect the files against unauthorised users who acquired a device of a recipient which
contains the files. Therefore, such unauthorised users will acquire the type of access given
to the recipient, and thus the four types of restriction mentioned above can be used to
restrict the type of access given to the recipient to protect the files in such situation. We
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discuss these restriction in detail in Section 4.5.
Types of access Ln Lp St Sl
RO T T T T
WO  T T T T
WO+ T T T T
RW  T T T T
RW+ T T T T
NRW F T F T
Table 4.2: Types of access and restriction
Table 4.2 illustrates 22 types of restricted access that might be granted to the recipients.
Each cell marked with letter T indicates a useful type of restricted access that owners of
files might need to grant to the recipients. In the table, two cells are marked with letter F
to indicate inadequate restriction on an access type. The two inadequate restrictions on
the access type are (NRW,Ln) and (NRW,St). This is because the NRW type of access
does not allow the recipients to view or edit the file; therefore, limiting the number of
times or the specific time to use this type of access is not sensible. However, the other two
restrictions on the NRW type of access (i.e. Lp and Sl) might be useful for some sharing
scenarios. For example, an owner might need to share files with cloud storage providers,
provided that the files are kept in the provider servers that are located at a particular
geographical area. Another owner might need the files to be kept in the provider servers
until a particular point of time, after which the provider will not be authorised to keep
the files in the servers, which must thus be removed.
It should be noted that the recipients can only be granted one type of access; however,
various restrictions can be used with that type of access. For example, an owner might
grant the recipients the following type of access: (RO, Lp, Sl) which allows the recipients
to perform a read operation on the file for a limited period of time and at a specific
location. These two restrictions should be satisfied in order for the recipients to view the
file.
Table 4.3 combines the di↵erent types of files propagation and access; and identifies
the useful combinations of these types. The term share and publish can be replaced with
any of the categories of file propagation depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Table 4.3: Types of files propagation and access
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4.4 Taxonomy based on the characterisation of file sharing
Based on the characterisation of the activity of file sharing discussed in the previous
section, we define a framework that can be used to classify this activity in a systematic
way. This framework, shown in Figure 4.2, will help classify the activity of file sharing by
distinguishing how files are propagated to and accessed by the recipients. Below is a brief
description of the proposed framework.
The framework has a tree-based structure, where each level represents either a way
of propagating files or accessing them. The paths of the tree are numbered; therefore,
specifying the path number for each level of the tree starting from the root downwards,
will result in a unique class of the activity of file sharing. The first four levels after the
root (i.e. paths from 1-18) represent types of file propagation, while the last two levels
(i.e. paths 19-28) represent types of file access. At each level of the framework, a unique
choice has to be made. In this way, every class of file sharing will form a single path in the
tree. However, there is one exception, namely level six -“restriction over access types”.
Any class of file sharing can utilise multiple restrictions or none (e.g. Ln and Lp at the
same time) over one type of access (e.g. RO), as described in the previous section.
To avoid redundant branches, the entire tree is not drawn. For instance, level two has
eleven types to choose from; two types belonging to path one and nine types belonging to
path two. Each of these types has the same three possibilities for level three (i.e. Static,
Dynamic and Transfer). Hence, at level three there are eleven identical groups of the three
possible values. Therefore, to avoid using redundant branches, the types at level three are
written once and can be used by all types at level two.
The framework, depicted in Figure 4.2, can be utilised in two ways: Firstly, the frame-
work can be applied to classifying the activity of file sharing, by showing di↵erent ways
that owners might want their files to be propagated and accessed for di↵erent sharing
scenarios. Secondly, it can be applied to classifying available file sharing methods, by
showing which method provides which class of sharing activity. In the next sections, we
illustrate how the framework can be applied to classifying both the activity of file sharing
in an organisation and some of the popular file sharing methods.
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Figure 4.2: Framework for classifying the activity of file sharing
85
4.4.1 Classifying the activities of file sharing in an organisation.
Alice runs a company that consists of several departments which are Human Resources,
Marketing, Production and Finance. Each department contains several employees. Em-
ployees within the same department and between di↵erent departments need to share files
with each other to get their job done. Therefore, Alice wants to define how the activity
of file sharing should be performed among employees.
Alice knows the Marketing department is responsible for dealing with customers. The
Marketing department sends surveys to customers; however, Alice wants these surveys to
be approved by the manager of the department, who is then responsible for moving copies
of the surveys to customers’ devices, so that customers can read and edit them and return
these copies to the department, if they are willing to do so. Hence, Alice has specified the
following class of file sharing for this department: 1-3-12-15-20.
Also, Alice knows that employees of the Production department each have to write a
report and share it with other employees in the same department; so that each will be
aware of others’ work and able to modify other reports in the case of mistakes being found.
Alice wants employees to view and edit others’ reports when they are in their o ces and
during working hours. Hence, Alice has specified the following class of file sharing for this
department: 2-7-13-16-20-(25 + 26).
With respect to the Finance department, Alice knows that employees of this depart-
ment write reports that are viewed by employees of the Human Resource department, in
order for them to make decisions about recruiting new employees. However, Alice wants
these reports to be approved by the manager of the department, who is then responsible
for moving copies of the reports to the company’s server that employees of the Human
Resources department can access. This will allow these reports to be updated by the man-
ager of the Finance department, while employees of the Human Resources department will
be able to view up-to-date reports. In addition, Alice wants employees of the Human Re-
sources department to view these reports for a limited period of time during working
hours. Hence, Alice has specified the following class of file sharing for this department:
2-6-13-16-17(24 + 25).
Finally Alice, who owns the company, needs to view monthly reports written by each
department manager. Alice does not want any manager to view reports written by other
managers. Therefore, Alice has specified the following class of file sharing among the
managers and herself as follows: 2-8-12-15-17.
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4.4.2 Classifying file sharing methods
There are various methods of file sharing that exist today. Some of them have been
designed merely for sharing files such as File Hosting Services, FTP, and peer-to-peer file
sharing; while others are an added feature to the main purpose of applications such as
Emails and Social Networking Sites. In this section, some of the most popular file sharing
methods are classified in accordance with the taxonomy described in the previous section.
The classification is summarised in Table 4.4. Each cell in the table shows which path the
sharing method can take at each level of the framework. It should be noted that these
methods are classified according to their current features. However, existing features in a
file sharing method might be withdrawn and a new feature might be included at anytime,
in which case the table should be updated accordingly. Below we give a brief description
for each classified method, and show which types of access and propagation the method
o↵ers at the di↵erent levels of the framework depicted in Figure 4.2.
File sharing
methods
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
Email 2
5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11
12 15 20 -
Peer-to-peer
file sharing
1 3 12 15 20 -
Anonymous
FTP
1 3,4 12 15 20 -
None-
anonymous
FTP
2 5,6,7,8,9 12 15 20 -
Cloud-storage
services
1, 2
3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9
12,13 15 17, 20 -
DFS 2
5, 6, 7, 8,
9
12, 13 16 17, 20 -
File hosting
services
1, 2
3, 4, 5, 6,
6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11
12 15 20 -
Usenet 1 3 12 15 20 -
Instant
messaging
2
5, 6, 7, 8,
9
12 15 20 -
Wikis 1, 2
3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9
12 15 17, 20 -
Blogs 1, 2
3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9
12 16 17, 21 -
Social
networking
sites
1, 2
3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9
12 16 17, 21 -
Table 4.4: Classification of file sharing methods
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Email: This is considered the most commonly-used method for sharing files. Although
there are a few drawbacks to sharing files via email, such as limitation on file size, it is still
a popular method for sharing files at present due to certain features. These features are
ease of use, widespread availability and suitability for various tasks. Almost anyone who
uses a computer owns an email account, and knows how to use it. Therefore, by using an
email to share files, the user will avoid all the di culties associated with other methods of
file sharing, such as ensuring that all recipients have the same method to be able to share
the files or ensuring that all recipients know how to use the method of sharing, especially
if the method is quite complex and di cult to learn. Examples of emails are Hotmail,
Yahoo, and Gmail.
• Level 1: Since email requires the owner of a file to enter the emails addresses of
the recipients, which means that recipients should be known in advance, it is only
suitable for sharing rather than publishing (i.e. path 2 in Figure 4.2).
• Level 2: Email allows the owner of a file to share it with a particular person or
group of people, hence, files can be shared as OneToOne or OneToGroup. A group
of owners can share their files with each other by email, as well as sharing them with
another person or group. Therefore, files can also be shared as Group, GroupToOne
and GroupToGroup. Also, email allows a group of owners who might not be known
in advance to the recipients and do not share their files with each other to share
them with a particular person or group of people. Therefore, files can be shared as
ManyToOne and ManyToGroup. Hence, all paths (i.e. 5,6,7,8,9,10,11 in Figure 4.2)
are applicable for sharing files by emails.
• Level 3: Email allows the owner of a file to only send a copy of it to the recipient
rather than the file itself. The copy received by the recipient is not linked to the
original; therefore, any changes to the copy by the recipient will not be reflected on
the original file. Hence, email allows sharing files in the static mode only (i.e. path
12 in Figure 4.2).
• Level 4: Since the copy that is sent to the recipient must be stored in the recipient’s
device in order to be accessed, email allows sharing files in distributed memory rather
than shared memory (i.e. path 15 in Figure 4.2).
• Level 5: Email provides only one type of access to recipients, which is RW  that
allows the recipients to view and edit the received files by appending or removing
content (i.e. path 20 in Figure 4.2).
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• Level 6: Email provides no restrictions over the type of access that recipients have.
Peer-to-peer file sharing: Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing applications have gained
much attention in recent years. As its name suggests, P2P file sharing applications utilise a
P2P network. Unlike a client-server network, a P2P network consists of multiple computers
(nodes) that are able to act as client and server at the same time. For instance, a node
in a P2P network can send a request to another node in the network, while responding
to requests from other nodes. Therefore, in P2P file sharing applications, files are not
uploaded to a central server; instead, they are scattered across users’ devices, each of which
can act as client and server simultaneously. Examples of P2P file sharing applications are
Napster, LimeWire, Shareaza, Kazaa,and BitTorrent.
• Level 1: P2P file sharing requires an owner of a file to use a P2P client to register the
file to P2P network. Once the file is registered to the network, other users who use
clients that connect them to the same network will be able to search and download
that file. Therefore, it is suitable for publishing rather than sharing.
• Level 2: P2P file sharing allows the owner of a file to share it with everyone on the
network; therefore, files can be published only as OneToMany.
• Level 3: P2P file sharing allows the owner of a file to publish an independent copy
of the file to the recipients. Hence, it allows publishing in the static mode.
• Level 4: Since the sent copies to the recipients will be stored in their devices in order
to be accessed, P2P file sharing allows the publishing of files in distributed memory
rather than shared memory.
• Level 5: P2P file sharing provides only one type of access for recipients which is RW 
that allows the recipients to view and edit received files by appending or removing
content.
• Level 6: P2P file sharing provides no restrictions over the type of access the recipients
have.
FTP: This is an acronym that stands for File Transfer Protocol. It is the standard
Internet protocol for transferring files from one computer to another. It is not really
transferring as in moving files from one location to another, but rather is the copying of
files from one computer to another. FTP is an old, but still popular, method for sharing
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files on the Internet. To share files through FTP, there must be an FTP server which holds
all the files to be shared and an FTP client who logs in to the FTP server to obtain file
copies. File transfer can occur in two directions as follows: Downloading is transferring
a file from an FTP server (the remote computer) to an FTP client (the local computer).
Uploading is transferring a file from the FTP client to the FTP server. There are two types
of FTP which are anonymous FTP and non-anonymous FTP. Each of these is examined
separately below:
Anonymous FTP: This allows anonymous access to the uploaded files on the FTP
server to anyone with an FTP client, even through a web browser. Most anonymous FTP
servers allow anonymous users to download files from the server, but no one can update
the directory except its owner.
• Level 1: Since the files uploaded to the server are publicly available, to be accessed
by anyone with an FTP client, anonymous FTP is suitable for publishing rather
than sharing.
• Level 2: Anonymous FTP allows the particular owner of files to publish them for
everyone; or for a group of owners of files, who share their files with each other, to
publish them for everyone. Therefore, files can be published only as OneToMany or
GroupToMany.
• Level 3: Anonymous FTP allows the owner of a file to only publish an independent
copy of the file to the recipients. Hence, it allows publishing in the static mode.
• Level 4: Since the copies sent to recipients must be stored in their devices in order
to be accessed, Anonymous FTP allows files to be published in distributed memory
rather than shared memory.
• Level 5: Anonymous FTP provides only one type of access to the recipients which
is RW  which allows the recipients to view and edit the received files by appending
or removing content.
• Level 6: Anonymous FTP provides no restrictions over the type of access the recip-
ients have.
Non-anonymous FTP: Unlike anonymous FTP, non-anonymous FTP does not allow
anonymous access to the uploaded files on the server. Users accessing a non-anonymous
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FTP server will be prompted for a unique username and password which will be used as
a basis for making a decision about whether to allow or deny the user access to the files.
The di↵erences between anonymous FTP and non-anonymous FTP are only at levels 1
and 2.
• Level 1: Since the users in non-anonymous FTP (unlike anonymous FTP) are promp-
ted for a unique username and password, not everyone can access the files; therefore,
non-anonymous FTP is suitable for sharing rather than publishing.
• Level 2: Non-anonymous FTP allows the owner of a file to share it with a particular
person or group. Also, it allows a group of owners of files to share them with each
other as well as with a particular person or group; or a group of owners who might
not be known in advance to the recipients and do not share their files with each
other to share them with a particular person or group. Therefore, files in non-
anonymous FTP can be shared as OneToOne, OneToGroup, Group, GroupToOne,
GroupToGroup, ManyToOne, and ManyToGroup.
Cloud-storage services: These allow users to create storage accounts to store their
files. Users are able to perform several operations on their storage accounts such as
upload, download, delete, and to share files. These operations can be performed by the
users in two ways. Firstly, through a web browser from any device; and secondly, through
a proprietary software client installed into their devices. Cloud-storage services o↵er a
synchronisation service, which means operations on a storage account made through a
browser will be redirected in the installed client of that account and vice versa. Also,
users who own several devices (e.g., laptop, tablet, Smartphone) can install a client into
each device to synchronise the files stored in their storage accounts across their devices.
Examples of cloud-storage services are Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft’s Skydrive.
• Level 1: Cloud-storage services allow users to share their files either with users
subscribed to the same service or with users from the outside. Sharing files with
other users subscribed to the same service requires the owner of a file to select a
person or group of people from the same service to share the file with and specify
the operations that they can perform on the shared file (e.g., read and write). Since
the file will be released only to users from the same service who the owner has
selected, it is suitable for sharing. On the other hand, sharing files with other users
that are not subscribed to the same service requires the owner of the files to generate
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a URL for that file and distribute the URL to others. The URL can be distributed
to everyone (e.g. posted in a public forum) or to a person or group (e.g. via email).
Therefore, Cloud-storage services are suitable for publishing and sharing.
• Level 2: Cloud storage services allow the owner of a file or group of owners of files
who are sharing them with each other to publish their files for everyone. Also,
it allows the owner of a file to share it with a particular person or group and a
group of owners to share their files with each other as well as sharing them with
a particular person or group. Therefore, files in cloud storage services can be pub-
lished or shared as OneToMany, GroupToMany, OneToOne, OneToGroup, Group,
GroupToOne, GroupToGroup.
• Level 3: Cloud storage services allow the owner of a file to publish or share an
independent or linked copy of the file with recipients. Hence, it allows publishing
and sharing in the static and dynamic modes.
• Level 4: The published or shared copies of the files must be stored in the recipients’
devices to be accessed. Therefore, Cloud-storage services allow the publishing and
sharing of files in distributed memory.
• Level 5: Cloud-storage services allow the recipients to have only RO and RW  types
of access.
• Level 6: Cloud-storage services provide no restrictions over the type of access that
recipients have.
Distributed file systems: These are file systems that allow and manage access to files
and folders from multiple computers through a network. They are similar to traditional
file systems but designed to provide file storage and controlled access to files over local
and wide area networks. In DFS, files are stored on one or more central servers that
can be accessed by any number of remote clients in the network. The remote clients can
retrieve the files from the server to work with them as if they were stored locally on their
computers.
To protect files, DFS utilises authentication and authorisation techniques. The former
is used to allow only authorised users to access the files; while the latter is used to spe-
cify the operations that authorised users are allowed to perform on the accessed files,
such as reading, writing, and deleting. Authentication is often implemented as a user-
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name/password, symmetric key cryptography (e.g., Kerberos) or public key cryptography
(e.g., X.509) whereas authorisation is often implemented as an Access Control List (ACL).
Unlike other file sharing methods which are mainly focused on transferring the files
from one location to another, DFS provides other features that enhance the activity of
sharing; namely, users’ mobility, files’ availability and transparency. Users’ mobility means
that a user can store his/her files in a server and access these files in a uniform view from
any computer. This is very useful in environments where users do not have a particular
computer to work on, so that they can use any computer to access their files. Files’
availability means that the files will be available to access all the time, even if the computer
of the user has crashed due to software or hardware failure. This is because the files are
not stored locally, so the user can use another computer to access the files, which are
stored on the server. Even if a server in DFS has crashed, the files will be available as
DFS utilises replication techniques to spread the files to multiple servers and thus avoid
single points of failure. Transparency means that users will be able to access files over
a network as easily as if the files were stored locally. DFS is designed to be transparent
in di↵erent aspects including login, access, location, concurrency, failure, and replication,
which results in remote clients not being aware of any systemic complexity and only seeing
a system that is similar to a local file system.
DFS can be implemented as a client-server network or peer-to-peer (p2p) network.
Examples of the former are NFS [99], AFS [49], SMB [70], Coda [102], and xFS [7];
while examples of the latter are Ivy [72], Farsite [2], and OceanStore [59]. Although p2p
DFS utilises the same underlying techniques as a p2p file sharing application, the main
di↵erence between them is that p2p DFS provides persistent non-volatile storage with a
file system like interface. This interface provides a layer of transparency for the user and
to the applications which access it.
• Level 1: Since DFS requires clients who are recipients to authenticate themselves
with the system before accessing the files (i.e. only authorised users can access the
files), it is suitable for sharing rather than publishing.
• Level 2: DSF allows a particular person to share his files with another particular
person or group of people; and allows a group of people to share their files with
each other as well as sharing their files with a particular person or a group of people.
Therefore, files can be shared as OneToOne, OneToGroup, Group, GroupToOne and
GroupToGroup.
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• Level 3: DFS allows the owner of a file to share an independent or linked copies
of the file with the recipients. Hence, it allows sharing in both static and dynamic
modes.
• Level 4: The shared copies of the files must be stored in a central server that need to
be accessible to the recipients. Therefore, DFS allows sharing files in shared memory.
• Level 5: DFS allows the recipients to have two types of access which are RO and
RW  .
• Level 6: DFS provides no restrictions over the type of access that the recipients
have.
File hosting services: This type of file sharing is also known as a one-click hosting
service. It has recently gained much popularity, as it provides easy steps to share files
compared to other types of file sharing methods. These easy steps are as follows: Firstly,
the user uploads any type of file to the server of the file hosting service through a basic
web interface. Secondly, the file hosting service provides the uploader with a URL for the
file. Thirdly, the uploader shares the URL with other people either privately, via email for
example, or publicly through posting the URL on any public sites. Originally this type
of file sharing was designed for file backup purposes and for uploading a file that was too
big to be sent as an email attachment. Examples of file hosting services are Rapidshare,
Hotfile, zSHARE, and Mediafire.
• Levels 1 and 2: Since file hosting services only generate a URL for the files to be
downloaded by the recipients, classifying it depends on how the URL is shared. The
URL can be shared using one or more of the other file sharing methods. However,
whatever method of sharing is used to share the URL, file hosting services will inherit
the characteristics of that method. For example, if the URL is shared by using email,
the file hosting service will inherit the characteristics of levels 1 and 2 of email, and
if the URL is shared using anonymous FTP, then it will inherit the characteristics
of levels 1 and 2 of anonymous FTP.
• Level 3: File hosting services allow the owner of a file to publish or share an inde-
pendent copy of the file with the recipients. Hence, it allows publishing or sharing
in the static mode.
• Level 4: The published or shared copies of the files must be stored in the recipients’
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devices in order to be accessed. Therefore, file hosting services allow the publishing
and sharing of files in distributed memory.
• Level 5: File hosting services allow the recipients to only have RW  type of access.
• Level 6: File hosting services provide no restrictions over the type of access the
recipients have.
Usenet: This is a collection of newsgroups where users can post messages and files that
are distributed among multiple servers known as news servers, NNTP servers or news-
feeds. Unlike p2p file sharing applications which utilise p2p networks, Usenet utilises the
traditional client-server network. Therefore, instead of users searching and downloading
files directly from each other’s devices, as is the case in p2p file sharing applications, they
search and download files from a News server. In other words, the files must first be
uploaded to a News server, which will distribute them to other News servers that users
can connect to in order to search for and download the uploaded files.
• Level 1: In order for a file to be shared, the users must use a client called news-reader
that allows them to connect to a News server to upload their files and search for and
download files uploaded by other users. Once the owner of the files has uploaded his
files to a newsgroup in a News server using a newsreader, other users can use their
newsreaders to connect to any News server to search for and download these files.
Therefore, Usenet is suitable for publishing rather than sharing, as the files will be
shared with everyone using Usenet.
• Level 2: Usenet allows a particular person to share his files with everyone. Therefore,
Usenet allows files to be published only as OneToMany.
• Level 3: Usenet allows the owner of a file to publish an independent copy of the file
for the recipients. Hence, it allows publishing in the static mode.
• Level 4: The published copies of the files must be stored in the recipients’ devices to
be accessed. Therefore, Usenet allows files to be published in distributed memory.
• Level 5: Usenet allows the recipients to only have RW  type of access.
• Level 6: Usenet provides no restrictions over the type of access the recipients have.
95
Instant messaging: This is a form of online communication that allows real-time in-
teraction through personal computers or mobile computing devices. It allows people to
exchange messages with each other. In addition to exchanging messages, which is its main
function, IM allows people to exchange files. IM can be implemented as a Client-server
network or Peer-to-peer network. In the former, the client communicates with the IM
sever to locate other users and exchange messages. Messages are not sent directly from
the sender to the receiver, but are sent first to the IM server and then from the IM server
to the receiver. In the latter, the client only contacts the IM server to locate other clients.
Once the client has located its peer, it contacts the peer directly. For transferring files,
most systems transfer them directly among clients rather than through the IM server. Ex-
amples of IM are ICQ, AOL Instant Messenger, Skype, Paltalk, Google Talk and Yahoo
Messenger.
People often do not di↵erentiate between the terms chat and IM. Although both of
them allow users to send short messages to each other in real time, the two terms convey
di↵erent meanings. In IM, in order for a user to communicate with others, the user must
first add them to his list of contacts, called the Buddy List or Friend List. This list
allows the user to choose who he wants to communicate with. The user will be able to
communicate with only one person on his list of contacts at a time. Alternatively, he can
create a private chat room (also known as a group chat) and invite more than one user
from his list of contacts, so that other users can join the private room by invitation from
any of the existing members of the private chat room. On the other hand, chat does not
impose such lists of contacts and often occurs in a virtual public chat room consisting of
many di↵erent users who may or may not know each other, for the purpose of discussing
a particular topic of interest. Most IM service providers, such as Paltalk, ICQ, Skype and
AOL Instant Messenger, integrate public chat rooms and other features such as Voice and
Video chat to their IM services. However, file sharing can only occur in IM but not in
public chat rooms.
• Level 1: Since IM requires the users to add others to their list of contacts (or their
friends’ lists of contacts in the case of sharing files in a private chat room) before
sharing takes place, IM is suitable for sharing rather than publishing.
• Level 2: IM allows an owner of a file to share his file with a particular person or
group, and a group of owners to share their files with each other as well as sharing
their files with a particular person or a group of people. Therefore, files in IM can
be shared as OneToOne, OneToGroup, Group, GroupToOne, and GroupToGroup.
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• Level 3: IM allows the owner of a file to share an independent copy of the file with
the recipients. Hence, it allows sharing in the static mode.
• Level 4: The shared copies of the files must be stored in the recipients’ devices to
be accessed. Therefore, IM allows the sharing of files in distributed memory.
• Level 5: IM allows the recipients to only have RW  type of access.
• Level 6: IM provides no restrictions over the type of access the recipients have.
Wikis: A wiki is a webpage or set of webpages that can be viewed and edited by anyone
who is allowed access. In wikis, users can create a webpage and add content to it; other
users can view this content and edit the page by modifying already existing content or
adding new content. While text is the primary content in wiki pages, users are able to
add photos, audios or videos to the pages, or put in links to other files that cannot be
displayed on the pages. Wikis can be public which means that webpages are available
to anyone on the Internet, or private, which means that webpages are only available to
selected individuals. A well-known example of a public wiki is Wikipedia and of a private
wiki is SamePage.
• Level 1: Since public wikis allow anyone to view their webpages, and private wikis al-
low only selected individuals to view their webpages, wikis are suitable for publishing
and sharing.
• Level 2: Although public and private wikis allow their webpages be viewed and ed-
ited by anyone who is allowed access, they can implement access control based on
username and password to restrict who can view and edit which pages. However,
such access control can only be implemented by the owner of the wiki itself but
not the users who access the wiki. Based on how access control is used in public
and private wikis, wikis can allow a particular person to share his files with an-
other particular person, a group of people, or everyone. Also, it allows a group of
people to share their files with each other, as well as with a particular person, a
group of people, or everyone. Therefore, wikis allow publishing and sharing files as
OneToOne, OneToGroup, OneToMany, Group, GroupToOne, GroupToGroup, and
GroupToMany.
• Level 3: Wikis allow the owner of a file to publish or share an independent copy of
the file with recipients. Hence, it allows publishing and sharing in the static mode.
97
• Level 4: The published and shared copies of the files must be stored in a webpage to
be accessed by recipients. Therefore, wikis allow the publishing and sharing of files
in shared memory.
• Level 5: Wikis allow the recipients to have two types of access, namely, RO and
RW  .
• Level 6: Wikis provide no restrictions over the type of access the recipients have.
Blogs: Blog is an abbreviated term for weblog which is a webpage or set of webpages
that are created and owned by a user for others to view and edit.
• Level 1: Similar to wikis, blogs can be public or private, and users can add text,
photos, videos or audios to their own webpages, or links to other files that cannot
be displayed on the pages. Public blogs allow the webpages created by the users to
be available to everyone on the Internet; and private blogs allow the webpages to
only be available for selected individuals. Hence, blogs are suitable for publishing
and sharing.
• Level 2: A blog can be owned by a single person or a group of people. If a blog is
owned by a single person, webpages can only be created by that person; whereas if the
blog is owned by a group of people, webpages can only be created by someone from
that group. Therefore, if a blog is public and owned by a single person, files can be
published as OneToMany, while if the blog is public and owned by a group of people,
files can be published as GroupToMany, On the other hand, if the blog is private
and owned by a single person, files can be shared as OneToOne and OneToGroup,
while if the blog is private, and owned by a group of people, files can be shared as
Group, GroupToOne and GroupToGroup.
• Level 3: Blogs allow the owner of a file to publish or share an independent copy of
the file with recipients. Hence, it allows publishing and sharing in the static mode.
• Level 4: The published and shared copies of the files must be stored in a webpage
to be accessed by recipients. Therefore, Blogs allow the publishing and sharing of
files in shared memory.
• Level 5: Blogs allow the recipients to have two types of access, namely, RO and
RW+ .
• Level 6: Blogs provide no restrictions over the type of access the recipients have.
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Social networking sites Like blogs, social networking sites allow users to create and
own webpages for others to view and edit.
• Level 1: Unlike blogs, users who access the webpages created by others can edit
these pages by adding new content of any type (e.g. a photo, video, audio, text or
links). Like wikis and blogs, the webpages in social networking sites can be public or
private, and users can add texts, photos, videos or audios to their webpages or links
to other files that cannot be displayed on the pages. Therefore, social networking
sites are suitable for publishing and sharing.
• Level 2: Like blogs, files can be published and shared as OneToMany, GroupToMany,
OneToOne, OneToGroup, Group, GroupToOne and GroupToGroup.
• Level 3: Like wikis and blogs, social networking sites allow publishing and sharing
in the static mode.
• Level 4: : Like wikis and blogs, social networking sites allow publishing and sharing
files in shared memory.
• Level 5: Social networking sites allow the recipients to have two types of access
which are RO and RW+ .
• Level 6: Social networking sites provide no restrictions over the type of access the
recipients have.
4.5 Discussion
The classification framework of the activity of file sharing described in this chapter can be
thought of as a series of policies that describe how files should be propagated and accessed
for di↵erent sharing scenarios. Enforcing these policies provides the protection required
against the accidental misuse described in the previous chapter. In particular, the type of
access given to the recipient can be used to prevent accidental disclosure and modification
by a naive. The types of restriction on the various access types can be used to prevent
accidental disclosure and modification by a masquerader; and the types of propagation
can be used to prevent accidental redistribution by a naive and a masquerader. In this
section we discuss how these policies can be used to protect files against accidental misuse.
Protecting the confidentiality of files at the recipients from accidental disclos-
ure to a naive: Accidental disclosure of shared files to a naive occurs when legitimate
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recipients view a file that they are not allowed to view. There are three types of access
that can be used to specify policies to control read operations in order to protect the file
against accidental disclosure to a naive. These types of access are NRW, WO  and WO+.
The NRW type of access is suitable when the recipient is only allowed to hold the file,
since read and write operations are not allowed with this type of access. The WO  type
of access is suitable when the recipient is only allowed to edit the file by appending or
removing content, but not to view it, since read operations are not allowed in this type
of access. The WO+ type of access is suitable when the recipient is only allowed to edit
the file by appending content, but not by removing or viewing it; since in this type of
access read operations are not allowed and write operations only allow editing of the file
by appending content, but not by removing content from it.
Protecting the integrity of files at the recipients from accidental modification
by a naive: Accidental modification of the shared files by a naive occurs when a legitim-
ate recipient edits a file that is not allowed to be edited, or edits a file in an unauthorised
manner. There are four types of access that can be used to specify policies that control
write operations in order to protect the file against accidental modification by a naive.
These types of access are NRW, RO, WO+ and RW+. The NRW type of access is suitable
when the recipient is only allowed to hold the file, since read and write operations are not
allowed with this type of access. The RO type of access is suitable when the recipient
is only allowed to read the file, since write operations are not allowed with this type of
access. The WO+ type of access is suitable when the recipient is only allowed to edit
the file by appending, but not removing content from it, since write operations are only
allowed to append content to the file with this type of access. The RW+ is type of access
is suitable when the recipient is only allowed to view and edit the file by appending, but
not removing content from it, since write operations are only allowed to append content
to the file with this type of access.
Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of files at the recipients from acci-
dental disclosure to and modification by a masquerader: Accidental disclosure to
and modification by a masquerader occurs when the device of a legitimate recipient, which
contains the shared file, is acquired by an unauthorised user. The masquerader in this
case will acquire the same type of access that is given to the recipient. Therefore, if the
file was protected against accidental disclosure to and modification by a naive, then it will
be protected against the masquerader as well. For example, if an NRW type of access was
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given to the recipient, the confidentiality and integrity of the file will not be violated by
a masquerader. However, it is more challenging to prevent a masquerader from exercising
other types of access given to the recipient, such RO and WO+. The di↵erent types of
restriction on the type of access given to the recipient can be used to specify policies that
control read and write operations to protect the files against accidental disclosure to and
modification by a masquerader.
Limiting the number of times (Ln) and the period of time (Lp) to exercise a specific
type of access is useful when the owner knows that the recipient does not need to exercise
that type of access indefinitely on the shared file. Such restrictions are specified with the
hope that they will not be satisfied when a masquerader acquires the device from the
legitimate recipient; i.e. that the access has reached its limited number of times or period
of time, and thus cannot be exercised. Although there is a chance that a masquerader
acquires the device from legitimate recipient, while the restrictions are still satisfied, the
consequences of violating the access will be less than having no restriction at all.
Specifying a specific time (St) and location (Sl) to exercise a specific type of access
is useful when the owner knows that the recipient needs access indefinitely but not all
the time and in every location. Such restrictions are specified with the hope that the
device will be secure against access by a masquerader during the specified time and in the
specified location.
Specifying these restrictions altogether provides a strong protection against accidental
disclosure to and modification by a masquerader. However, there are situations where
some of these restrictions cannot be specified. For instance, Alice might not know how
many times Bob needs to view her report, However, she might know for how long Bob
needs view her report. Also, Alice might not know at which time Bob needs to view her
report, However, she might know that Bob needs to view her report from his o ce etc.
It should taken into account that the more of these restrictions are specified, the fewer
chances a masquerader has to disclose or modify the shared files accidentally.
Protecting the shared of files at the recipients from accidental redistribution by
a naive or masquerader: Accidental redistribution of the shared files occurs when the
file is sent to an unauthorised user by a naive or by a masquerader who acquires the device
of a legitimate recipient. The di↵erent types of file propagation can be used to specify
policies that control send operations to protect the file against accidental redistribution.
For example, specifying a type of file propagation such as (Alice ! Bob - Static - DM),
will only allow the send operation to be performed if a copy of the file that is not linked to
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the original file is sent by the owner Alice to the recipient Bob or by the recipient Bob to
the owner Alice. Specifying a type of file propagation such as (Alice ! {Bob,Carol,Dave}
- Transfer - SM), will only allow a send operation to be performed if the original file, and
not a copy, is sent by the owner Alice to a location which the recipients {Bob,Carol,Dave}
can access; or is sent by any of the recipients {Bob,Carol,Dave} to a location which
the owner Alice or any of the recipients can access. Since the types of file propagation
specify to whom the file can be sent, accidental redistribution by owners, recipients and
masqueraders will be prevented. This is because in all cases the file can only be sent to
the users specified in the policy. For example, even if a masquerader acquires the device of
the owner or recipients, the masquerader will only be able to send the files to authorised
recipients specified in the policies but to no one else.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have characterised the activity of file sharing based on two factors:
how files can be propagated from owners to recipients; and how files can be accessed
by the recipients after their propagation. Based on the characterisation of the activity
of file sharing, we defined a framework that classifies the activity of file sharing into
di↵erent categories. These categories can be thought of as policies that describe how files
should be propagated and accessed in ways that satisfy di↵erent sharing scenarios. The
framework can be applied to the classification of available file sharing methods to find out
which method supports which categories of sharing. In such a way, users will choose the
appropriate method of sharing that supports the category of sharing needed. Enforcing
the di↵erent policies identified in the framework plays an important role in mitigating
accidental misuse of the shared files. In the next chapter, we present a novel approach for
enforcing these policies.
102
Chapter 5
Secure file system
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we propose a novel approach to enforce the policies discussed in the previous
chapter. We follow a language-based technique to enforce these policies, particularly by
the use of a type system. We design a language of commands to manipulate files and
specify their policies in a Unix-like file system, and a type system to enforce these policies.
In this setting, files are associated with security types that represent security policies, and
programs are sets of commands to be issued on files such as read, copy, move, etc. The
type system plays the role of a reference monitor that intercepts and statically analyses
each command to be issued on a file and determines whether or not the command is safe to
be executed. Safe commands are those which do not cause errors during execution. Such
errors might be caused by commands that violate the security policies associated with the
files or violate its own requirements (e.g. a file must exist to be removed). Therefore, if
commands are type-checked, then files’ and commands’ policies are not violated and can
be executed safely.
In this chapter, we focus on enforcing a particular constraint of the policies discussed
in Chapter 4; namely, limiting the number of times a file can be read in a shared-memory
style. This is because the ideas developed in this chapter to enforce this constraint rep-
resent the basic building blocks of our approach which can be easily extended to enforce
the whole policies discussed in Chapter 4. We discuss extensions to enforce these policies
in Chapter 6.
The contribution of this chapter is not to provide a thoroughly secure file system,
but rather is to provide a security mechanism to secure file sharing which is performed
through issuing various commands on files such as read, copy, and move by various users
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in a file system. The objective of the security mechanism is to protect shared files against
commands issued to manipulate them. Therefore, the notion of security we are concerned
with is that of file sharing, rather than the file system as a whole. In this chapter, we
focus on a small set of commands that manipulate files, and we present our approach to
secure files against them.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in Section 5.2 we present the notations
that we use throughout this chapter. In Section 5.3 we define security types that represent
policies to regulate copy operations. These security types control the access to copy oper-
ations and the flow caused by all operations including copy, such that policies for copying
files are not violated. In Section 5.4 we present a language that enforces these policies,
and define its syntax and semantics. We define the language semantics as small-step and
big-step semantics, and we show they are equivalent. In Section 5.5 we define the security
errors that we aim to prevent in our language. We divide these errors into syntactical and
type errors and describe each of them. In Section 5.6 we discuss syntactical errors and
define an algorithm to check for the syntactical correctness of commands before execution.
In Section 5.7 we present our type system that prevents errors which might occur during
execution, whether syntactical or type errors. In Section 5.8 we prove the soundness of our
type system with respect to the language semantics. In Section 5.9 we follow the method
of Hindley-Milner [27] and define a type inference algorithm and prove its soundness and
completeness. Finally, we summarise this chapter in Section 5.10.
5.2 Notations
A file system is represented as a set of files and ranged over by Greek small letters. A file
has a name, content and a type, and we write f(c) : ⌧ for a file with name f , content c
and type ⌧ . The type ⌧ associated with a file will serve as a permission to manipulate the
file in accordance with the type. In this chapter we deal with three kinds of sets of files.
• The set of files with names, content and types, ranged over by Greek small letters
 ,  , . . .. For example,   = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2, . . . , fn(cn) : ⌧n}. Therefore, it
represents the whole file system.
• The set of files with names and types but not content, ranged over by Greek capital
letters  , , . . .. For example,   = {f1 : ⌧1, f2 : ⌧2, . . . , fn : ⌧n}.
• The set of file names only, ranged over by Roman capital letters H,N,E, . . .. For
example, H = {f1, f2, . . . , fn}.
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Throughout this chapter, we sometimes need to compare two sets of di↵erent struc-
tures, such as H =   where we are only interested in the name part of the files in the sets,
or   =   where we are only interested in the name and type parts of the files in the sets.
Also, sometimes we are interested in the name part of the files in the set   and   to check
whether or not a particular file name exists in them, regardless of its type and content.
To facilitate this, we introduce the functions ec and et which are applied to the sets   and
 . The function ec takes the set   and erases the content of files in the set, whereas the
function et takes the set   or   and erases the types of files in the set. For example, if
  = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2} and   = {f1 : ⌧1, f2 : ⌧2}, then ec( ) = {f1 : ⌧1, f2 : ⌧2},
et( ) = {f1(c1), f2(c2)}, and et( ) = {f1, f2}. We apply these functions to sets to extract
the parts of files we are concerned with. For example, f1 2 et( ) ^ ec(et( )), whereas
f5 62 et( ) ^ ec(et( )), and if H = {f1, f2}, then H = et( ) = ec(et( )). For simplicity,
in this chapter we do not write these functions explicitly, rather we assume they are ap-
plied to sets where appropriate. Therefore, instead of writing H = et( ) = ec(et( )) and
f1 2 et( ) ^ ec(et( )), we simply write H =   =   and f1 2   ^  , respectively. It should
be clear from the context which parts of the files in a set we are concerned with. We use
this convention for all set operations (e.g. ✓,[,\, . . .) rather than just equality.
5.3 Security types and policies
Our approach to limiting the number of times a file can be read is by limiting the number
of copies the file can produce. Therefore, in this section we define policies to regulate
copy operations on files. To control the access to copy operations on files we define three
security types which are UC, LCn, and NC each of which specifies a distinct policy of how
copy operations can be performed on them. We refer to such types as security copy types.
UC stands for Unrestricted Copy, which means that a file associated with this type can
be copied without restriction. The copied version of a file of type UC should be allowed
to be copied in the same way, so should also be of type UC. LCn stands for Linear Copy,
which means that a file associated with this type can be copied n number of times, after
which the file cannot be copied anymore. However, unlike UC, the copied version of a file
of type LCn should not be copied anymore. NC stands for No Copy, which means that a
file associated with this type cannot be copied at all. Hence, the copied version of a file
of type LCn should be of type NC. To formally state the above policies, we define the
following functions and notations on types. The function dst stands for destination, for a
given type of a file, the function dst finds the appropriate type for the copied version of
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that file.
dst(UC) = UC dst(LCn) = NC () n > 0.
The function red stands for reduction, for a given type of a file, the function red reduces
that type if needed when it is copied. It is mainly useful for the type LCn to limit the
number of times the type can be copied.
red(UC) = UC red(LCn) = LCn 1 () n > 0
Let T (f) denote the type associated with the file f . Then the policies of security
copy types described above can be stated as follows: a file f can be copied if and only if
T (f) 2 {UC,LCn>0} and the copied version of f must have the type dst(T (f)) and f must
have the type red(T (f)) after it has been copied. For example, assume that T (f) = LC2,
then f can be copied since LC2 2 {UC,LCn>0} and once is copied, f must have the type
red(LC2) = LC1 and the copied version of f must have the type dst(LC2) = NC. Note
that we do not define dst(LCn0) nor dst(NC) or red(LCn0) and red(NC). This is because
files of these types do not satisfy the condition NC,LCn0 2 {UC,LCn>0}, thus cannot
be copied.
However, some operations other than copy might cause information to flow from a
file to another. Let f1 !o f2 denotes flow of information from f1 to f2 by operations
other than copy such as mv, cat, etc. Such a flow of information might violate the copy
policies of files. For example, assume T (f1) = NC and T (f2) = UC, then f1 !o f2, will
lead the file f1 to be copied indirectly without any restriction by copying f2. To control
the information flow among files, our security copy types form a lattice (⌧,v), where
⌧ = {NC,LCn,UC}, are partially ordered by v (see Figure 5.1). NC and UC are the
upper bound and the lower bound of the set ⌧ , respectively. The least restrictive type is
UC, while the most restrictive type is NC. Therefore, information is allowed only to flow
upwards in the lattice, which means from the less restrictive type to the more restrictive.
It should be noted that a type LCn is less restrictive than a type LCn
0
if and only if
n > n0. For example, LC4 is less restrictive than LC2, therefore, information is allowed to
flow from a file of type LC4 to a file of type LC2.
By having a lattice of security types, there are two kinds of information flow policies
that can be enforced based on whether the type system is flow-insensitive or flow-sensitive.
The policy enforced by flow-insensitive type systems is inappropriate when the security
types represent access permissions to operations. This might not be true for the current
security copy types we address in this chapter. However, when we discuss the additional
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NC
LCn
UC
Figure 5.1: Security copy types
types to control access to other operations in Chapter 6 such inappropriateness will be
obvious. On the other hand, the policy enforced by flow-sensitive type systems is quite
promising to control the flow of information among files. However, our view is that each file
should have its own security policy which should be respected regardless of the information
flowed into it, and only allowed to change to a more restrictive policy.
Therefore, the information flow policy we need to enforce is somewhere in between the
flow policies enforced by flow-insensitive and flow-sensitive type systems. We follow the
idea of flow-insensitive type systems in that flow of information must only result in a more
restrictive type of information, while we follow the idea of flow-sensitive type systems
in that information can flow anywhere, and the security types can be changed during
computation. This can be achieved by allowing information to flow from a security type
⌧1 to any security type ⌧2, provided that the security type ⌧2 is changed to the least upper
bound of ⌧1 and ⌧2 (i.e. ⌧1t⌧2), after the flow of information. Since 8⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T , ⌧ v ⌧ t⌧ 0,
where T is lattice of security types, any information flow is considered a restriction as long
as the destination changes its type to the least upper bound of its type and the source
type. This is because the least upper bound of two types is always more restrictive than
each of them. In such way we benefit from the restrictiveness of flow-insensitive type
systems and the permissiveness of flow-sensitive type systems.
However, even if information flows to a destination file of type that is at least as
restrictive as the type of the source file, the copy policy of the source file might still be
violated. For example, assuming that T (f1) = NC and T (f2) = UC, then f1 !o f2 should
result in f2 changing its type to T (f1)tT (f2) = NC. However, now the information exists
in both the source file f1 and the destination file f2, and thus, f1 !o f2 has the same e↵ect
as copying f1 to f2 even though the copy policy of f1 does not allow it. Another example,
assuming T (f1) = LC
4 and T (f2) = UC, then f1 !o f2 should result in f2 changing its
type to T (f1) t T (f2) = LC4. However, now the information exists in both the source
file f1 and the destination file f2, and thus, f1 can be copied directly 4 times and also
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indirectly 4 more times by copying f2 even though the policy of f1 does not allow it. We
overcome this violation by the notion of resource consumption, that is a file is consumed
when it is used. Therefore, information flow such as f1 !o f2, will consume f1 and allow
only f2 to exist after the flow. In such a way, any information flow is a restriction and will
never violate the copy policies of files.
Therefore, information flow such as f1 !o f2 is always allowed, provided that f2
changes its type to T (f1) t T (f2) and f1 is consumed after performing the operation.
However, this is useful when f2 is associated with a type. Operations such as f1 !o f2
can be performed while f2 is not associated with a type. In such case, it is su cient to
assign the type of f1 to f2, that is T (f2) = T (f1). Let f 2 types denotes a file f has a
type, and f 62 types denotes a file f does not have a type either because it does not exist,
and therefore, it must be created for the flow to proceed, or might not be associated with
any policy. Below we define the policies for performing operations other than copy.
Definition 5.3.1. 8f1, f2 2 types. f1 !o f2 is allowed, provided that f2 must change its
type to T (f1) t T (f2) and f1 is consumed after performing the operation.
Definition 5.3.2. 8f1 2 types ^ 8f2 62 types. f1 !o f2 is allowed, provided that f2 must
be assigned the type T (f1) and f1 is consumed after performing the operation.
The above definitions show the constraints on operations that cause flow of information
from a single source file to a destination file. However, some operations might cause flow
of information from multiple source files to a destination file. Let f1, f2 !o f3 denotes an
operation that causes flow of information from f1 and f2 to f3. In this case, if f3 2 types,
then the type of f3 must be changed to T (f1)t T (f2)t T (f3), whereas if f3 62 types, then
f3 must be assigned the type T (f1) t T (f2). We give the following definitions for such
cases as follows.
Definition 5.3.3. 8f1, f2, f3 2 types. f1, f2 !o f3 is allowed, provided that f3 must
change its type to T (f1) t T (f2) t T (f3) and f1, f2 are consumed after performing the
operation.
Definition 5.3.4. 8f1, f2 2 types ^ 8f3 62 types. f1, f3 !o f3 is allowed, provided that
f2 must be assigned the type T (f1) t T (f2) and f1, f2 are consumed after performing the
operation.
Similarly, copying f1 to f2 can be performed while f2 2 types or f2 62 types. If
f2 62 types, then it is su cient to assign to it the type of dst(T (f1)). If f2 2 types,
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then the type of f2 must change to dst(T (f1)) t T (f2). Let f1 !copy f2 denotes the flow
of information from f1 to f2 caused by copy operations, then we define the policy for
performing copy operations as follows.
Definition 5.3.5. 8f1, f2 2 types. f1 !copy f2 is allowed if and only if T (f1) 2 {UC,LCn>0},
and f2 must change its type to dst(T (f1))tT (f2) and f1 must change its type to red(T (f1))
after performing the operation.
Definition 5.3.6. 8f1 2 types ^ 8f2 62 types. f1 !copy f2 is allowed if and only if
T (f1) 2 {UC,LCn>0}, and f2 must be assigned the type dst(T (f1)) and f1 must change
its type to red(T (f1)) after performing the operation.
To illustrate the above definitions of policies, we give the following examples of oper-
ations performed on a set of files with names and types  . Based on the definition above,
we show which operation is allowed to be performed and which is not, as well as the
consequences of performing the operation on the set  . Let   = {f1 : UC, f2 : LC4, f3 :
LC2, f4 : NC}, then,
f1 !o f3 is allowed and   = {f2 : LC4, f3 : LC2, f4 : NC}
f3 !o f1 is allowed and   = {f1 : LC2, f2 : LC4, f4 : NC}
f4 !o f5 is allowed and   = {f1 : UC, f2 : LC4, f3 : LC2, f5 : NC}
f3 !o f2 is allowed and   = {f1 : UC, f2 : LC2, f4 : NC}
f4, f3 !o f1 is allowed and   = {f1 : NC, f2 : LC4}
f4 !copy f2 is not allowed because T (f4) 62 {UC,LCn>0}.
f3 !copy f1 is allowed and   = {f1 : NC, f2 : LC4, f3 : LC1, f4 : NC}
f1 !copy f5 is allowed and   = {f1 : UC, f2 : LC4, f3 : LC2, f4 : NC, f5 : UC}
In the next section we present the language syntax and semantics.
5.4 Language syntax and semantics
Let hfi be a set of valid files names for a given file system. The syntax of the language is
given by the following grammar:
hpi ::= hcsi | hfi
hcsi ::= hci | hci; hcsi
hci ::= cp hfi hfi | rm hfi | mkf hfi hti | rd hfi | cat hfi hfi hfi | mv hfi hfi
| copy hfi hfi | append hfi hfi hfi | move hfi hfi
hti ::= NC | LCn | UC | void
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The language above consists of phrases. A phrase is either a list of commands (cs) or a
file name (f). Commands can be either a single command (c) or a sequence of commands
(c ; cs). We include commands to copy, remove, make, read, concatenate and move files.
These commands operate on a file system   that we represent as a set of files. A file has
a name, content and a type, and we write f(c) : ⌧ for a file with name f , content c and
type ⌧ . For example,   = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2, . . . , fn(cn) : ⌧n}. We use the following
notations: C(f) and T (f) denote the content of file f and the type of file f , respectively.
C(f1) + C(f2) and T (f1) t T (f2) denote concatenating the content of f1 and f2, and the
join of the types of f1 and f2, respectively. We write  [f2  C(f1)] for updating f2 with
the content of f1 in the file system  , and  [f2  T (f1)] for updating f2 with the type of
f1 in  . Both operations require that f1 and f2 must exist in   and  [f2  C(f1)] requires
both files to have distinct names. We write  [ f ] to remove f from   if f exists in  ,
and  [+f ] to add f to   if f does not already exist in  . We write  [f3  C(f1) + C(f2)]
for updating f3 with the concatenated content of f1 and f2, and  [f3  T (f1) t T (f2)]
for updating f3 with the join of the types of f1 and f2. Both operations require that f1,
f2 and f3 must exist in   and  [f3  C(f1) + C(f2)] requires both files to have distinct
names. Note that a sequence of operations can be applied to   in order from left to right.
For example, the notation  [+f, f ] denotes adding file f first and then removing the file
f from  . We can now put all these ideas together to give the semantics of commands in
terms of evaluation rules as shown in Figure 5.2.
We write he,  i !  0 for evaluating the command e in   that yields a new file system
 0. For example, let   = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2, f3(c3) : ⌧3}, then
hcp f1 f2,  i ! {f1(c1) : red(⌧1), f2(c1) : ⌧2 t dst(⌧1), f3(c3) : ⌧3}
hrm f1,  i ! {f2(c2) : ⌧2, f3(c3) : ⌧3}
hmkf f4 t,  i ! {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2, f3(c3) : ⌧3, f4(c4) : t}
hrd f1,  i ! {f2(c2) : ⌧2, f3(c3) : ⌧3}
hcat f1 f2 f3,  i ! {f3(c1 + c2) : ⌧3 t ⌧1 t ⌧2}
hmv f1 f2,  i ! {f2(c1) : ⌧2 t ⌧1, f3(c3) : ⌧3}
hcopy f1 f4,  i ! {f1(c1) : red(⌧1), f3(c3) : ⌧3, f4(c1) : dst(⌧1)}
happend f1 f2 f4,  i ! {f3(c3) : ⌧3, f4(c1 + c2) : ⌧1 t ⌧2}
hmove f1 f4,  i ! {f2(c2) : ⌧2, f3(c3) : ⌧3, f4(c1) : ⌧1}
We di↵erentiate between two kinds of commands as shown in the evaluation rules in
Figure 5.2. Commands that overwrite existing files and commands that do not overwrite
existing files. The commands cp, cat, and mv are those commands which overwrite existing
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1. hcp f1 f2 ,   i !  [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f2) t dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]
2. hrm f,  i !  [ f ]
3. hmkf f t,  i !  [+f ][f  t]
4. hrd f,  i !  [ f ]
5. hcat f1 f2 f3,  i !  [f3  C(f1) + C(f2)][f3  T (f1) t T (f2) t T (f3)][ f1, f2]
6. hmv f1 f2 ,   i !  [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f1) t T (f2)][ f1]
7. hcopy f1 f2 ,   i !  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]
8. happend f1 f2 f3,  i !  [+f3, f3  C(f1) + C(f2)][f3  T (f1) t T (f2)][ f1, f2]
9. hmove f1 f2,   i !  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f1)][ f1]
Figure 5.2: Single-step semantics
files since they all require that the destination file must exist in  . On the other hand, the
commands copy, append, and move are those commands which do not overwrite existing
files since they all require that the destination file must be created first, and thus must
not exist in  . These commands are useful to prevent accidental overwriting of existing
files.
The evaluation rules reflect the definitions of policies given in the previous section.
The cp rule reflects Definition 5.3.5 while the copy rule reflects Definition 5.3.6. The cat
rule reflects Definition 5.3.3 while in the mv rule reflects Definition 5.3.1. The append rule
reflects Definition 5.3.4 while in the move rule reflects Definition 5.3.2.
From the single-step transitions, we can define the semantics of sequences of commands
in two di↵erent ways: we give the small-step semantics in Figure 5.3, and the big-step
semantics in Figure 5.4.
For the small-step semantics, we define )⇤ to be reflexive and transitive closure of )
i.e.:
1. if hc,  i )  0, then hc,   i )⇤  0.
2. for any hc,  i, hc,  i )⇤ hc,  i.
3. if hc,  i )⇤  0 and hc0,  0i )⇤  00, then hc,  i )⇤  00
We can now show that these two semantics are equivalent.
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hc,   i )  0
(ecs)hc; cs,  i ) hcs,  0i
hc,   i !  0
(ec)hc,  i )  0
Figure 5.3: Small-step semantics
hc,   i +  0 hcs,  0 i +  00
(ecs)hc; cs,  i +  00
hc,   i !  0
(ec)hc,  i +  0
Figure 5.4: Big-step semantics
Theorem 5.4.1. (Equivalence of semantics) For all commands e, stores   and  0, we have
If he,  i +  0 () he,  i )⇤  0
Proof. We show each direction separately. If he,  i +  0, then he,  i )⇤  0. We proceed
by induction on the structure of the command e. There are two cases, one for atomic
commands and one for the sequence of commands.
1. If e is an atomic command c, then the only rule whose conclusion matches the
configuration hc,  i +  0 is the big-step rule (ec). By the small-step rule (ec), we also
have hc,  i )  0. Thus, we conclude that hc,  i )⇤  0 as required.
2. If e is a sequence of commands c; cs, then the only rule whose conclusion matches the
configuration hc; cs,  i +  0 is the big-step rule (ecs). Since the last rule used in the
derivation was (ecs), it must be the case that hc,  i +  0 and hcs,  0i +  00 hold as well.
By the induction hypothesis twice, we must have hc,  i )⇤  0, and hcs,  0i )⇤  00.
By the small-step rule (ecs) we have hc; cs,  i ) hcs,  0i. Thus, we conclude that
hc; cs,  i )⇤  00 as required.
We now look at the other direction. If he,  i )⇤  0, then he,  i +  0. We proceed
by induction on the structure of the command e. There are two cases, one for atomic
commands and one for the sequence of commands.
1. If e is an atomic command c, then the only rule whose conclusion matches the
configuration hc,  i )  0 is the small-step rule (ec). By the big-step rule (ec), we also
havehc,  i +  0 as required.
2. If e is a sequence of commands c; cs, then the only rule whose conclusion matches
the configuration hc; cs,  i ) hcs,  0i is the small-step rule (ecs). Since the last rule
used in the derivation was (ecs), it must be the case that hc,  i )  0 hold as well.
By the induction hypothesis, we must have hc,  i +  0. By the big-step rule (ec), we
have hc,  i +  0 as required.
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In the next section we define the security errors that can occur during evaluation of
commands.
5.5 Security errors
A security error is a configuration which fails to evaluate, written as he,  i ! Err. Such
failure of evaluation results from two kinds of errors which we refer to as syntactical errors
and type errors. In this section we look at each of them independently.
5.5.1 Syntactical errors
Syntactical errors are those errors which occur when the constraints of an operation ap-
plied to   are not satisfied. These constraints are shown in Table 5.1. Evaluating the
configuration he,  i leads to an error if any of the constraints of an operation applied to  
during the evaluation is not satisfied.
For example, let   = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2}, then hmkf f1 t,  i ! Err, because the
operation  [+f1] requires f1 to not exist in  . Such error prevents accidental overwriting of
existing files by creating a file that already exists. hrm f3,  i ! Err, because the operation
 [ f3] requires f3 to exist in  . This is a reasonable error since a file needs to exist in order
to be removed. hmv f1 f1,  i ! Err, because the operation  [f1  C(f1)] requires both
files to have distinct names. If we allow the configuration hmv f1 f1,  i to evaluate without
an error, it will have the same e↵ect as hrm f1,  i, and hence, a file might be removed
accidentally. Similarly, hcat f1 f2 f1,  i ! Err for the same reason as the configuration
hmv f1 f1,  i. happend f1 f1 f3,  i ! Err, because the operations  [ f1, f1] requires f1
to exist twice in   which cannot happen, and also the operation  [f3  C(f1) + C(f1)]
requires both files to have distinct names.
As shown in Figure 5.2, multiple operations are applied to   and in order from left to
right. In the above examples, we show the first operation that failed in each configuration,
which means that previous operations did not fail in the same configuration. For example,
in happend f1 f1 f3,  i ! Err, we have the following operations applied to   in order
 [+f3, f3  C(f1) + C(f1)][f3  T (f1) t T (f1)][ f1, f1]. However, we showed only the
first operation failure, which is  [f3  C(f1) + C(f1)], as the operation [+f3] did not fail
because f3 62   in the example above.
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Operation Constraints
 [+f ] f 62  
 [ f ] f 2  
 [f2  T (f1)] f1, f2 2  
 [f2  C(f1)] f1, f2 2   ^ f1 6= f2
 [f3  T (f1) t T (f2)] f1, f2, f3 2  
 [f3  C(f1) + C(f2)] f1, f2, f3 2   ^ f1 6= f2, f1 6= f3, f2 6= f3
Table 5.1: Constraints of operations applied to  
5.5.2 Types errors
Types errors are those errors which occur when the constraints of an operation applied to
a type of a file are not satisfied. These constraints are shown in Table 5.2.. Evaluating
the configuration he,  i leads to an error if any of the constraints of an operation applied
to a type during the evaluation is not satisfied.
Operation Constraints
dst(⌧) ⌧ 2 {UC,LCn>0}
red(⌧) ⌧ 2 {UC,LCn>0}
Table 5.2: Constraints of operations applied to types
For example, let   = {f1(c1) : LC0, f2(c2) : NC}, then hcp f1 f2,  i ! Err, because
the operations dst(LC0) and red(LC0) are applied to LC0 where LC0 62 {UC,LCn>0}, and
hcopy f2 f3,  i ! Err, because the operations dst(NC) and red(NC) are applied to NC
where NC 62 {UC,LCn>0}.
5.6 Syntactical correctness
The occurrence of file names in a command determines whether or not the command can
be evaluated in a particular file system   without syntactical errors. It should be noted
that a guarantee of syntactical-free error of evaluating the command in a file system  
is not a guarantee of being error free. This is because there might be a type error even
if there is no syntactical error. In this section we are concerned with syntactical errors
and we assume no type errors can occur during evaluation. We write he,  i !s Err for a
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configuration that fails to evaluate because of syntactical errors and he,  i 6!s Err for a
configuration that does not fail because of syntactical errors, and thus, should lead to a new
state  0. Below we discuss the atomic commands and sequence of commands separately,
and show when such commands can be evaluated in a state   without syntactical errors.
5.6.1 Atomic commands
Some atomic commands, such as (rm f), require the occurrence of file names to exist in   to
be evaluated without syntactical errors, while other commands, such as (mkf f t), require
them to not exist in  . For example, in a file system   where   = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2},
the configurations hrm f1,  i and hmkf f3 t,  i will not lead to syntactical errors if evaluated,
hrm f1,  i 6!s Err and hmkf f3 t,  i 6!s Err. This is because the constraints of both
commands are satisfied, that is f1 2   and f3 62  . On the other hand, the configurations
hrm f3,  i and hmkf f1 t,  i will lead to syntactical errors if evaluated, hrm f1,  i !s Err
and hmkf f3 t,  i !s Err. This is because the constraints of both commands are not
satisfied. To determine whether or not an atomic command will lead to a syntactical error
if evaluated in a particular file system  , we need to find out which file names must be in
  and which file names must not be in  .
Table 5.3 shows the constraints on file names that must be satisfied for each command
to be evaluated without syntactical errors. H denotes the set of file names that must exist
in   and N denotes the set of file names that must not exist in  . We define the function
C(e) that takes an atomic command e and returns the set of file names in e that must be
in   and the set of file names in e that must not be in  , if the file names in e are distinct
from each other. Therefore, we write C(e) = (H,N) if and only if the command e satisfies
the condition in the table, where (H,N) are the sets of file names of the command e as
shown in the table. For example, C(cp f1 f2) = ({f1, f2},?), since f1 6= f2. However,
C(cp f1 f1) should fail, since it is not the case that f1 6= f1. Below we give a proof of
that a configuration he,  i will not lead to a syntactical error if evaluated, he,  i 6!s Err,
if C(e) = (H,N) and H ✓   and N \   = ?.
Theorem 5.6.1. If C(e) = (H,N) and H ✓   and N \   = ?, then he,  i 6!s Err.
Proof. We proceed by cases on the atomic commands e. There are 9 cases, here we show
a selection of them.
1. If e is the command cp f1 f2, then we have C(cp f1 f2) = ({f1, f2},?) and {f1, f2} ✓
  and ? \   = ?. Now we can apply rule (1) to obtain hcp f1 f2 ,   i !  [f2  
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Commands H N Condition
cp f1 f2 {f1, f2} ? f1 6= f2
rm f {f1} ?  
mkf f t ? {f1}  
rd f {f1} ?  
cat f1 f2 f3 {f1, f2, f3} ? f1 6= f2, f1 6= f3, f2 6= f3
mv f1 f2 {f1, f2} ? f1 6= f2
copy f1 f2 {f1} {f2} f1 6= f2
append f1 f2 f3 {f1, f2} {f3} f1 6= f2, f1 6= f3, f2 6= f3
move f1 f2 {f1} {f2} f1 6= f2
Table 5.3: Constraints for atomic commands
C(f1)][f2  T (f2) t dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]. Since the operations  [f2  
C(f1)][f2  T (f2) t dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))] require f1 2   and f2 2  , and we
have {f1, f2} ✓  , then hcp f1 f2,  i 6!s Err as required.
2. If e is the command rm f , then we have C(rm f) = ({f},?) and {f} ✓   and
? \   = ?. Now we can apply rule (2) to obtain hrm f,  i !  [ f ]. Since the
operation  [ f ] requires f 2  , and we have {f} ✓  , then hrm f,  i 6!s Err.
3. If e is the command mkf f ⌧ , then we have C(mkf f ⌧) = (?, {f}) and ? ✓   and
{f}\  = ?. Now we can apply rule (3) to obtain hmkf f t,  i !  [+f ][f  t]. Since
the operation  [+f ] requires f 62   and we have {f}\   = ?, then the operation can
be successfully applied to  . Also, since the operation [f  t] requires f 2  , and
we have established that  [+f ] can be applied to   successfully, it must be case that
f 2   after applying the operation  [+f ], therefore, hmkf f ⌧,  i 6!s Err.
4. If e is the command rd f , then we have C(rd f) = ({f},?) and {f} ✓   and
? \   = ?. Now we can apply rule (4) to obtain hrd f,  i !  [ f ]. Since the
operation  [ f ] requires f 2  , and we have {f} ✓  , then hrd f,  i 6!s Err.
5. If e is the command copy f1 f2, then we have C(copy f1 f2) = ({f1}, {f2}) and
{f1} ✓   and {f2}\   = ?. Now we can apply rule (7) to obtain hcopy f1 f2 ,   i !
 [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]. Since the operation  [+f2]
requires f2 62  , and we have {f2} \   = ?, then the operation can be success-
fully applied to  . Also, since the operations  [f2  C(f1)][f2  dst(T (f1))][f1  
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red(T (f1))] require f1 2   and f2 2  , and we have {f1} ✓   and we have established
that the operation  [+f2] can be applied to   successfully, it must be the case that
f2 2   after applying the operation, therefore, hcopy f1 f2 ,   i 6!s Err.
5.6.2 Sequence of commands
Theorem 5.6.1 illustrates the constraints for an atomic command to be evaluated in a file
system   without syntactical errors. However, applying these constraints to commands
individually to determine whether or not a sequence of commands can be evaluated in
a file system   without syntactical errors does not work. In other words, even if atomic
commands can be evaluated individually in a file system   without syntactical errors,
evaluating them in a sequence in   might lead to syntactical errors. For example, let
  = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2}. Then, the configuration hrm f1; rm f1,  i 6!s Err, because
hrm f1,  i 6!s Err and hrm f1,  i 6!s Errr. This is because for both configurations the
constraints of the command are satisfied, that is C(rm f1) = ({f1},?) and {f1} ✓   and?\
  = ?. However, by applying the small-step (ecs) rule to the configuration hrm f1; rm f1,  i
we have hrm f1; rm f1,  i ) hrm f1,  0i where  0 = {f2(c2) : ⌧2} as evaluating the first
command removes f1 from  . Now by applying the small-step (ec) rule to the configuration
hrm f1,  0i we have hrm f1,  0i )s Err because f1 62  0. Similarly, hmkf f3 t; mkf f3 t,  i 6!s
Errr, because hmkf f3 t,  i 6!s Errr and hmkf f3 t,  i 6!s Errr. This is because for both
configurations the constraints of the command are satisfied, that is C(mkf f3 t) = (?, {f3})
and ? ✓   and {f3} \   = ?. However, by applying the small-step (ecs) rule to the
configuration hmkf f3 t; mkf f3 t,  i we have hmkf f3 t; mkf f3 t,  i ) hmkf f3 t,  0i where
  = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2, f3(c3) : ⌧3} as evaluating the first command creates f3 in
 . Now by applying the small-step (ec) rule to the configuration hmkf f3 t,  0i, we have
hmkf f3 t,  0i )s Err, because f3 2  0.
One the other hand, even if atomic commands will lead to a syntactical error if eval-
uated individually in a file system  , evaluating them in a sequence in   might not lead
to syntactical errors. For example, the configuration hrm f1; mkf f1 t,  i !s Err, because
hmkf f1 t,  i !s Err. This because the constraints of the command in the configuration
hmkf f1 t,  i are not satisfied, that is C(mkf f1 t) = (?, {f1}) and ? ✓   and {f1}\   6= ?.
However, by applying the small-step (ecs) rule to the configuration hrm f1; mkf f1 t,  i we
have hrm f1; mkf f1 t,  i ) hmkf f1 t,  0i where  0 = {f2(c2) : ⌧2} as evaluating the first
command removes f1 from  . Now by applying the small-step (ec) rule to the configuration
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hmkf f1 t,  0i, we have hmkf f1 t,  0i )  00, where  00 = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2} as evaluat-
ing the second command creates f1 in  . Similarly, hmkf f3 t; rm f3,  i !s Err, because
hrm f3,  i !s Err. This is because the constraints of the command in the configuration
hrm f3,  i are not satisfied, that is C(rm f3) = ({f3},?) and {f3} 6✓   and ? \   = ?.
However, by applying the small-step (ecs) rule to the configuration hmkf f3 t; rm f3,  i we
have hmkf f3 t; rm f3,  i ) hrm f3,  0i where  0 = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2, f3(c3) : ⌧3} as
evaluating the first command creates f3 in  . Now by applying the small-step (ec) rule to
the configuration hrm f1,  0i, we have hrm f1,  0i )  00, where  00 = {f1(c1) : ⌧1, f2(c2) : ⌧2}
as evaluating the second command removes f3 from  0.
Since commands evaluation changes the state  , such changes must be considered
by subsequent commands when evaluated. Some evaluation of commands remove file
names from  , therefore, such file names can be created but not removed or used by
subsequent commands. For example, hrm f1; mkf f1 s⌧,  i 6!s Err but hrm f1; rm f1,  i !s
Err and hrm f1; cp f1 f2,  i !s Err. Other evaluations of commands create file names
in  , therefore, such file names can be removed or used but not created by subsequent
commands. For example hmkf f3 s⌧ ; rm f3,  i 6!s Err and hmkf f3 s⌧ ; cp f3 f2,  i 6!s Err
but hmkf f3 s⌧ ; mkf f3 s⌧,  i !s Err.
To find out whether a sequence of commands can be evaluated in a file system   without
syntactical errors, we must first find out whether the sequence of commands is consistent
or not. A sequence of commands is consistent if and only if each command in the sequence
satisfies the following two conditions. Firstly, any file name of a command that needs to
be in   must not have been removed by a previous command. Secondly, any file name of
a command that needs not be in   must not have been created by a previous command.
Table 5.4 shows the set of files that are removed or created by evaluating each command.
C denotes the set of files that are created by evaluating the command and E denotes the
set of files that are erased by evaluating the command.
We define an algorithm that given a sequence of commands, the algorithm succeeds if
the commands are consistent. Additionally, the algorithm finds the minimum set of file
names that must be in   and the minimum set of file names that must not be in   for the
sequence of commands to be evaluated without syntactical errors. For a given command
cs, we compute 4-tuple (H,N,C,E) that gives the constraints on a starting file system
  so that it can be evaluated without syntactical errors. H denotes the set of file names
that must exist in  , N denotes the set of file names that must not exist in  . C denotes
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Commands C E
cp f1 f2 ? ?
rm f ? {f}
mkf f t {f} ?
rd f ? {f1}
cat f1 f2 f3 ? {f1, f2}
mv f1 f2 ? {f1}
copy f1 f2 {f2} ?
append f1 f2 f3 {f3} {f1, f2}
move f1 f2 {f2} {f1}
Table 5.4: File creation and erasure by commands
the set of file names that are created by the sequence of commands, such file names do not
necessarily have to be free in   initially. E denotes the set of file names that are erased
by the sequence of commands, such file names do not necessarily have to be in   initially.
Table 5.5 gives the heart of the algorithm. We write c(H,N,C,E) = (H 0, N 0, C 0, E0) if
an atomic command c satisfies the conditions in the table, where (H 0, N 0, C 0, E0) are the
sets updated by the command c. The algorithm starts with (?,?,?,?). For example,
cp f1 f2(?,?,?,?) = ({f1, f2},?,?,?). This means that the files {f1, f2} must be part
of the file system when this command is evaluated. When a command does not satisfy the
conditions in the table, the algorithm fails. For example, cp f1 f1(?,?,?,?) should fails
since the condition f1 6= f1 is not satisfied. Sequences of commands are then computed
by composition: c; cs(?,?,?,?) = cs(c(?,?,?,?)). Below we give several examples to
show how the algorithm works for sequences of commands.
Example 5.6.1. rm f1; rm f1(?,?,?,?)
rm f1(rm f1(?,?,?,?)) = rm f1({f1},?,?, {f1}) since f1 62 E
rm f1({f1},?,?, {f1}) = fails since f1 2 E
Example 5.6.2. mkf f1 t; mkf f1 t(?,?,?,?)
mkf f1 t(mkf f1 t(?,?,?,?)) = mkf f1 t(?, {f1}, {f1},?) since f1 62 C
mkf f1 t(?, {f1}, {f1},?) = fails since f1 2 C
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Term H N C E Condition
cp f1 f2 H [ ({f1, f2}   C) N C E f1 /2 E, f2 62 E,
f1 6= f2
rm f H [ ({f}   C) N C   {f} E [ {f} f /2 E
mkf f t H N [ ({f}   E) C [ {f} E   {f} f /2 C
rd f H [ ({f}   C) N C   {f} E [ {f} f /2 E
f1 /2 E, f2 62 E,
cat f1 f2 f3 H [ ({f1, f2, f3}   C) N C   {f1, f2} E [ ({f1, f2} f3 62 E, f1 6= f2,
f1 6= f3, f2 6= f3
mv f1 f2 H [ ({f1, f2}   C) N C   {f1} E [ {f1} f1 /2 E, f2 62 E,
f1 6= f2
copy f1 f2 H [ ({f1}   C) N [ ({f2}   E) C [ {f2} E   {f2} f1 /2 E, f2 62 C
f1 6= f2
f1 /2 E, f2 62 E,
append f1 f2 f3 H [ ({f1, f2}   C) N [ ({f3}   E) (C [ {f3})   {f1, f2} (E [ ({f1, f2})   {f3} f3 62 C, f1 6= f2,
f1 6= f3, f2 6= f3
move f1 f2 H [ ({f1}   C) N [ ({f2}   E) (C [ {f2})   {f1} (E [ ({f1})   {f2} f1 /2 E, f2 62 C
f1 6= f2
Table 5.5: Constraints for sequence of commands
Example 5.6.3. mkf f1 t; rm f1; mkf f1 t(?,?,?,?)
rm f1; mkf f1 t(mkf f1 t(?,?,?,?)) = rm f1; mkf f1 t(?, {f1}, {f1},?) since f1 62 C
mkf f1 t(rm f1(?, {f1}, {f1},?)) = mkf f1 t(?, {f1},?, {f1}) since f1 62 E
mkf f1 t(?, {f1},?, {f1}) = (?, {f1}, {f1},?) since f1 62 C
Example 5.6.4. rm f1; mkf f1 t; rm f1(?,?,?,?)
mkf f1 t; rm f1(rm f1(?,?,?,?)) = mkf f1 t; rm f1({f1},?,?, {f1}) since f1 62 E
rm f1(mkf f1 t({f1},?,?, {f1})) = rm f1({f1},?, {f1},?) since f1 62 C
rm f1({f1},?, {f1},?) = ({f1},?,?, , {f1}) sincef1 62 E
Example 5.6.5. mkf f2 t; move f1 f2(?,?,?,?)
move f1 f2(mkf f2 t(?,?,?,?)) = move f1 f2(?, {f2}, {f2},?) since f2 62 C
move f1 f2(?, {f2}, {f2},?) = fails since f2 2 C
We can relate these syntactical constraints with the operational semantics through the
following result which states that if the file system satisfies the constraints needed for a
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command as set out above, then it will be evaluated without syntactical errors. Essentially,
this key result gives the constraints on the file system: which files must be present, and
which files must not be present.
Theorem 5.6.2. For any command sequence cs, if cs(?,?,?,?) = (H,N,C,E), then
for any file system  , if H ✓   and N \   = ?, then hcs,  i )⇤  0.
Proof. We prove a stronger result. For any command sequence cs, if
cs(H,N,C,E) = (H 0, N 0, C 0, E0)
then for any file system  , if
(H 0 [ C)  E ✓   and (N 0   C) [ E \   = ?
then
1. hcs,  i )⇤  0, and
2. (H 0 [ C 0)  E0 ✓  0
3. (N 0   C 0) [ E0 \  0 = ?.
There are 10 cases, here we show a selection of them.
1. If c is rm f , then assume
rm f(H,N,C,E) = (H [ ({f}  C), N,C   {f}, E [ {f})
succeeds, and therefore f 62 E, and (H[({f} C)[C) E ✓   and (N C)[E\  =
?.
Now, to show that hrm f,  i !  [ f ], we need to show that f 2  . We shall show
that f 2 (H [ ({f}  C) [ C)  E.
First, note that f 62 E, so we can simplify the problem to check:
f 2 (H [ ({f}  C) [ C).
There are two cases to consider:
Either f 2 C: (H [ C), then f 2  .
or f 62 C: (H [ ({f}  C) [ C) = (H [ {f} [ C), and again f 2  .
Therefore, f 2  , and (N   C) [ E \   = ?, so the command succeeds.
121
Now, to show that (H [ (C   {f})  (E [ {f})) ✓  [ f ], we need to show that f 62
(H [ (C   {f})  (E [ {f})), which follows by set-theoretical arguments. Therefore,
(H [ (C   {f})  (E [ {f})) ✓  [ f ].
Now, we need to show that (N   (C   {f})) [ (E [ {f}) \  [ f ] = ?. This is true
by assumption(the [ f ] does not change the result).
2. if c is mkf f , then assume
mkf f(H,N,C,E) = (H,N [ ({f}  E), C [ {f}, E   {f})
succeeds, and therefore f 62 C, and (H[C) E ✓   and ((N[({f} E)) C)[E\  =
?.
Now, to show that hmkf f,  i !  [+f ], we need to show that f 62  . We shall show
that f 2 ((N [ ({f}  E))  C) [ E.
First, note that f 62 C, so we can simplify the problem to check:
f 2 (N [ ({f}  E)) [ E
There are two cases to consider:
Either f 62 E : (N [ {f} [ E), then f 62  .
or f 2 E : (N [ E), then again f 62  .
Therefore, f 62  , and (H [ C)  E ✓  , so the command succeeds.
Now, to show that (H [ (C [ {f}))  (E   {f}) ✓  [+f ], we need to show that f 2
(H [ (C [ {f}))  (E  {f}), which follows by set-theoretical arguments. Therefore,
(H [ (C [ {f}))  (E   {f}) ✓  [+f ].
Now, to show that ((N [ ({f}   E))   (C [ {f})) [ (E   {f}) \  [+f ] = ?, we
need to show that f 62 ((N [ ({f} E))  (C [ {f})) [ (E   {f}), which follows by
set-theoretical arguments.
Therefore, (N [ ({f}  E)  (C [ {f}) [ E   {f}) \  [+f ] = ?.
3. if c is copy f1 f2, then assume
copy f1 f2(H,N,C,E) = (H [ ({f1}  C), N [ ({f2}  E), C [ {f2}, E   {f2})
succeeds, and therefore f1 62 E, f2 62 C, and f1 6= f2, ((H [ ({f1} C))[C) E ✓  
and ((N [ ({f2}  E))  C) [ E \   = ?.
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Now, to show that hcopy f1 f2 ,   i !  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  dst(T (f1))][f1  
red(T (f1))], we need to show that f1 2   and f2 62  . We shall sow that f1 2
((H [ ({f1}  C)) [ C)  E and f2 2 ((N [ ({f2}  E))  C) [ E.
Case f1 2 ((H [ ({f1}  C)) [ C)  E:
First, note that f1 62 E, so we can simplify the problem to check:
f1 2 ((H [ ({f1}  C)) [ C).
There are two cases to consider:
Either f1 2 C: (H [ C), then f 2  .
or f1 62 C: (H [ ({f1}  C) [ C) = (H [ {f1} [ C), and again f1 2  .
Case f2 2 ((N [ ({f2}  E))  C) [ E.
First, note that f2 62 C, so we can simplify the problem to check:
(N [ ({f2}  E)) [ E.
There are two cases to consider:
Either f2 62 E : (N [ {f} [ E), then f2 62  .
or f2 2 E : (N [ E), then again f2 62  .
Therefore, f1 2   and f2 62  , so the command succeeds.
Now, to show that ((H [ ({f1}   C)) [ (C [ {f2}))   (E   {f2}) ✓  0, we need to
show that f1, f2 2 ((H [ ({f1}   C)) [ (C [ {f2}))   (E   {f2}), which follows by
set-theoretical arguments.
Therefore, ((H [ ({f1}  C)) [ (C [ {f2}))  (E   {f2}) ✓  0.
Now to show that ((N [ ({f2}   E))   (C [ {f2})) [ (E   {f2}) \  0 = ?, we need
to show that f2 62 ((N [ ({f2}   E))   (C [ {f2})) [ (E   {f2}), which follows by
set-theoretical arguments.
Therefore, ((N [ ({f2}  E))  (C [ {f2})) [ (E   {f2}) \  0 = ?.
5.7 Type system
In the previous section we presented the constraints that must be satisfied by commands
in order to be evaluated in a file system   without syntactical errors. However, even in
the absence of syntactical errors, there might be a type error that leads a configuration
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to fail to evaluate. In this section, we develop a type system that determines whether or
not commands can be evaluated in a file system   without type errors as well as without
syntactical errors. Typing judgements have the form
  |  0 ` p : ⌧
where   is a set of files with names and types of the form f : ⌧ . We write ? for the empty
set. For example,   = {f1 : ⌧1, f2 : ⌧2, f3 : ⌧3, . . . , fn : ⌧n}. It should be noted that files
in the context   are unique and the symbol “,” is the disjoint union operation, so that
the set of files in   does not contain repetitions. The judgement   |  0 ` p : ⌧ means that
typing the phrase p of type ⌧ in the context  , will change the context to  0. In other
words, the contexts   and  0 represent the set of files before and after typing the phrase
p. Note that a phrase p could be a command, a file name, or a sequence of commands.
The typing rules are shown in Figure 5.5. In the next sections we present the typing rule
for each phrase individually and give examples to show which phrase is typable and which
is not. A phrase is typable if there exists a derivation for it, otherwise is not typable.
5.7.1 Typing rule for file names
(f)
 , f : ⌧ |   ` f : ⌧
The typing rule for a file name f says that typing a file from the context   consumes
the file from the context, provided that f 2  .
Example 5.7.1. The file f1 is typable in the context   = {f1 : NC} since f1 2   as shown
below.
(f)
f1 : NC | ? ` f1 : NC
Example 5.7.2. The file f2 is not typable in the context   = {f1 : NC} since f2 62   as
shown below.
(?)
f1 : NC |? ` f2 :?
5.7.2 Typing rule for cp command
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ ⌧ v LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0
(cp)
  |  00, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : ⌧ 0 t dst(⌧) ` cp f1 f2 : void
The typing rule for cp command says that if we can type f1 and f2 from the context
  and f1 is of type UC or LC
n>0, then we can type the command cp f1 f2 of type void
and the type of f2 is changed to be the least upper bound of its type and the type of
dst(T (f2)), and the type of f1 is changed to be red(T (f1)).
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(f)
 , f : ⌧ |   ` f : ⌧
  |  0 ` c : void  0 |  00 ` cs : void
(cs)
  |  00 ` c; cs : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ ⌧ v LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0
(cp)
  |  00, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : ⌧ 0 t dst(⌧) ` cp f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f : ⌧
(rm)
  |  0 ` rm f : void
(mkf)
  |  , f : t ` mkf f t : void
  |  0 ` f : ⌧
(rd)
  |  0 ` rd f : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0  00 |  000 ` f3 : ⌧ 00
(cat)
  |  000, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 t ⌧ 00 ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0
(mv)
  |  00, f2 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` mv f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ ⌧ v LCn>0
(copy)
  |  0, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : dst(⌧) ` copy f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0
(append)
  |  00, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` append f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧
(move)
  |  0, f2 : ⌧ ` move f1 f2 : void
Figure 5.5: Typing rules
Example 5.7.3. The command cp f1 f2 is typable in the context   = {f1 : LC2, f2 : UC}
since f1 2   and f2 2  , and T (f1) v LCn>0, as shown below.
(f)
f1 : LC
2, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` f1 : LC2 LC2 v LCn>0
(f)
f2 : UC | ? ` f2 : UC
(cp)
f1 : LC
2, f2 : UC | f1 : LC1, f2 : NC ` cp f1 f2 : void
Example 5.7.4. The command cp f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = {f1 : NC, f2 :
UC} since T (f1) 6v LCn>0 as shown below.
(f)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` f1 : NC NC 6v LCn>0
(f)
f2 : UC | ? ` f2 : UC
(?)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC |? ` cp f1 f2 :?
Example 5.7.5. The command cp f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = {f1 : UC}
since f2 62   as shown below.
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(f)
f1 : UC | ? ` f1 : UC UC v LCn>0
(?)
? |? ` f2 :?
(?)
f1 : UC |? ` cp f1 f2 :?
5.7.3 Typing rule for rm command
  |  0 ` f : ⌧
(rm)
  |  0 ` rm f : void
The typing rule for rm command says that if we can type f from the context  , then
we can type the command rm f of type void.
Example 5.7.6. The command rm f1 is typable in the context   = {f1 : NC, f2 : UC}
since f1 2   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` f1 : NC
(rm)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` rm f1 : void
Example 5.7.7. The command rm f1 is not typable in the context   = {f2 : UC} since
f1 62   as shown below.
(?)
f2 : UC |? ` f1 :?
(?)
f2 : UC |? ` rm f1 :?
5.7.4 Typing rule for mkf command
(mkf)
  |  , f : t ` mkf f t : void
The typing rule for mkf command says that typing the command mkf f t of type void
will add f of type t to the context  , provided that f 62  .
Example 5.7.8. The command mkf f1 NC is typable in the context   = {f2 : UC} since
f1 62   as shown below.
(mkf)
f2 : UC | f2 : UC, f1 : NC ` mkf f1 NC : void
Example 5.7.9. The command mkf f2 NC is not typable in the context   = {f2 : UC}
since f2 2   as shown below.
(?)
f2 : UC | f2 : UC, ? ` mkf f2 NC :?
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5.7.5 Typing rule for rd command:
  |  0 ` f : ⌧
(rd)
  |  0 ` rd f : void
The typing rule for rd command says that if we can type f from the context  , then
we can type the command rd f of type void.
Example 5.7.10. The command rd f1 is typable in the context   = {f1 : NC, f2 : UC}
since f1 2   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` f1 : NC
(rd)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` rd f1 : void
Example 5.7.11. The command rd f1 is not typable in the context   = {f2 : UC} since
f1 62   as shown below.
(?)
f2 : UC |? ` f1 :?
(?)
f2 : UC |? ` rd f1 :?
5.7.6 Typing rule for cat command
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0  00 |  000 ` f3 : ⌧ 00
(cat)
  |  000, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 t ⌧ 00 ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void
The typing rule for cat command says that if we can type f1, f2 and f3 from the
context  , then we can type the command cat f1 f2 f3 of type void and f1 and f2 will be
consumed from the context   while the type of f3 is changed to be the least upper bound
of its type, the type of f1 and the type of f2.
Example 5.7.12. The command cat f1 f2 f3 is typable in the context   = {f1 : UC, f2 :
NC, f3 : LC
4} since f1 2   and f2 2   and f3 2   as shown below. To compress the proof,
let   = {f2 : NC, f3 : LC4}.
(f)
  |   ` f1 : UC
(f)
  | f3 : LC4 ` f2 : NC
(f)
f3 : LC
4 | ? ` f3 : LC4
(cat)
  | f3 : NC ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void
Example 5.7.13. The command cat f1 f2 f3 is not typable in the context   = {f1 :
UC, f2 : NC} since f3 62   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : UC, f2 : NC | f2 : NC ` f1 : UC
(f)
f2 : NC | ? ` f2 : NC
(?)
? |? ` f3 :?
(?)
f1 : UC, f2 : NC |? ` cat f1 f2 f3 :?
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5.7.7 Typing rule for mv command
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0
(mv)
  |  00, f2 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` mv f1 f2 : void
The typing rule for mv command says that if we can type f1 and f2 from the context
 , then we can type the command mv f1 f2 of type void and f1 will be consumed from the
context   while the type of f2 is changed to be the least upper bound of its type and the
type of f1.
Example 5.7.14. The command mv f1 f2 is typable in the context   = {f1 : NC, f2 : UC}
since f1 2   and f2 2   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` f1 : NC
(f)
f2 : UC | ? ` f2 : UC
(mv)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : NC ` mv f1 f2 : void
Example 5.7.15. The command mv f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = {f1 : NC}
since f2 62   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : NC | ? ` f1 : NC
(?)
? |? ` f2 :?
(?)
f1 : NC |? ` mv f1 f2 :?
5.7.8 Typing rule for copy command
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ ⌧ v LCn>0
(copy)
  |  0, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : dst(⌧) ` copy f1 f2 : void
The typing rule for copy command says that if we can type f1 from the context  ,
and f1 is of type UC or LC
n>0, then we can type the command copy f1 f2 of type void
and the type of f1 is changed to be red(T (f1)), and f2 will added to the context   and
assigned the type dst(f1), provided that f2 62  .
Example 5.7.16. The command copy f1 f2 is typable in the context   = {f1 : LC1}
since f1 2  , f2 62   and T (f1) v LCn>0 as shown below.
(f)
f1 : LC
1 | ? ` f1 : LC1 LC1 v LCn>0
(copy)
f1 : LC
1 | f1 : LC0, f2 : NC ` copy f1 f2 : void
Example 5.7.17. The command copy f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = {f1 : LC0}
since T (f1) 6v LCn>0 as shown below.
(f)
f1 : LC
0 | ? ` f1 : LC0 LC0 6v LCn>0
(?)
f1 : LC
0 |? ` copy f1 f2 :?
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Example 5.7.18. The command copy f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = {f1 :
LC1, f2 : UC} since f2 2   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : LC
1, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` f1 : LC1 LC1 v LCn>0
(?)
f1 : LC
1 | f2 : UC, f1 : LC1, ? ` copy f1 f2 :?
Example 5.7.19. The command copy f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = ? since
f1 62   as shown below.
(?)
? |? ` f1 :? ? v LCn>0
(?)
? |? ` copy f1 f2 :?
5.7.9 Typing rule for append command
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0
(append)
  |  00, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` append f1 f2 f3 : void
The typing rule for append command says that if we can type f1 and f2 from the
context  , then we can type the command append f1 f2 f3 of type void and f1 and f2 will
be consumed from the context   while f3 will be added to the context   and its type will
be the least upper bound of the type of f1 and the type of f2, provided that f3 62  .
Example 5.7.20. The command append f1 f2 f3 is typable in the context   = {f1 :
UC, f2 : NC} since f1 2  , f2 2  , and f3 62   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : UC, f2 : NC | f2 : NC ` f1 : UC
(f)
f2 : NC | ? ` f2 : NC
(append)
f1 : UC, f2 : NC | f3 : NC ` append f1 f2 f3 : void
Example 5.7.21. The command append f1 f2 f3 is not typable in the context   = {f1 :
UC, f2 : NC, f3 : LC
0} since f3 2   as shown below.
(f)
  | f2 : NC, f3 : LC0 ` f1 : UC
(f)
f2 : NC, f3 : LC
0 | f3 : LC0 ` f2 : NC
(?)
  | f3 : LC0, ? ` append f1 f2 f3 : void
Example 5.7.22. The command append f1 f2 f3 is not typable in the context   = {f1 :
UC} since f2 62   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : UC | ? ` f1 : UC
(?)
? |? ` f2 :?
(?)
f1 : UC |? ` append f1 f2 f3 :?
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5.7.10 Typing rule for move command
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧
(move)
  |  0, f2 : ⌧ ` move f1 f2 : void
The typing rule for move command says that if we can type f1 from the context  ,
then we can type the command move f1 f2 of type void and f1 will be consumed from the
context   while f2 will be added to the context   and its type will be the same as the
type of f1, provided that f2 62  .
Example 5.7.23. The command move f1 f2 is typable in the context   = {f1 : NC} since
f1 2   and f2 62   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : NC | ? ` f1 : NC
(move)
f1 : NC | f2 : NC ` move f1 f2 : void
Example 5.7.24. The command move f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = {f1 :
NC, f2 : UC} since f2 2   as shown below.
(f)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC ` f1 : NC
(?)
f1 : NC, f2 : UC | f2 : UC, ? ` move f1 f2 :?
Example 5.7.25. The command move f1 f2 is not typable in the context   = ? since
f1 62   as shown below.
(?)
? |? ` f1 :?
(?)
? |? ` move f1 f2 :?
5.7.11 Typing rule for sequences of commands
  |  0 ` c : void  0 |  00 ` cs : void
(cs)
  |  00 ` c; cs : void
The typing rule for sequences of commands cs says that if typing the command c of
type void changes the context   to  0 and typing the command cs of type void changes
the context  0 to  00, then typing these commands in sequence changes the context   to
 00.
Example 5.7.26. The sequence of commands rd f1; rdf2; rd f3 is typable in the context
  = {f1 : UC, f2 : LC2, f3 : NC} as shown below. To compress the proof, let   = {f2 :
LC2, f3 : NC}.
(f)
  |   ` f1 : UC
(rd)
  |   ` rd f1 : void
(f)
  | f3 : NC ` f2 : LC2
(rd)
  | f3 : NC ` rd f2 : void
(f)
f3 : NC | ? ` f3 : NC
(rd)
f3 : NC | ? ` rd f3 : void
(rd)
  | ? ` rdf2; rd f3 : void
(cs)
f1 : UC, f2 : LC
2, f3 : NC | ? ` rd f1; rdf2; rd f3 : void
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5.8 Properties of the type system
In this section we prove the soundness of our type system with respect to the operational
semantics. A type system is sound if well-typed programs compute without evaluation
errors. We defined evaluation errors to be syntactical and type errors. Syntactical errors
can occur by all commands while type errors can only occur by two commands which
are cp and copy. This is because cp and copy commands apply the operations dst(⌧)
and red(⌧) to the type of the source file and will cause a type error if their constraints
are not satisfied. Therefore, all well-typed commands evaluate without an error if they
can evaluate without syntactical errors and well-typed cp and copy commands evaluate
without an error if they can evaluate without syntactical errors as well as type errors. We
prove the soundness of our type system by proving two properties which are progress and
preservation.
5.8.1 Progress
Traditionally, the progress theorem states that a program is either a value or can take a
step of evaluation. However, in our case, programs are commands that operate on files in
a file system, and should always take a step of evaluation. Therefore, if a command e is
typable in a particular file system  , then the command e must take a step of evaluation.
Theorem 5.8.1 (Progress). If   =   and   |  0 ` e : ⌧ , then he,  i 6! Err
Proof. We proceed by cases on typing derivation of e. There are 9 cases as follows.
1. e = cp f1 f2
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (cp) with conclusion:   |
 00, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : ⌧ 0 t dst(⌧) ` cp f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivations
with conclusions:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ , ⌧ v LCn>0 and  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0. Now we can
use rule (1) to obtain hcp f1 f2 ,  i !  [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f2) t dst(T (f1))][f1  
red(T (f1))]. Since the configuration hcp f1 f2 ,  i require f1 2   and f2 2   and
f1 6= f2 to be evaluated without syntactical error, and we have f1 2   and f2 2  
and f1 6= f2 in  , because   does not allow repetition of file names, and   =  .
Then, hcp f1 f2 ,   i 6!s Err. Also, since the operations dst(T (f1)) and red(T (f1))
requires (T (f1)) v LCn>0 in   and we have T (f1) v LCn>0 in   and   =  . Then,
hcp f1 f2 ,   i 6! Err as required.
2. e = rm f
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We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (rm) with conclusion:   |
 0 ` rm f : void. We must also have subderivation with conclusion:   |  0 ` f : ⌧ .
Now we can use rule (2) to obtain hrm f,  i !  [ f ]. Since the configuration hrm f,  i
requires f 2   to be evaluated without syntactical error, and we have f 2   and
  =  . Then hrm f,  i 6! Err.
3. e = mkf f t
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (mkf) with conclusion:
  |  , f : t ` mkf f t : void. Now we can use rule (3) to obtain hmkf f t,  i !
 [+f ][f  t]. Since the configuration hmkf f t,  i requires f 62   to be evaluated
without syntactical error, and we have f 62  , because the symbol “,” in  , f : t does
not allow repetition of file names, and   =  . Then, hmkf f t,  i 6! Err.
4. e = rd f
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (rd) with conclusion:   |
 0 ` rd f : void. We must also have subderivation with conclusion:   |  0 ` f : ⌧ .
Now we can use rule (4) to obtain hrd f,  i !  [ f ]. Since the configuration hrd f,  i
requires f 2   to be evaluated without syntactical error, and we have f 2   and
  =  . Then hrd f,  i 6! Err.
5. e = cat f1 f2 f3
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (cat) with conclusion:
  |  000, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 t ⌧ 00 ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void. We must also have subderivations
with conclusions:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ ,  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0, and  00 |  000 ` f3 : ⌧ 00. Now
we can use rule (5) to obtain hcat f1 f2 f3,  i !  [f3  C(f1) + C(f2)][f3  
T (f1) t T (f2) t T (f3)][ f1, f2]. Since the configuration hcat f1 f2 f3,  i requires
f1 2  , f2 2  , f3 2  , and f1, f2 and f3 have distinct names to be evaluated without
syntactical error, and we have f1 2  , f2 2  , f3 2  , and f1, f2 and f3 have distinct
names in  , because   does not allow repetition of file names, and   =  . Then,
hcat f1 f2 f3,  i 6! Err.
6. e = mv f1 f2
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (mv) with conclusion:   |
 00, f2 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` mv f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivations with conclusions:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ and  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0. Now we can use rule (6) to obtain hmv f1 f2 ,  i !
 [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f1)tT (f2)][ f1]. Since the configuration hmv f1 f2 ,  i requires
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f1 2  , f2 2  , and f1 6= f2 in   to be evaluated without syntactical error, and we
have f1 2  , f2 2  , and f1 6= f2 in  , because   does not allow repetition of file
names, and   =  . Then, hmv f1 f2,  i 6! Err.
7. e = copy f1 f2
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (copy) with conclusion:
  |  0, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : dst(⌧) ` copy f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivation
with conclusion:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ and ⌧ v LCn>0. Now we can use rule (7) to obtain
hcopy f1 f2 ,  i !  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]. Since the
configuration hcopy f1 f2 ,  i requires f1 2  , f2 62   and f1 6= f2 in   to be evaluated
without syntactical error, and we have f1 2  , f2 62   and f1 6= f2 in  , and   =  .
Then, hcopy f1 f2 ,  i 6!s Err. Also, since the operations dst(T (f1)) and red(T (f1))
requires (T (f1)) v LCn>0 in   and we have T (f1) v LCn>0 in   and   =  . Then,
hcopy f1 f2 ,   i 6! Err as required.
8. e = append f1 f2 f3
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (append) with conclusion:
  |  00, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` append f1 f2 f3 : void. We must also have subderivations with
conclusions:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ and  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0. Now we can use rule (8) to obtain
happend f1 f2 f3,  i !  [+f3, f3  C(f1) + C(f2)][f3  T (f1) t T (f2)][ f1, f2].
Since the configuration happend f1 f2 f3,  i requires f1 2  , f2 2  , f3 62  , and f1,
f2 and f3 have distinct names in   to be evaluated without syntactical error, and we
have f1 2  , f2 2  , f3 62  , and f1, f2 and f3 have distinct names in  , because  
does not allow repetition of file names, and   =  . Then, happend f1 f2 f3,  i 6! Err.
9. e = move f1 f2
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (move) with conclusion:
  |  0, f2 : ⌧ ` move f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivation with conclusion:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ . Now we can use rule (9) to obtain hmove f1 f2,   i !  [+f2, f2  
C(f1)][f2  T (f1)][ f1]. Since the configuration hmove f1 f2,   i requires f2 62  ,
f1 2  , and f1 6= f2 in  , and we have f2 62  , f1 2  , and f1 6= f2 in  , and   =  .
Then, hmove f1 f2,  i 6! Err.
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5.8.2 Preservation
Traditionally, the preservation theorem states that as we evaluated a program, its type
is preserved at each evaluation step. As we mentioned above, in our case, programs are
commands which are all of type void. However, programs manipulate files and their types,
and we need to ensure that types of files are preserved during evaluation. Therefore, if a
command is typable in a particular file system  , then types of files we obtain by typing
the command must be preserved in the file system we obtain by evaluating the command.
This property shows the consistency of the type system with the operational semantics,
that is not only typed commands evaluate without errors, but also the types of files in the
file system after evaluating the command correspond to the types of files resulted from
typing the commands.
Theorem 5.8.2 (Preservation). If   =   and   |  0 ` e : ⌧ , and he,  i !  0, then  0 =  0.
Proof. We proceed by cases on he,  i !  0. There are 9 cases as follows.
1. e = hcp f1 f2 ,   i !  [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f2) t dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (cp) with conclusion:   |
 00, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : ⌧ 0 t dst(⌧) ` cp f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivations
with conclusions:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ , ⌧ v LCn>0 and  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0. To compress
the proof let  0 =  [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f2) t dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]. Now we
have the following cases based on typing f1 and f2.
(a) :   |  0 ` f1 : LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : UC
In this case, the typing derivation of emust have the form   |  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 :
NC ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 : NC. Now we know that
  6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1) and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1 and
UC 6= NC, respectively. We also know that   6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1)
and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1 and UC 6= NC, respectively.
Since   6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1) and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), and   6=  0 because
 (f1) 6=  0(f1) and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), and  0(f1) =  0(f1) that is LCn 1 = LCn 1
and  0(f2) =  0(f2) that is NC = NC, and   =  . Then,  0 =  0 as required.
(b) :   |  0 ` f1 : LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : LCn>0.
In this case, the typing derivation of emust have the form   |  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 :
NC ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 : NC. Now we know that
  6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1) and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1 and
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LCn>0 6= NC, respectively. We also know that   6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1)
and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1 and LCn>0 6= NC, respectively.
Since   6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1) and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), and   6=  0 because
 (f1) 6=  0(f1) and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), and  0(f1) =  0(f1) that is LCn 1 = LCn 1
and  0(f2) =  0(f2) that is NC = NC, and   =  . Then,  0 =  0 as required.
(c) :   |  0 ` f1 : LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : NC
In this case, the typing derivation of emust have the form   |  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 :
NC ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 : NC. Now we know that
  6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1. We also know that
  6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1. Since   6=  0 because
 (f1) 6=  0(f1), and   6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1), and  0(f1) =  0(f1), that is
LCn 1 = LCn 1 and   =  . Then,  0 =  0 as required.
(d) :   |  0 ` f1 : UC  0 |  00 ` f2 : UC
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  00, f1 : UC, f2 :
UC ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : UC, f2 : UC. Now we know that   =  0
and   =  0. Since   =  0 and   =  0 and   =  , then  0 =  0.
(e) :   |  0 ` f1 : UC  0 |  00 ` f2 : LCn>0
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  00, f1 : UC, f2 :
LCn>0 ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : UC, f2 : LCn>0. Now we know that
  =  0 and   =  0. Since   =  0 and   =  0 and   =  , then  0 =  0.
(f) :   |  0 ` f1 : UC  0 |  00 ` f2 : NC
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  00, f1 : UC, f2 :
NC ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : UC, f2 : NC. Now we know that   =  0
and   =  0. Since   =  0 and   =  0 and   =  , then  0 =  0.
2. e = hrm f,  i !  [ f ]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (rm) with conclusion:   |  0 `
rm f : void. We must also have subderivation with conclusion:   |  0 ` f : ⌧ . We
know that   6=  0 because f 62  0. We also know that   6=  [ f ] because f 62  [ f ].
Since   6=  0 because f 62  0 and   6=  [ f ] because f 62  [ f ], and   =  . Then,
 0 =  [ f ] as required.
3. e = hmkf f t,  i !  [+f ][f  t]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (mkf) with conclusion:
  |  , f : t ` mkf f t : void. Let  0 =  , f : t and  0 =  [+f ][f  t]. We know that
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  6=  0 because f : t 2  0. We also know that   6=  0 because f : t 2  0. Since   6=  0
because f : t 2  0, and   6=  0 because f : t 2  0, and  0(f) =  0(f), and   =  .
Then,  0 =  0 as required.
4. e = hrd f,  i !  [ f ]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (rd) with conclusion:   |  0 `
rd f : void. We must also have subderivation with conclusion:   |  0 ` f : ⌧ . We
know that   6=  0 because f 62  0. We also know that   6=  [ f ] because f 62  [ f ].
Since   6=  0 because f 62  0 and   6=  [ f ] because f 62  [ f ], and   =  . Then,
 0 =  [ f ] as required.
5. e = hcat f1 f2 f3,  i !  [f3  C(f1)+C(f2)][f3  T (f1)tT (f2)tT (f3)][ f1, f2]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (cat) with conclusion:
  |  000, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 t ⌧ 00 ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void. We must also have subderivations
with conclusions:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ ,  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0, and  00 |  000 ` f3 : ⌧ 00. Let
 0 =  [f3  C(f1)+C(f2)][f3  T (f1)tT (f2)tT (f3)][ f1, f2]. Now we have the
following cases based on typing f1, f2, and f3.
(a)   |  0 ` f1 : NC  0 |  00 ` f2 : LCn>0  00 |  000 ` f3 : UC
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  000, f3 : NC `
cat f1 f2 f3 : void. Let  0 =  000, f3 : NC. We know that   6=  0 because
f1 : NC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0 and  (f3) 6=  0(f3), that is UC 6= NC. We also
know that   6=  0 because f1 : NC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0 and  (f3) 6=  0(f3),
that is UC 6= NC. Since   6=  0 because f1 : NC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0
and  (f3) 6=  0(f3), and   6=  0 because f1 : NC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0 and
 (f3) 6=  0(f3), and  0(f3) =  0(f3), that is NC = NC, and   =  . Then,
 0 =  0.
Other cases are similar.
6. e = hmv f1 f2 ,   i !  [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f1) t T (f2)][ f1]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (mv) with conclusion:   |
 00, f2 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` mv f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivations with conclusions:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ and  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0. Let  0 =  [f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f1)tT (f2)][ f1].
Now we have the following cases based on typing f1 and f2.
(a)   |  0 ` f1 : NC  0 |  00 ` f2 : UC
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In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  00, f2 : NC `
mv f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f2 : NC. Now we know that   6=  0 because
f1 : NC 62  0 and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), that is UC 6= NC. We also know that   6=  0
because f1 : NC 62  0 and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), that is UC 6= NC. Since   6=  0
because f1 : NC 62  0 and  (f2) 6=  0(f2), and   6=  0 because f1 : NC 62  0 and
 (f2) 6=  0(f2), and  0(f2) =  0(f2), and   =  . Then,  0 =  0.
Other cases are similar.
7. e = hcopy f1 f2 ,  i !  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (copy) with conclusion:
  |  0, f1 : red(⌧), f2 : dst(⌧) ` copy f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivation
with conclusion:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ and ⌧ v LCn>0. Let  0 =  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  
dst(T (f1))][f1  red(T (f1))]. Now we have the following cases based on typing f1.
(a)   |  0 ` f1 : LCn>0
In this case, the typing derivation of emust have the form   |  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 :
NC ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : LCn 1, f2 : NC. We know that   6=  0
because  (f1) 6=  0(f1), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1 and f2 : NC 2  0. We also know
that   6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1), that is LCn>0 6= LCn 1 and f2 : NC 2  0.
Since   6=  0 because  (f1) 6=  0(f1) and f2 : NC 2  0, and   6=  0 because
 (f1) 6=  0(f1) and f2 : NC 2  0, and  0(f1) =  0(f1), that is LCn 1 = LCn 1,
and  0(f2) =  0(f2), that is NC = NC, and   =  . Then,  0 =  0.
(b)   |  0 ` f1 : UC
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  00, f1 : UC, f2 :
UC ` cp f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  00, f1 : UC, f2 : UC. We know that   6=  0
because f2 : UC 2  0. We also know that   6=  0 because f2 : UC 2  0.
Since   6=  0 because f2 : UC 2  0, and   6=  0 because f2 : UC 2  0, and
 0(f2) =  0(f2), that is UC = UC, and   =  . Then,  0 =  0.
8. e = happend f1 f2 f3,  i !  [+f3, f3  C(f1)+C(f2)][f3  T (f1)tT (f2)][ f1, f2]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (append) with conclusion:
  |  00, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` append f1 f2 f3 : void. We must also have subderivations
with conclusions:   |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ and  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0. Let  0 =  [+f3, f3  
C(f1)+C(f2)][f3  T (f1)tT (f2)][ f1, f2]. Now we have 6 cases based on typing
f1 and f2, we show two of them.
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(a) :   |  0 ` f1 : UC  0 |  00 ` f2 : NC
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  00, f3 : NC `
append f1 f2 f3 : void. Let  0 =  00, f3 : NC. We know that   6=  0 because
f1 : UC 62  0, f2 : NC 62  0, and f3 : NC 2  0. We also know that   6=  0 because
f1 : UC 62  0, f2 : NC 62  0, and f3 : NC 2  0. Since   6=  0 because f1 : UC 62  0,
f2 : NC 62  0 and f3 : NC 2  0, and   6=  0 because f1 : UC 62  0, f2 : NC 62  0
and f3 : NC 2  0, and   =  . Then,  0 =  0.
(b) :   |  0 ` f1 : UC  0 |  00 ` f2 : LCn>0
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  00, f3 : LCn>0 `
append f1 f2 f3 : void. Let  0 =  00, f3 : LCn>0. We know that   6=  0 because
f1 : UC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0, and f3 : LCn>0 2  0. We also know that   6=  0
because f1 : UC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0, and f3 : LCn>0 2  0. Since   6=  0
because f1 : UC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0 and f3 : LCn>0 2  0, and   6=  0 because
f1 : UC 62  0, f2 : LCn>0 62  0 and f3 : LCn>0 2  0, and   =  . Then,  0 =  0.
Other cases are similar.
9. e = hmove f1 f2,   i !  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f1)][ f1]
We know there is a typing derivation for e by using rule (move) with conclusion:
  |  0, f2 : ⌧ ` move f1 f2 : void. We must also have subderivation with conclusion:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧ . Let  0 =  [+f2, f2  C(f1)][f2  T (f1)][ f1]. Now we have the
following cases based on typing f1.
(a)   |  0 ` f1 : NC
In this case, the typing derivation of e must have the form   |  0, f2 : NC `
move f1 f2 : void. Let  0 =  0, f2 : NC. Now we know that   6=  0 because
f1 : NC 62  0 and f2 : NC 2  0. We also know that   6=  0 because f1 : NC 62  0
and f2 : NC 2  0. Since   6=  0 because f1 : NC 62  0 and f2 : NC 2  0, and
  6=  0 because f1 : NC 62  0 and f2 : NC 2  0, and  0(f2) =  0(f2), and   =  .
Then,  0 =  0.
Other cases are similar.
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5.9 Type inference algorithm
In this section we present a type inference algorithm T for typing phrases. The type
inference algorithm T finds the type of a phrase within a given type environment if any
such type exists. That is, for a given phrase e and initial type environment A, the type
inference algorithm computes a type ⌧ of e if e is typable or fails if e is not typable.
We prove two properties of the algorithm T which are soundness and completeness. The
algorithm T is sound if it only computes types of phrases that are typable in the given
type environment. This property is useful to show that the algorithm T will not give false
positive results. The algorithm T is complete if it only fails to compute types of phrases
that are not typable in the given type environment. This property is useful to show that
the algorithm T will not give false negative results.
5.9.1 Algorithm T
The algorithm T is defined as a recursive function. The main function T (A, e), takes a type
environment A and a phrase e, and computes (⌧, A0) which is the unique type ⌧ of e and
the new environment A0. The algorithm fails if any of the recursive invocations of T (A, e)
fails or any of the invocations of the helper functions defined below fails. Such failure
indicates a typing error. We define a number of helper functions: check(↵, ) returns
true if the types are compatible. Note that any two base types are not compatible, e.g.
check(LC, void) will fail, and type variable and base type will always succeed. less(⌧, ⌧ 0)
returns true if ⌧ v ⌧ 0. lub(⌧, . . . , ⌧n) returns the least upper bound of all its parameters
i.e. ⌧ t . . .t⌧n. It should be noted that unification is not needed in our case, since we need
to check for base types rather variable types. Using these functions, we can now define
the type inference algorithm T :
T (A, e) = (⌧, A0)
where:
1. If e is the filename f , and f : ↵ 2 A then ⌧ = ↵, A0 = Ar {f : ↵}.
2. If e is a sequence of commands, c; cs let
( , A1) = T (A, c)
check( , void)
(↵, A2) = T (A1, cs)
check(↵, void)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2.
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3. If e is the command cp f1 f2 let
( , A1) = T (A, f1)
less( , LCn>0)
(↵, A2) = T (A1, f2)
then if f1, f2 62 A2, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f1 : red( ), f2 : lub(↵, dst( ))}.
4. If e is the command rm f let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1.
5. If e is the command mkf f t, then if f 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A [ {f : t}.
6. If e is the command rd f let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1.
7. If e is the command cat f1 f2 f3 let
( , A1) = T (A, f1)
(↵, A2) = T (A1, f2)
( , A3) = T (A2, f3)
then if f3 62 A3, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A3 [ {f3 : lub( ,↵,  )}.
8. If e is the command mv f1 f2 let
( , A1) = T (A, f1)
(↵, A2) = T (A1, f2)
then if f2 62 A2, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f2 : lub( ,↵)}.
9. If e is the command copy f1 f2 let
( , A1) = T (A, f1)
less( , LCn>0)
then if f2 62 A and f1 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f1 : red( ), f2 : dst( )}.
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10. If e is the command append f1 f2 f3 let
( , A1) = T (A, f1)
(↵, A2) = T (A1, f2)
then if f3 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f3 : lub( ,↵)}.
11. If e is the move command, move f1 f2 let
( , A1) = T (A, f1)
then if f2 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f2 :  }.
5.9.2 Soundness of T
In this section we show that the algorithm T is sound with respect to the formal typing
system. The algorithm T is sound if for any given type environment A and phrase e, if
the algorithm T on input A and e computes the new environment A0 and the type ⌧ , then
there is a derivation for e such that A | A0 ` e : ⌧ in the type system:
T (A, e) = (⌧, A0)) A | A0 ` e : ⌧
Theorem 5.9.1 (Soundness of T ). If T (A, e) succeeds with (⌧, A0), then there is a deriv-
ation ending in A | A0 ` e : ⌧ .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of the prhase e. There are 11 cases as
follows.
1. If e is the filename f and f : ⌧ 2 A [ {f : ⌧}, then T (A [ {f : ⌧}, f) succeeds
immediately with (⌧, A). Using the (f) rule, there is a derivation ending in A, f : ⌧ |
A ` f : ⌧ as required.
2. If e is the sequence of commands c; cs, then T (A, c) succeeds with ( , A1), check( , void)
succeeds, T (A1, cs) succeeds with (↵, A2), and check(↵, void) also succeeds. Now,
by the inductive hypothesis twice, there are derivations A | A1 ` c : void and
A1 | A2 ` cs : void. Using the (cs) rule, there is a derivation A | A2 ` c; cs : void as
required.
3. If e is the cp command cp f1 f2, then T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1) and T (A1, f2)
succeeds with (↵, A2). By the inductive hypothesis twice, there are derivations
ending in A | A1 ` f1 :   and A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵. Since less( ,LCn>0), we have
  v LCn>0 and now we can use the (cp) rule to give a derivation of A | A2, f1 :
red( ), f2 : ↵ t dst( ) ` cp f1 f2 : void as required.
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4. If e is the rm command rm f , then T (A, f) succeeds with (↵, A1). By the inductive
hypothesis, there is a derivation of A | A1 ` f : ↵. Now we can use the (rm) rule to
give a derivation of A | A1 ` rm f : void as required.
5. If e is the mkf command mkf f t and f 62 A, then T (A, (mkf f t)) succeeds im-
mediately with (void, A [ {f : ⌧}). Using the (mkf) rule, there is a derivation
A | A, f : t ` mkf f t : void as required.
6. If e is the rd command rd f , then T (A, f) succeeds with (↵, A1). By the inductive
hypothesis, there is a derivation ending in A | A1 ` f : ↵. Using the (rd) rule, there
is a derivation A | A1 ` rd f : void as required.
7. If e is the cat command cat f1 f2 f3, then T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1), T (A1, f2)
succeeds with (↵, A2), and T (A2, f3) succeeds with ( , A3). Now, by the inductive
hypothesis triple, there are derivations ending in A | A1 ` f1 :  , A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵,
and A2 | A3 ` f3 :  . Using the (cat) rule, there is a derivation A | A3, f3 :  t↵t  `
cat f1 f2 f3 : void as required.
8. If e is the mv command mv f1 f2, then T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1) and T (A1, f2)
succeeds with (↵, A2). By the inductive hypothesis twice, there are derivations
ending in A | A1 ` f1 :   and A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵. Now we can use the (mv) rule to give
a derivation of A | A2, f2 :   t ↵ ` mv f1 f2 : void as required.
9. If e is the copy command copy f1 f2, then T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1). By
the inductive hypothesis, there is a derivation ending in A | A1 ` f1 :  . Since
less( ,LCn>0), we have   v LCn>0 and now we can use the (copy) rule to give a
derivation of A | A1, f1 : red( )f2 : dst( ) ` copy f1 f2 : void as required.
10. If e is the append command append f1 f2 f3, then T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1)
and T (A1, f2) succeeds with (↵, A2). By the inductive hypothesis twice, there are
derivations ending in A | A1 ` f1 :   and A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵. Now by using the
(append) rule, there is a derivation of A | A2, f3 :   t ↵ ` append f1 f2 f3 : void as
required.
11. If e is the move command move f1 f2, then T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1). By the
inductive hypothesis, there is a derivation ending in A | A1 ` f1 :  . Using the
(move) rule, there is a derivation of A | A1, f2 :   ` move f1 f2 : void as required.
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5.9.3 Completeness of T
In this section we show that the algorithm T is complete with respect to the formal typing
system. The algorithm T is complete if for any given type environment A and phrase e, if
there is a derivation for e such that A | A0 ` e : ⌧ in the type system, then the algorithm
T on input A and e will compute the new environment A0 and the type ⌧ .
A | A0 ` e : ⌧ ) T (A, e) = (⌧, A0)
Theorem 5.9.2 (Completeness of T ). If there is a derivation ending in A | A0 ` e : ⌧ ,
then T (A, e) succeeds with (⌧, A0).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of the prhase e. There are 11 cases as
follows.
1. If e is the file name f and f : ⌧ 2 A[ {f : ⌧}, then by (f) rule, there is a derivation
ending in A, f : ⌧ | A ` f : ⌧ . Now, T (A [ {f : ⌧}, f) succeeds with (⌧, A) as
required.
2. If e is the sequence of commands c; cs, then by (cs) rule there is a derivation ending
in A | A2 ` c; cs : void which consists of two derivations: A | A1 ` c : void and
A1 | A2 ` cs : void. By the induction hypothesis twice, T (A, c) succeeds with
(void, A1) for the first derivation and T (A1, cs) succeeds with (void, A2) for the
second derivation. Now T (A, (c, cs)) succeeds with (void, A2) as requied.
3. If e is the cp command cp f1 f2, then by (cp) rule, there is a derivation ending
in A | A2, f1 : red( ), f2 : ↵ t dst( ) ` cp f1 f2 : void which consists of two
derivations: A | A1 ` f1 :   and A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵. By the induction hypothesis twice
and since   v LCn>0 we have less( ,LCn>0), T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1) for
the first derivation, and T (A1, f2) succeeds with (↵, A2) for the second derivation.
Now T (A, (cp f1 f2)) succeeds with (void, A2 [ {f1 : red( ), f2 : lub(↵, dst( ))}) as
required.
4. If e is the rm command rm f , then by (rm) rule there is a derivation ending in
A | A1 ` rm f : void which consists of one derivation: A | A1 ` f :  . By the
induction hypothesis, T (A, f) succeeds with ( , A1). Now T (A, (rm f)) succeeds
with (void, A1) as required.
5. If e is the command mkf f t and f 62 A, then by (mkf) rule, there is a derivation
ending in A | A, f : ⌧ ` mkf f t : void. Now, T (A, (mkf f t)) succeeds with
(void, A [ {f : ⌧}) as required.
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6. If e is the command rd f , then by (rd) rule there is a derivation ending in A | A1 `
rd f : void which consists of one derivation: A | A1 ` f :  . By the induction hypo-
thesis, T (A, f) succeeds with ( , A1). Now, T (A, (rd f)) succeeds with (void, A1)
as required.
7. If e is the cat command cat f1 f2 f3, then by (cat) rule, there is a derivation
ending in A | A3, f3 :   t ↵ t   ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void which consists of three
derivations: A | A1 ` f1 :  , A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵, and A2 | A3 ` f3 :  . By the
induction hypothesis triple, T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1), T (A1, f2) succeeds with
(↵, A2), and T (A2, f3) succeeds with ( , A3). Now, T (A, (cat f1 f2 f3)) succeeds
with (void,A3 [ {f3 : lub( ,↵,  )}) as required.
8. If e is the mv command mv f1 f2, then by (mv) rule, there is a derivation ending in
A | A2, f2 :   t ↵ ` mv f1 f2 : void which consists of two derivations: A | A1 ` f1 :  
and A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵. By the induction hypothesis twice, T (A, f1) succeeds with
( , A1) and T (A1, f2) succeeds with (↵, A2). Now, T (A, (mv f1 f2)) succeeds with
(void, A2 [ {f2 : lub( ,↵)}) as required.
9. If e is the copy command copy f1 f2, then by (copy) rule, there is a derivation
ending in A | A1, f1 : red( ), f2 : dst( ) ` copy f1 f2 : void which consists of one
derivation: A | A1 ` f1 :  . By the induction hypothesis and since   v LCn>0
we have less( ,LCn>0), T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1). Now T (A, (copy f1 f2))
succeeds with (void, A1 [ {f1 : red( )f2 : dst( )}) as required.
10. If e is the append command append f1 f2 f3, then by (append) rule, there is a
derivation ending in A | A2, f3 :   t ↵ ` append f1 f2 f3 : void which consists of
two derivations: A | A1 ` f1 :   and A1 | A2 ` f2 : ↵. By the induction hypothesis
twice, T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1) and T (A1, f2) succeeds with (↵, A2). Now,
T (A, (append f1 f2 f3)) succeeds with (void, A2 [ {f3 : lub( ,↵)}) as required.
11. If e is the move command move f1 f2, then by (move) rule, there is a derivation
ending in A | A1, f2 :   ` move f1 f2 : void which consists of one derivation:
A | A1 ` f1 :  . By the induction hypothesis, T (A, f1) succeeds with ( , A1). Now,
T (A, (move f1 f2)) succeeds with (void, A1 [ {f2 :  }}) as required.
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5.10 Summary
In this chapter we presented our approach to enforce a particular constraint of the policies
identified in Chapter 4; namely, limiting the number of times a file can be read. We
enforced this constraint by limiting the number of copies a file can produce. We achieved
this by defining security types that regulate copy operations on files. These security types
control the access to copy operations and the flow caused by all operations including copy,
such that policies for copying files are not violated. The file system we consider is based
on the notion of resource consumption, that is a file is a resource which is consumed when
it is used, unless the file is explicitly copied. Therefore, a file can be read as much as it
can be copied. If the file cannot be copied, then it can be read only once. We designed
a language of commands to enforce these policies in a file system. The commands of the
language can be issued to manipulate files according to their policies. We showed that
these commands might result in execution errors. We divided these errors into syntactical
and type errors. The former occur when the constraints of an operation applied to the
file system are not satisfied while the latter occur when the constraints of an operation
applied to a type of a file are not satisfied. We discussed syntactical errors and define
an algorithm to check for syntactical correctness of commands before execution. While
this su ces to prevent syntactical errors before execution, type errors might still occur.
Therefore, we developed a type system that enforces the policies of files and prevents both
syntactical errors and type errors of commands before execution. That is, a type-checked
commands are guaranteed to not cause errors during execution. We proved the soundness
of the type system with respect to the operational semantics of the language. Finally,
we define a type inference algorithm for typing phrases in our language, and proved its
soundness and completeness.
The type system developed in this chapter can be thought of as a reference monitor
that intercepts each command to be performed on files and checks if the command is
allowed by the types of the files and enforces the flow policies of these files. Types of files
are not necessarily stored with file names and contents in the file system  . They can
be separated from   and stored in a di↵erent location (e.g.,  ) and fetched upon request
by the type system. For example,   will be the set of file names with contents (e.g.,
{f1(c1), . . . , fn(cn)}) and   will be the set of file names with types (e.g., {f1 : ⌧1, . . . , fn :
⌧n}). For checking commands that need to be executed, the type system makes   to
be the typing context to begin with. Once all the commands are type-checked correctly,
the resulting typing context after the checking (e.g.,  0) should replace the types of files
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stored in  . In this way, we could have an untyped operational semantics that relies solely
on the safety guarantee given by the type system. In fact, the reason for having typed
operational semantics is just to simplify the soundness proof of the type system—once we
have established this result, we can optimise these out.
Unlike conventional security type systems where security types only represent inform-
ation flow policies, our security types can be thought of as files permissions that represent
both access control and information flow policies. They represent access control policies
as they dictate which commands can be issued on which types of files. They also represent
information flow policies as they form a lattice structure which dictates where informa-
tion is allowed to flow. For example, information flow from a file f1 to f2 is allowed if
and only if the permission of f2 is at least as restrictive as the permission of f1. Since
flow of information can only be caused by issuing commands on files, such commands are
subject to access control checks by the type system as well as information flow checks.
That is, the type system enforces access control policies by checking whether or not the
commands issued on files are allowed by their types, and enforces information flow policies
by checking whether or not the information flow caused by the commands, if any exists,
satisfies the lattice structure of the types associated with the files. Although the security
types presented in this chapter only regulates copy operations, other operations can be
regulated in the same way as we discuss in the next chapter.
The language and the type system presented in this chapter is kept to a minimum
to avoid complexity in presenting our approach. Various extensions useful in practice
including conditionals, loops, recursion, and variables are left for future work. We aimed
to start this line of research with a very simple language with the desired properties and
then extending it while ensuring these properties are still preserved. Therefore, we focused
on a small set of commands that are essential to perform the activity of file sharing in
a multi-user system such as Unix. In future work we aim to extend the language with
various features and the type system to enforce di↵erent kinds of policies useful in practice.
In this chapter we presented a small set of atomic commands that manipulate files.
These atomic commands can be grouped together to form macro commands. Such macro
commands can do the functionality of several atomic commands. An example of a useful
macro command is that which combines copy and rd commands. For example if we
introduce read as a macro command and define it as follows:
read f = copy f f 0; rd f 0
then, users will be relieved from having to issue copy command on a file each time they
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need to read it to retain a copy of it after reading it. That is, limiting the number of times
a file can be read is automatically handled by the macro command read. In this case,
users will have two options, either issuing read command to read a file and retain a copy
of it after reading it, or issuing rd command to read a file and consume it. Of course, if
the file cannot be copied, then it can only be read and consumed by issuing rd command.
At this stage, a program can either be a single command or a sequence of commands.
In a single command, the type system checks the command before executing it, to find out
whether the command will cause an error or not if it is executed. As mentioned above,
we can have untyped operational semantics and rely only on the type system such that
type-checked commands can only be executed. This is because it is guaranteed that type-
checked commands will not cause an error. In this case, therefore, the usefulness of our
approach is that a user cannot execute a command that violates files or system policies.
For example, the type system will prevent executing a command that removes a file that
does not exist, creates a file that already exists, copies a file that must not be copied,
or reads a file more than the allowed number of times. This is because such commands
violate our policies, and thus, will cause an error if executed.
On the other hand, in a sequence of commands, the type system checks every command
in the sequence before executing them, to find out whether any of them will cause an error
during execution. In this case, the usefulness of our approach is that a program which
consists of a sequence of commands can be either executed as a whole or nothing will be
executed. If we rely on typed operational semantics only, then a sequence of commands
will not be executed fully if there is a command, for example in the middle of the sequence,
causes an error. That is, some commands might be executed and others might not, and
thus, the program will not complete its job.
However, our type system will type-check such program which consists of a sequence
of commands, and only allow it to be executed if it is guaranteed that the program will
complete its job. That is, every command in the sequence will not cause an error during
execution. Having a program completing its job or nothing should be done is of great
importance in many scenarios. One of these scenarios is a program which consists of a
sequence of commands for copying each file in a file system for a backup purpose. If we
execute such program without type-checking, and if there is a copy command in the middle
of the sequence which copies a file of type NC. Then, this will cause an error and the
result of the program will be incomplete, because files will be copied up to the point of
the error and not all of them. However, our type system will reject this program because
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it contains an error, and thus, cannot be executed. Therefore, either the whole backup is
completed or nothing should be copied.
In fact, the importance of a program to complete its job applies to any program consists
of a sequence of commands which contains commands to be executed mainly for successful
execution of other commands. For example, copy f1 f2; rd f2 should not be executed if
the user issuing this sequence of commands is not allowed to read the file. This is because
the file f1 is copied in order to be read, however, if it cannot be read, then it should not
be copied in the first place.
Therefore, our type system helps users to execute correct programs that are not only
secure but also guaranteed to complete their jobs without any interruption as a result of
an error. Once the current language is extended with conditionals, loops, recursion, and
variables, type-checking programs will become essential for successful execution.
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Chapter 6
Future extension and discussion
6.1 Introduction
The type system presented in the previous chapter is focused on enforcing a particular
constraint which is limiting the number of times a file can be read in a file system (shared
memory). This is achieved by controlling the access to copy operations and the flow of
information caused by any operations, such that policies for copying files are not violated.
There are a number of ways in which the type system in the previous chapter can be
extended to enforce the various policies identified in Chapter 4. For example, the type
checker might not only enforce the number of times a file can be read, but also the di↵erent
types of access and propagation identified in Chapter 4. In this chapter we investigate
some of these possible extensions. The extensions discussed in this chapter require further
investigation and proofs of their properties which is our aim for future work. However, a
significant step towards realising these extensions is taken in this chapter.
This chapter is organised as follows: in Section 6.2 we define security access types
that represent security policies to regulate read and write operations. We discuss these
policies and show how the type system in the previous chapter can be used to enforce
the new policies with slight modification to the typing rules. In Section 6.3 we extend
the type system presented in the previous chapter to enforce both policies that regulate
copy, read, and write operations, and extend the typing algorithm for typing phrases
according to the revised type system. In Section 6.4 we extend policies of files to include
ownership and authorisation information. We present a revised type system that not only
enforces which operations can be performed on which types of files, but also which user
can perform these operations. In Section 6.5 we extend the language with commands
that manipulate policies of files, and present typing rules for these commands. We revise
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the typing algorithm presented in Section 6.3 for typing phrases according to the typing
rules presented in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. We discuss these extensions in Section 6.6 and
summarise the chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 Accessing files
The security policies imposed by the security types described in the previous chapter
are only concerned with the copy operations. Such security types regulate how the copy
operation can be performed on the original files as well as the copy version of these files.
Although copy is a crucial operation such that controlling it will limit the number of times
a file can be read in our system, it is not concerned with accessing the files. Accessing
the files can be made either by reading or modifying the files which are performed by the
two critical operations read and write, respectively. Similar to copy, the operations read
and write must be governed by the security policies to prevent unauthorised access to the
files. In this section we investigate additional security types which we refer to as security
access types that represent security policies to regulate read and write operations.
6.2.1 Security access types
We define six security access types to control read and write operations which are NRW,
RO, WO , WO+, RW , and RW+ each of which specifies a distinct policy of how read
and write operations can be performed on them. NRW stands for NoReadOrWrite, which
means that a file associated with this type cannot be read or written into it. RO stands
for ReadOnly, which means that a file associated with this type can only be read but
not written into it. WO  stands for WriteOnly, which means that a file associated with
this type can only be written into it by either appending or removing content from it.
WO+ stands for WriteOnly, which means that a file associated with this type can only
be written into by appending content but not removing content from it. RW  stands for
ReadWrite, which means that a file associated with this type can be read or written into
it by appending or removing content from it. RW+ stands for ReadWrite, which means
that a file associated with this type can be read or written into it by appending content
but not removing content from it.
Similar to the copy security types described in Chapter 5, the security access types form
a lattice (⌧,v) where ⌧ = {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}, are partially ordered by
v (see Figure 6.1). NRW and RW  are the upper bound and the lower bound of the set
⌧ , respectively. The least restrictive type is RW , while the most restrictive type is NRW.
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NRW
RO WO+
WO RW +
RW  
Figure 6.1: Security access types
In the previous chapter we dealt with copy security types and di↵erentiate between flow
of information caused by copy operations, such as cp and copy, and by other operations,
such as cat, mv, append etc. This is because we added more constraints on performing copy
operations such as the source file must be of type UC or LCn>0 and the destination file
must change its type to be the join of its type and the dst of the source type. In this way,
we control the access to copy operations and the flow caused by all operations including
copy. In this section we ignore the additional constraints imposed by the copy operations
and focus on the general policy introduced in the previous chapter and the security access
types introduced in this chapter. The policy of information flow generally stated that flow
of information from f1 to f2 is always allowed, provided that f2 must change its type to
T (f1) t T (f2) and f1 is consumed after performing the operation, if the operation is not
copy. Otherwise, f1 must not be consumed. If f2 62 Types, then it will be assigned the
join of the source types.
This policy violates the meaning of the security access types described above. For
example, assume that 8f 2 Types, T (f) 2 {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}; i.e.
that is, types of files are those of security access types only. Now, the typing rules in
the previous chapter which reflects the policies described above, violates the policies of
the security access types as follows. Assume that T (f1) = RO and T (f2) = NRW, then
mv f1 f2 will result in f2 changes its type to T (f1) t T (f2) = NRW. Although the new
type of f2 will always be at least as restrictive as both types of f1 and f2, the policy of f2
is violated. This is because the type of f2 is NRW which requires that such a file cannot
be written into it. Now assume that T (f1) = NRW and T (f2) = WO
+, then cp f1 f2
will result in f2 changing its type to T (f1) t T (f2) = NRW. Again the policy of f2 is
violated because cp f1 f2 overwrites the content of f2 by the content of f1 whereas the
type of f2 is WO
+ which requires such a file can be written into it by appending but not
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removing content from it. Finally, assume that T (f1) = RO, T (f2) = RO T (f3) = WO
 ,
then cat f1 f2 f3 will result in f3 changing its type to T (f1) t T (f2) t T (f3) = NRW.
While the policy of f3 is not violated because its type allows its content to be overwritten,
the policies of f1 and f2 are violated. This is because cat f1 f2 f3 will append f1 and f2
together to overwrite f3, whereas the types of f1 and f2 is RO which requires such files to
be read only but not written into.
To avoid this violation to the security access types, we need to add constraints to
control the access to write operations in addition to the flow policies defined in the previous
chapter. Thus, we need to enforce the following three policies. a) A file f can be
read if and only if T (f) 2 {RW ,RW+,RO}. b) A file f can be overwritten if and
only if T (f) 2 {RW ,WO }. c) A file f can be appended to it if and only if T (f) 2
{RW ,RW+WO ,WO+}. In the next section we present the language and the typing
rules to enforce the policies described above.
6.2.2 Language and typing rules
The syntax of the language will be the same as described in the previous chapter. However,
the only di↵erence is in the types which represent the security access types only. That is,
hti ::= NRW | RO | WO  | WO+ | RW  | RW+ | void
Below we describe the constraints that must be satisfied for each command to be
executed successfully, and present the revised typing rule as follows:
cp: To successfully execute the command cp f1 f2 , the following constraints must be
satisfied: a) The source file f1 and the destination file f2 must already exist in the
system. b) The destination file f2 must be either of type RW
  or WO . c) The source
and destination files must exist in the system after executing the command. d) The type
of the destination file f2 must be changed to be the join of its type and the source type
after executing the command. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0 ⌧ 0 vWO 
(cp)
  |  00, f1 : ⌧, f2 : ⌧ 0 t ⌧ ` cp f1 f2 : void
rd: To successfully execute the command rd f , the following constraints must be sat-
isfied: a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The file f must be either of
type RW , RW+, or RO. c) The file f must not exist in the system after executing the
command. This leads to the following typing rule:
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  |  0 ` f : ⌧ ⌧ v RO
(rd)
  |  0 ` rd f : void
cat: To successfully execute the command cat f1 f2 f3 , the following constraints must
be satisfied: a) The source files f1 and f2 and the destination file f3 must already exist in
the system. b) The source files f1 and f2 must be either of type RW
 ,RW+, WO  or WO+.
c) The destination file f3 must be either of type RW
  or WO . d) The source files f1
and f2 must not exist in the system after executing the command. e) The destination file
f3 must exist in the system after executing the command. f) The type of the destination
file f3 must be changed to be the join of its type and the types of the source files after
executing the command. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0  00 |  000 ` f3 : ⌧ 00 ⌧, ⌧ 0 vWO+ ^ ⌧ 00 vWO 
(cat)
  |  000, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 t ⌧ 00 ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void
mv: To successfully execute the command mv f1 f2 , the following constraints must be
satisfied: a) The source file f1 and the destination file f2 must already exist in the system.
b) The destination file f2 must be either of type RW
  or WO . c) The source file f1 must
not exist in the system after executing the command. d) The destination file f2 must exist
in the system after executing the command e) The type of the destination file f2 must be
changed to be the join of its type and the source type after executing the command. This
leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0 ⌧ 0 vWO 
(mv)
  |  00, f2 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` mv f1 f2 : void
append: To successfully execute the command append f1 f2 f3 , the following constraints
must be satisfied: a) The source files f1 and f2 must already exist in the system. b) The
destination file f3 must not exist in the system. c) The source files f1 and f2 must be either
of type RW ,RW+, WO  or WO+. d) The source files f1 and f2 must not exist in the
system after executing the command. e) The destination file f3 must exist in the system
after executing the command. f) The type of the destination file f3 must be the join of the
types of the source files after executing the command. This leads to the following typing
rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0 ⌧, ⌧ 0 vWO+
(append)
  |  00, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` append f1 f2 f3 : void
The remaining typing rules are unchanged and depicted with the modified typing rules
in Figure 6.2. It can be seen that the type system shown in Figure 6.2 is similar to the
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type system presented in Chapter 5 which focuses on regulating copy operations. The only
di↵erence is that the checking performed by the type system presented in this section is
to control read and write operations and enforce their flow policies, whereas the checking
performed by the previous type system is to control copy operations and enforce their
flow policies. The typing algorithm for the previous system, therefore, can be used with
a slight modification for checking the new types. We present a new version of the typing
algorithm when we discuss combining the two type systems in the next section.
(f)
 , f : ⌧ |   ` f : ⌧
  |  0 ` c : void  0 |  00 ` cs : void
(cs)
  |  00 ` c; cs : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0 ⌧ 0 vWO 
(cp)
  |  00, f1 : ⌧, f2 : ⌧ 0 t ⌧ ` cp f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f : ⌧
(rm)
  |  0 ` rm f : void
(mkf)
  |  , f : t ` mkf f t : void
  |  0 ` f : ⌧ ⌧ v RO
(rd)
  |  0 ` rd f : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0  00 |  000 ` f3 : ⌧ 00 ⌧, ⌧ 0 vWO+ ^ ⌧ 00 vWO 
(cat)
  |  000, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 t ⌧ 00 ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0 ⌧ 0 vWO 
(mv)
  |  00, f2 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` mv f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧
(copy)
  |  0, f1 : ⌧, f2 : ⌧ ` copy f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧  0 |  00 ` f2 : ⌧ 0 ⌧, ⌧ 0 vWO+
(append)
  |  00, f3 : ⌧ t ⌧ 0 ` append f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : ⌧
(move)
  |  0, f2 : ⌧ ` move f1 f2 : void
Figure 6.2: Typing rules for security access types
It can be seen from the typing rules in Figure 6.2 that if there is information flow
from a source file to a destination file, then the security type of the source file is always
transferred to the destination file and joined with its security type. This could occur even
when the security type of the destination file is di↵erent from the source file. For example,
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if T (f1) = RO and T (f2) = RW
 , then the command cp f1 f2 will type check and will
result in f2 changes its type to be RO t RW  = RO. This might seem to be inconsistent
with standard notions of integrity which are intended to preserve validity of an association
between specific objects and their contents. For example, a file of type RW  should only
store information of type RW , and a file of type RO should only store information of type
RO. However, our security types represent policies that dictate what can be done with
files, and the standard notions of integrity contradict the policies imposed by our security
types. For example, the security type RO dictates that a file associated with this type can
only be read but not written into it. This is useful to avoid accidental overwriting of a file
that is created to be read only. Therefore, if T (f1) = RO and T (f2) = RO, then cp f1 f2
must not be allowed, even through the types of the source and destination files are the
same. This is because the policy imposed by the security type RO will be violated if such
command is executed. The only security types that allow a file to be overwritten are RW 
and WO . However, if we allow a file of type RW  or WO  to only store information of
the same type, then copying a file of type RO, for example, will not be possible. This is
because RO 6= RW  _WO . We avoid this by allowing a file of type RW  or WO  to
store information of any type. However, to preserve the integrity constraints of both the
source and destination files, we require the destination file to change its type to be the
join of the security type of the source file and the security type of the destination file.
In this way, the destination file will only store information of the same type or more
restrictive type. In case of the information to be stored in a destination file is associated
with less restrictive type than the type of the destination file, then the information will
acquire the type of the destination file. For example, if T (f1) = RW
  and T (f2) = WO ,
then the command cp f1 f2 will type check and will result in f2 changes its type to be
RW tWO  = WO . On the other hand, if the information to be stored in a destination
file is associated with more restrictive type than the type of the destination file, then
the destination file will acquire the type of the information to be stored. For example, if
T (f1) = NRW and T (f2) = RW
 , then the command cp f1 f2 will type check and will
result in f2 changes its type to be NRW t RW  = NRW.
Therefore, changing the type of the destination file to be the join of the type of the
information to be stored and the type of the destination file plays an important rule in
preserving the integrity of files. This is because the integrity constraints of the informa-
tion to be stored and the integrity constraints of the destination file can only change to
constraints that is at least as restrictive as both of them.
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6.3 Security copy and access types
In this section we combine the two systems introduced so far to enforce their policies in
one system. In the previous systems we assumed each file is associated with a type ⌧
where ⌧ 2 {UC,LCn,NC} _ {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}. The type system in
Chapter 5 controls the access to copy operations and the flow caused by all operations
including copy; while the type system in the previous section controls the access to read
and write operations and the flow caused by all operations. In the system we introduce
in this section we need to control the access to copy, read, and write operations as well as
the flow caused by them. To achieve this we need to combine both lattices of the security
types such that each file should be associated with two types. One type regulates copy
operations and the other type regulates read and write operations. Therefore, we assume
that each file in the system is associated with an ordered pair type of the form f : (↵, )
where ↵ is a security copy type and   is a security access type. This leads to the following
definition of a pair type:
Definition 6.3.1. 8f 2 types, T (f) = (↵, ),
where ↵ 2 {UC,LCn,NC} ^   2 {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}.
Based on this definition, the types (UC,RO) and (NC,NRW) are allowed because
(UC,RO) ! UC 2 {UC,LCn,NC} ^ RO 2 {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}, and
(NC,NRW)! NC 2 {UC,LCn,NC}^NRW 2 {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}. On
the other hand, the types (UC,LC) and (WO,RO) are not allowed because (UC,LC) !
UC 2 {UC,LCn,NC} ^ LC 62 {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}, and (WO,RO) !
WO 62 {UC,LCn,NC}^RO 2 {NRW,RO,WO ,WO+,RW ,RW+}. It should be noted
that all possible pair types that we could instantiate of the form f : (↵, ) are useful in
particular scenarios. The type ↵ controls access to copy operations and controls the flow
of information caused by all operations including copy. The type   controls access to
read and write operations and control the flow of information caused by all operations
including read and write. Considering the two security types ↵ and   as an ordered
pair type, allows us to control the access to the three operations copy, read, and write
and control the flow of information caused by them and all other operations. In the next
section we present the language and the typing rules to enforce the policies of both systems
described previously.
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6.3.1 Language and typing rules
In this section we revise the language and typing rules. The only di↵erence in the revised
language is in the command mkf and the type ⌧ which is now a pair type (↵, ). The
command mkf now takes a file f , a security copy type ↵, and a security access type  , and
creates a file f of type (↵, ). The syntax of the language is as follows.
hpi ::= hcsi | hfi
hcsi ::= hci | hci; hcsi
hci ::= cp hfi hfi | rm hfi | mkf hfi h↵i h i | rd hfi | cat hfi hfi hfi | mv hfi hfi
| copy hfi hfi | append hfi hfi hfi | move hfi hfi
hti ::= (h↵i, h i) | void
h↵i ::= NC | LCn | UC
h i ::= NRW | RO | WO  | WO+ | RW  | RW+
Figure 6.3 shows the new type system that enforces both policies presented in each
previous system. This type system will not only enforce the number of times a file can be
read, but also enforce the di↵erent types of access of the policies identified in Chapter 4.
For example, based on the security types of files, the type system enforces which file can
or cannot be read or written into it. In the next section we revise the typing algorithm
presented in the previous chapter to accommodate the new version of the typing rules.
6.3.2 Typing algorithm
In this section we present a type inference algorithm T for typing phrases according to the
new type system depicted in Figure 6.3. It is similar to the typing algorithm presented in
the previous chapter, however, with slight modification to accommodate the new checking
in the revised type system. We define the following functions: check(⌧, ⌧ 0) returns true
if the types are compatible. less(⌧, ⌧ 0) returns true if ⌧ v ⌧ 0. lub(⌧, . . . , ⌧n) returns the
least upper bound of all its parameters i.e. ⌧ t . . . t ⌧n. Note that if ⌧ = (⌧1, ⌧2) and
⌧ 0 = (⌧ 01, ⌧ 02), then lub(⌧, ⌧ 0) = (⌧1 t ⌧ 01, ⌧2 t ⌧ 02). ⇡1(⌧) and ⇡2(⌧) returns the security copy
type and access type of ⌧ , respectively. That is, if ⌧ = (⌧1, ⌧2), then ⇡1(⌧) = ⌧1 and
⇡2(⌧) = ⌧2. Finally, the functions red and dst are as defined before, however, for simplicity
when applied to a pair type, they should be understood as applying to the security copy
type of the pair only. For example, if ⌧ = (⌧1, ⌧2), then red(⌧) = (red(⌧1), ⌧2). Using these
functions, we can now define the type inference algorithm T as follows:
The Type Reconstruction Algorithm T :
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(f)
 , f : (↵, ) |   ` f : (↵, )
  |  0 ` c : void  0 |  00 ` cs : void
(cs)
  |  00 ` c; cs : void
  |  0 ` f1 : (↵, ) ↵ v LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : (↵0, 0)  0 vWO 
(cp)
  |  00, f1 : (red(↵), ), f2 : (dst(↵) t ↵0,  t  0) ` cp f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f : (↵, )
(rm)
  |  0 ` rm f : void
(mkf)
  |  , f : (↵, ) ` mkf f ↵   : void
  |  0 ` f : (↵, )   v RO
(rd)
  |  0 ` rd f : void
  |  0 ` f1 : (↵, )  0 |  00 ` f2 : (↵0, 0)  00 |  000 ` f3 : (↵00, 00)  , 0 vWO+ ^  00 vWO 
(cat)
  |  000, f3 : (↵ t ↵0 t ↵00,  t  0 t  00) ` cat f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : (↵, )  0 |  00 ` f2 : (↵0, 0)  0 vWO 
(mv)
  |  00, f2 : (↵ t ↵0,  t  0) ` mv f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : (↵, ) ↵ v LCn>0
(copy)
  |  0, f1 : (red(↵), ), f2 : (dst(↵), ) ` copy f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : (↵, )  0 |  00 ` f2 : (↵0, 0)  , 0 vWO+
(append)
  |  00, f3 : (↵ t ↵0,  t  0) ` append f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : (↵, )
(move)
  |  0, f2 : (↵, ) ` move f1 f2 : void
Figure 6.3: Typing rules for security copy and access types
T (A, e) = (⌧, A0)
where:
1. If e is the filename f , and f : ↵ 2 A then ⌧ = ↵, A0 = Ar {f : ↵}.
2. If e is a sequence of commands, c; cs let
(↵, A1) = T (A, c)
check(↵, void)
( , A2) = T (A1, cs)
check( , void)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2.
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3. If e is the cp command, cp f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
less(⇡1(↵),LC
n>0)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
less(⇡2( ),WO
 )
then if f1, f2 62 A2, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f1 : red(↵), f2 : lub(dst(↵), )}.
4. If e is the rm command, rm f let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1.
5. If e is the mkf command, mkf f ↵, then if f 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A [ {f : ↵}.
6. If e is the rd command, rd f let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
less(⇡2(↵),RO)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1.
7. If e is the cat command, cat f1 f2 f3 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
( , A3) = T (A2, f3)
less(⇡2(↵),WO
+)
less(⇡2( ),WO
+)
less(⇡2( ),WO
 )
then if f3 62 A3, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A3 [ {f3 : lub(↵, ,  )}.
8. If e is the mv command, mv f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
less(⇡2( ),WO
 )
then if f2 62 A2, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f2 : lub(↵, )}.
160
9. If e is the copy command, copy f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
less(⇡1(↵),LC
n>0)
then if f2 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f1 : red(↵), f2 : dst(↵)}.
10. If e is the append command, append f1 f2 f3 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
less(⇡2(↵),WO
+)
less(⇡2( ),WO
+)
then if f3 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f3 : lub(↵, )}.
11. If e is the move command, move f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
then if f2 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f2 : ↵}.
6.4 Ownership and authorisation
In the previous section we presented a type system to control the access to copy, read,
and write operations and the flow of information that is caused by all operations. The
type system in the previous section is missing two important aspects that are related to
each other. These two aspects are ownership and authorisation. The former indicates the
owners of files while the latter indicates the users authorised by the owners to perform
particular operations on their files. Although the security copy and access types presented
in the previous sections o↵er some sort of authorisation by controlling which operations
can be performed on which types of files, they are not concerned with who can perform
these operations. For example, consider the case where Alice is a user and has two private
files f1 and f2. Alice wants f1 to be read only by Bob and wants f2 to be read only by
Carol. To prevent these two files from any modification, Alice can give the following type
to her files (NC,RO), so that only read operations can be performed on them. However,
although Alice is not willing to allow Carol to read f1, Carol can read f1 by issuing the
command rd f1 since the type of the f1 allows such operation to be performed. Therefore,
Alice will not be able to specify these policies and the two files can be read by any user.
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The security copy types and security access types can control which operations can be
performed on which types of files, but not which users can perform which operations on
which types of files. For Alice to specify her policy in the above example, the ownership
and authorisation aspects should be incorporated into the type, such that an owner of a
file can specify which user is allowed to perform the operations allowed by the type of
the file. In this section we augment the security copy types and the security access types
with ownership and authorisation aspects. The users authorised to perform the allowed
operations on files must be specified by the owners of the files. Files are owned by users
who created them. To control the allowed operations so that only the authorised users
can perform them, the type of the file must contain the owners and the authorised users
of that file. Our approach to incorporate the ownership and the authorisation information
into the types of the files is inspired by earlier work of Myers and Liskov [75, 76, 74, 77]
who develop a decentralised model for information flow known as the decentralised label
model (DLM).
6.4.1 Label structure
Our security types of files which represent the security policies will be expressed in a label.
Similar to DLM, a label consists of one or more components; each component representing
a file type which is a policy. However, the structure and the interpretation of labels are
di↵erent from the conventional structure and interpretation of DLM. A label with one
policy has the following form.
l1 = {↵,  ,  }
where ↵ and   are a security copy type and a security access type, respectively, which are
discussed in the previous sections.   represents the ownership and authorisation informa-
tion for this policy. It has exactly the same structure as the entire label of DLM, however,
with di↵erent interpretation.   has the following form.
o : u1, u2, u3
where o is the owner and u1, u2, u3 are the authorised users specified by the owner. Thus,
the label l1 is expressed as follows.
l1 = {↵,  , o : u1, u2, u3}
the interpretation of such label is that the file owner o authorises the users u1, u2, u3 to
perform operations on the file that are allowed by the security types ↵ and  . Therefore,
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users will not be able to perform any operations arbitrarily, rather the operations to be
performed must be authorised by the security types and the information flow caused by
them must not violate the lattice structure of either of the security types. In other words,
  controls which users are allowed to perform operations on the file, while ↵ and   control
which operations can be performed on the file and control the flow of information that
results from these operations. A concrete example for a label with one policy is the
following.
l2 = {UC, RO, Alice : Bob, Carol,Dave}
the single policy in label l2 states that the owner Alice allows Bob, Carol, and Dave to
only copy and read the file associated with this label. If there is another user Eve who
issues read or copy operations to copy or read the file, these will fail. This is because Eve
is not one of the authorised users who are specified by the owner Alice to perform these
operations.
The single policy label that is described above is assumed to be attached to a file
at the time of creation. That is the single policy label will be attached to a file when
the command mkf is issued by a user. Therefore, each file in the system is assumed to
be attached with a label. The owner of such a policy will be the user who issued the
command mkf. However, a label might contain multiple policies as a result of information
flow caused by any operation. For example, if f1 ^ f2 2 Types, which means both files are
associated with a label, then flow of information from f1 to f2, must result in f2 changing
its label to enforce all the policies of its label and the label of f1. To formally define the
components and properties of our label we use the following notations. o (J) denotes the
owner of the policy J . u (J) denotes the set of authorised users of the policy J including
the owner. ↵(J) denotes the security copy type of the policy J .  (J) denotes the security
access type of the policy J . Hence, if we assume J is the following single policy label:
l3 = {NC, WO , Alice : Bob, Carol}
then, o (J) = Alice, u (J) = Alice,Bob, Carol, ↵(J) = NC,  (J) = WO. However, as
a result of information flow between two files, two single label policies are combined and
lead to a label that consists of more than one policy. For simplicity we assume that label
l consists of two polices J and K, however, this can be applied to any number of policies.
Below we define the properties of our label more generally to encompass a multiple policy
label. We assume the following label as running example for the definitions below:
l4 = {LC3,RO, Alice : Bob; UC,WO , Bob : Carol}
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Definition 6.4.1. The set of owners of a label l denoted as o (l) is the union of all owners
of each policy in the label l.
o (l) = o (K) t o (J)
The owner set of a label is the owner of each policy in the label. For example o (l4) =
o (Alice)to (Bob) = (Alice,Bob). Therefore, only Alice and Bob are the owners of label
l4.
Definition 6.4.2. The set of e↵ective authorised users of a label l denoted as u (l) is the
intersection of all authorised users of each policy in the label l.
u (l) = u (K) u u (J)
The set of e↵ective authorised users are those who are agreed by each policy owner as
authorised users. That is, each policy owner must specify these users as authorised users
in his policy. For example, u (l4) = u (Alice,Bob) u u (Bob, Carol) = (Bob). Therefore,
only Bob is the e↵ective authorised user in label l4 as both policies agree on this.
Definition 6.4.3. The e↵ective security copy type of a label l denoted as ↵(l) is the join
of all security copy types of each policy in the label l.
↵(l) = ↵(K) t ↵(J)
The e↵ective security copy type is the type that is at least as restrictive as the security
copy type of each policy in the label l. That is, the least upper bound or join of the security
copy types of every policy in the label l. For example, ↵(l4) = ↵(LC
3) t ↵(UC) = (LC3).
Therefore, LC3 will be the security copy type of label l4.
Definition 6.4.4. The e↵ective security access type of a label l denoted as  (l) is the
join of all security access types of each policy in the label l.
 (l) =  (K) t  (J)
The e↵ective security access type is the type that is at least as restrictive as the
security access type of each policy in the label l. That is, the least upper bound or
join of the security access types of every policy in the label l. For example,  (l4) =
 (RO) t  (WO ) = (NRW). Therefore, NRW will be the security access type in label l4.
Definition 6.4.5. The e↵ective policy of a label l denoted as ep(l) is the intersection of
all authorised users in each policy of l, the join of all security copy types in each policy of
l, and the join of all security access types in each policy of l.
ep(l) = ↵(l) ^  (l) ^ u (l)
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The e↵ective policy is the policy that is derived from a label of multiple policies. This
policy is the only one to consider when evaluating a multiple policy label. For example,
ep(l4) = ↵(l4) ^  (l4) ^ u (l4) = (LC3; NRW;Bob).
Definition 6.4.6. The union of two labels l and l0, written as lt l0, is the set of all policies
that exist in both l and l0.
l t l0 = l [ l0
For example, if l = {LC2,RW+, Alice : Bob, Carol; UC,RO, Bob : Carol} and l0 =
{NC,RO, Bob : Carol}, then l t l0 = {LC2,RW+, Alice : Bob, Carol; UC,RO, Bob :
Carol; NC,RO, Bob : Carol}.
Definition 6.4.7. The e↵ective authorised users of a label l0 is a subset of the e↵ective
authorised users of a label l, written as u (l) v u (l0), if and only if every e↵ective
authorised user in l0 is also an e↵ective authorised user in l.
u (l) v u (l0) = u (l0) ✓ u (l)
For example, if l = {LC2,RW+, Alice : Bob, Carol} and l0 = {NC,RO, Alice : Bob},
then (Alice,Bob, Caro) v (Alice,Bob).
Definition 6.4.8. The function red if applied to label l, written as red(l), changes the
security copy type ↵ in each policy in l to be red(↵(l)).
red(l) = 8J 2 l,↵(J) = red(↵(l))
For example, red(l4) = {LC2,RO, Alice : Bob; LC2,WO , Bob : Carol}.
Definition 6.4.9. The function dst if applied to label l, written as dst(l), changes the
security copy type ↵ in each policy in l to be dst(↵(l)).
dst(l) = 8J 2 l,↵(J) = dst(↵(l))
For example, dst(l4) = {NC,RO, Alice : Bob; NC,WO , Bob : Carol}.
Based on these definitions, previous policies to control copy, read, and write opera-
tions can be stated straightforwardly by only considering the e↵ective policies of labels.
For example, a file f associated with label l can be read if  (l) 2 {RW ,RW+,RO}, over-
written if  (l) 2 {RW ,WO }, appended to it if  (l) 2 {RW ,RW+WO ,WO+}, or
copied if ↵(l) 2 {UC,LCn>0}. Our aim for introducing the label structure in this section
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is not to change previous policies, but rather to restrict who can exercise them. There-
fore, we extend the previous policies to control copy, read, and write operations with the
following: a) Operations can be performed if and only if the user issuing them is one
of the e↵ective authorised users of all the label associated with the files the operations
applied to. b) Flows of information from a source file to a destination file caused by any
operation is allowed if and only if the e↵ective authorised users of the label associated with
the destination file is a subset of the e↵ective authorised users of the label associated with
the source file. c) Flows of information from a source file to a destination file caused by
any operations must change the label associated with the destination file to be the union
of its label and the label associated with the source file. d) A newly created file should
be assigned the user who created it to be the owner and the only authorised user of the
policy associated with the created file. e) Files can be deleted or renamed if and only if
the user issuing these operations is one of the owners of the label associated with the files
the operations applied to.
In the next section we present the revised language and typing rules to enforce the
policy described above
6.4.2 Language and typing rules
The syntax of the language is given by the following grammar:
hpi ::= hui.hcsi | hfi
hcsi ::= hci | hci; hcsi
hci ::= cp hfi hfi | rm hfi | mkf h↵i h i | rd hfi | cat hfi hfi hfi | mv hfi hfi
| copy hfi hfi | append hfi hfi hfi | move hfi hfi
h⌧i ::= hli | void
hli ::= hpli | hpli; l
hpli ::= h↵i, h i, h i
h↵i ::= NC | LCn | UC
h i ::= NRW | RO | WO  | WO+ | RW  | RW+
h i ::= hui : hui, hui, hui, . . .
It can be seen that commands are unchanged and the same as described in the previous
section. The only di↵erence is in the hui which ranges over the set of users’ names for a
given file system and the structure of file types which are represented as labels hli. A label
can be of a single policy pl, or multiple policies pl1, pl2, pl3, pln. Each policy consists of a
security copy type ↵, a security access type  , and an ownership and authorisation type
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 . The new typing judgements have the following form:
  |  0 ` u.cs : ⌧   |  0 ` f : ⌧
where   is a set of files with labels of the form f : l. For example,   = {f1 : l1, f2 : l2, f3 :
l3, . . . , fn : ln}. The judgment   |  0 ` u.cs : ⌧ means that typing a single or a sequence of
commands of type ⌧ in the context   by user u, will change the context to  0. Similarly,
the judgement   |  0 ` f : ⌧ means that typing a file in the context   will change the
context to  0. The typing rules for a file name and a sequence of commands are the same
as follows:
(f)
 , f : l |   ` f : l
  |  0 ` u.c : void  0 |  00 ` u.cs : void
(cs)
  |  00 ` u.c;u.cs : void
The remaining revised typing rules are given together with a description of the addi-
tional constraints for each of the commands below:
cp command: To successfully execute the command cp f1 f2, the following constraints
must be satisfied: a) The source file f1 and the destination file f2 must already exist in
the system. b) The e↵ective security copy type of the label associated with the file f1
must be either of type UC or LCn>0. c) The user who issues the command must be one
of the e↵ective authorised users of the labels associated with f1 and f2. d) The e↵ective
authorised users of the label associated with the file f2 must be a subset of the e↵ective
authorised users of the label associated with the file f1. e) The e↵ective security access
type of the label associated with the file f2 must be either of type RW
  or WO . f) The
source and destination files must exist after executing the command. g) After executing
the command, the security copy type of each policy in the label associated with the file
f1 must be changed to be the same as the type resulted from applying the function red
to the the e↵ective security copy type of the label associated with the file f1. h) After
executing the command, the label associated with the file f2 must be changed to be the
union of its label and the label of the file f1, where the security copy type of each policy in
the label associated with the file f1 must be changed to be the same as the type resulted
from applying the function dst to its e↵ective security copy type before taking the union.
This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : l ↵(l) v LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0
u 2 u (l) ^ u (l0)
u (l) v u (l0)  (l0) vWO 
(cp)
  |  00, f1 : red(l), f2 : l0 t dst(l) ` u.cp f1 f2 : void
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rm command: To successfully execute the command rm f , the following constraints
must be satisfied: a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The user who issues
the command must be one of the owners of the label associated with the file f . c) The file
f must not exist in the system after executing the command. This leads to the following
typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(rm)
  |  0 ` u.rm f : void
mkf f ↵   command: To successfully execute the command mkf f ↵  , the following
constraints must be satisfied: a) The file f must not exist in the system. b) The file f
must exist in the system after executing the command. c) The file f must be associated
with a label of the form (↵, ,  ), where ↵ and   must be the security copy type and the
security access type, respectively, that are specified at the time the command mkf is issued.
Whereas   is the ownership and the authorisation component of the label that must be of
the form u : u, where u must be the user who issued the command. In other words, the
command mkf f ↵   will automatically set the user who executed it to be the owner and
the only authorised user. This leads to the following typing rule:
(mkf)
  |  , f : (↵, , u : u) ` u.mkf f ↵   : void
rd command: To successfully execute the command rd f , the following constraints
must be satisfied: a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The user who issues
the command must be one of the e↵ective authorised users of the label associated with
the file f . c) The file f must not exist in the system after executing the command. This
leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 u (l)  (l) v RO
(rd)
  |  0 ` u.rd f : void
cat command: To successfully execute the command cat f1 f2 f3, the following con-
straints must be satisfied: a) The source files f1 and f2, and the destination file f3 must
already exist in the system. b) The user who issues the command must be one of the
e↵ective authorised users of the labels associated with the files f1, f2, and f3. c) The
e↵ective authorised users of the label associated with the file f3 must be a subset of the
e↵ective authorised users of both labels associated with the files f1 and f2. d) The e↵ective
security access type of the labels associated with the source files f1 and f2 must be either
of type RW ,RW+, WO  or WO+. e) The security access type of the label associated
with the destination file f3 must either be of type RW
  or WO . f) The source files f1
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and f2 must not exist in the system after executing the command. g) The destination file
f3 must exist in the system after executing the command, and its label must be changed
to be the union of its label and the labels of the source files f1 and f2. This leads to the
following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : l  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0  00 |  000 ` f3 : l00
u 2 u (l) ^ u (l0) ^ u (l00)
u (l) ^ u (l0) v u (l00)
 (l) ^  (l0) vWO+
 (l00) vWO 
(cat)
  |  000, f3 : l t l0 t l00 ` u.cat f1 f2 f3 : void
mv command: To successfully execute the command mv f1 f2, the following constraints
must be satisfied: a) The source file f1 and the destination file f2 must already exist in
the system. b) The user who issues the command must be one of the owners of the label
associated with the source file f1, and one of the authorised users of the label associated
with the destination file f2. c) The e↵ective authorised users of the label associated with
the file f2 must be a subset of the e↵ective authorised users of the label associated with
the file f1. d) The e↵ective security access type of the label associated with the file f2
must be either of type RW  or WO . e) The source file must not exist after executing the
command. f) The destination file must exist after executing the command and its label
must be changed to be the union of its label and the label associated with the file f1, after
executing the command. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : l  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0 u 2 o (l) ^ u (l0) u (l) v u (l0)  (l0) vWO 
(mv)
  |  00, f2 : l0 t l ` u.mv f1 f2 : void
copy command: To successfully execute the command copy f1 f2, the following con-
straints must be satisfied: a) The source file f1 must already exist in the system. b) The
destination file f2 must not exist in the system. c) The e↵ective security copy type of the
label associated with the file f1 must be either of type UC or LC
n>0. d) The user who
issues the command must be one of the e↵ective authorised users of the label associated
with f1. e) The source and destination files f1 and f2 must exist after executing the
command. f) After executing the command, the security copy type of each policy in the
label associated with the file f1 must be changed to be the same as the type resulting from
applying the function red to the e↵ective security copy type of the label associated with
the file f1. g) After executing the command, the file f2 must be assigned the union of the
label associated with the file f1 applied to it dst function, and a label where its security
copy type is the e↵ective security copy type of the label associated with the file f1 applied
to it dst function, and its security access type is the e↵ective security access type of the
label associated with the file f1, and the owner and the authorised users are the only user
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who issues the command. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : l ↵(l) v LCn>0 u 2 u (l)
(copy)
  |  0, f1 : red(l), f2 : dst(↵(l), (l), u : u) t dst(l) ` u.copy f1 f2 : void
append command: To successfully execute the command append f1 f2 f3, the following
constraints must be satisfied: a) The source files f1 and f2 must already exist in the
system. b) The destination file f3 must not exist in the system. c) The user who issues
the command must be one of the e↵ective authorised users of the labels associated with
the files f1, and f2. d) The e↵ective security access type of the labels associated with
the source files f1 and f2 must be either of type RW
 ,RW+, WO  or WO+. e) The
source files f1 and f2 must not exist in the system after executing the command. f) The
destination file f3 must exist in the system after executing the command, and must be
assigned the union of the labels of the source files f1 and f2, and a label where its security
copy type is the join of the e↵ective security copy type of the label associated with the
files f1 and f2, its security access type is the join of the e↵ective security access type of
the label associated with the files f1 and f2, and the owner and the authorised users are
the only user who issues the command. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f1 : l  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0 u 2 u (l) ^ u (l0)  (l) ^  (l0) vWO+
(append)
  |  00, f3 : (↵(l) t ↵(l0), (l) t  (l), u : u) t l t l0 ` u.append f1 f2 f3 : void
move command: To successfully execute the command move f1 f2, the following con-
straints must be satisfied: a) The source files f1 must already exist in the system. b) The
destination file f2 must not exist in the system. c) The user who issues the command
must be one of the owners of the label associated with the source file f1. d) The source
file must not exist after executing the command. e) The destination file must exist after
executing the command and must be assigned the label associated with the file f1. This
leads to the following typing rule.
  |  0 ` f1 : l u 2 o (l)
(move)
  |  0, f2 : l ` u.move f1 f2 : void
The typing rules are shown together in Figure 6.4. In the next section we introduce
new commands along with their typing rules for manipulating file policies.
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(f)
 , f : l |   ` f : l
  |  0 ` u.c : void  0 |  00 ` u.cs : void
(cs)
  |  00 ` u.c;u.cs : void
  |  0 ` f1 : l ↵(l) v LCn>0  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0
u 2 u (l) ^ u (l0)
u (l) v u (l0)  (l0) vWO 
(cp)
  |  00, f1 : red(l), f2 : l0 t dst(l) ` u.cp f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(rm)
  |  0 ` u.rm f : void
(mkf)
  |  , f : (↵, , u : u) ` u.mkf f ↵   : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 u (l)  (l) v RO
(rd)
  |  0 ` u.rd f : void
  |  0 ` f1 : l  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0  00 |  000 ` f3 : l00
u 2 u (l) ^ u (l0) ^ u (l00)
u (l) ^ u (l0) v u (l00)
 (l) ^  (l0) vWO+
 (l00) vWO 
(cat)
  |  000, f3 : l t l0 t l00 ` u.cat f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : l  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0 u 2 o (l) ^ u (l0) u (l) v u (l0)  (l0) vWO 
(mv)
  |  00, f2 : l0 t l ` u.mv f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : l ↵(l) v LCn>0 u 2 u (l)
(copy)
  |  0, f1 : red(l), f2 : dst(↵(l), (l), u : u) t dst(l) ` u.copy f1 f2 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : l  0 |  00 ` f2 : l0 u 2 u (l) ^ u (l0)  (l) ^  (l0) vWO+
(append)
  |  00, f3 : (↵(l) t ↵(l0), (l) t  (l), u : u) t l t l0 ` u.append f1 f2 f3 : void
  |  0 ` f1 : l u 2 o (l)
(move)
  |  0, f2 : l ` u.move f1 f2 : void
Figure 6.4: Typing rules
6.5 Downgrading and upgrading of policies
In this section we introduce several commands to manipulate file policies. Unlike previous
commands which a↵ect the files themselves, the commands introduced in this section
a↵ect the labels associated with the files. Such commands might downgrade or upgrade
a file policy. Downgrading a policy, referred to as declassification in the literature, is the
process of making the policy less restrictive, while upgrading a policy is the process of
making the policy more restrictive. Although upgrading might occur implicitly as a result
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of information flow from a file with a less restrictive policy to a file with a more restrictive
policy; performing it explicitly might be useful in some situations. For example, an owner
might find out later that a file should not be written into it anymore, and allow it only
to be read. On the other hand, downgrading cannot occur as a result of information flow.
However, downgrading might be useful in some situations, for example, the owner of a file
might find out later that a file need not be confidential anymore and allow it to be read.
Downgrading policies is a critical operation and leads to policy violation if it used
improperly. For example, a user who is allowed to only write to a file, might downgrade
the policy of a file to allow himself to read and write to the file. To prevent such violation
of policies, we allow only owners of files to issue commands that manipulate policies.
Therefore, only the owner of a file can change the policy associated with that file. Since a
file might be associated with several policies that belong to di↵erent owners, we allow the
commands that manipulate policies to a↵ect only the policy that belongs to the owner who
issues that command. Because only the e↵ective policy will be taken into account when
evaluating a label associated with the file, the other polices belonging to other owners
will not be a↵ected. That is, downgrading a single policy in a label consisting of multiple
policies, will not change the overall policy of the label if there is another policy that is
more restrictive than the downgraded policy.
As explained in the previous section, a label l might consist of a single policy (e.g.
pl), or multiple policies (e.g. pl1, pl2, pl3, . . . , pln), where each policy belongs to an owner.
Below we define functions useful for typing commands presented in the next section.
Definition 6.5.1. The function sp(l, u, pl), takes a label l, a user u, and a policy pl, and
swaps every policy in l owned by the user u with the policy pl.
sp(l, u, pl) = (8k 2 l ^ o (k) = u! swap(k, pl))
Definition 6.5.2. The function ap(l, pl), takes a label l and a policy pl and appends the
policy pl to the label l.
ap(l, pl)! pl t l
Definition 6.5.3. The function s↵(l, u,↵), takes a label l, a user u, and a security copy
type ↵, and swaps every security copy type in every policy in l owned by the user u with
the security copy type ↵.
s↵(l, u,↵) = (8k 2 l ^ o (k) = u! swap(↵(k),↵))
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Definition 6.5.4. The function s (l, u, ), takes a label l, a user u, and a security access
type  , and swaps every security access type in every policy in l owned by the user u with
the security access type  .
s (l, u, ) = (8k 2 l ^ o (k) = u! swap( (k), ))
Definition 6.5.5. The function s (l, u,  ), takes a label l, a user u, and an ownership and
authorisation type  , and swaps every ownership and authorisation type in every policy
in l owned by the user u with the ownership and authorisation type  .
s (l, u,  ) = (8k 2 l ^ o (k) = u! swap( (k),  ))
Definition 6.5.6. The function ru(l, u1, u2), takes a label l and two users u1 and u2, and
removes the user u2 from the authorised users of every policy in the label l owned by the
user u1.
ru(l, u1, u2) = (8k 2 l ^ o (k) = u1 ^ u2 2 u (k)! remove(u2, k))
Definition 6.5.7. The function au(l, u1, u2), takes a label l and two users u1 and u2, and
adds the user u2 to the authorised users of every policy in the label l owned by the user
u1.
au(l, u1, u2) = (8k 2 l ^ o (k) = u1 ^ u2 62 u (k)! add(u2, k))
In the next section, we present the commands for manipulating file policies along with
descriptions and their typing rules.
6.5.1 Language and typing rules
We extend the syntax of the language presented in the previous section with the following
commands:
hci ::= chmod↵ hfi h↵i | chmod  hfi h i | chmod  hfi h i | chmodp hfi hpli |
| addp hfi hpli | rmuser hfi hui | adduser hfi hui
The rest of the language remains unchanged. The additional commands presented
above allow owners of files to manipulate their file policies in di↵erent ways. Owners
can change a particular type of policy they own by issuing chmod↵, chmod , or chmod .
Owners can also change the whole policy by issuing the command chmodp, or can add a
new policy by issuing the command addp. Finally, owners can add or remove users from
the policies they own by issuing the commands adduser and rmuser, respectively. Below
we give a brief description of each command with its typing rule.
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chmod↵: The command chmod↵ f ↵ changes the security copy type ↵ of the policies
owned by the user who issues the command that exist in the label associated with the
file f . To successfully execute the command chmod f ↵, the following constraints must
be satisfied: a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The user who issues the
command must be an owner of a policy in the label associated with the file f . c) After
executing the command, the security copy of the policies owned by the user who issued
the command must be changed to the new type ↵ that is provided to the command
chmod↵ f ↵. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmod↵)
  |  0, f : s↵(l, u,↵) ` u.chmod↵ f ↵ : void
chmod : The command chmod  f   changes the security access type   of the policies
owned by the user who issues the command that exist in the label associated with the file f .
To successfully execute the command, the following constraints must be satisfied: a) The
file f must already exist in the system. b) The user who issues the command must be an
owner of a policy in the label associated with the file f . c) After executing the command,
the security access type of the policies owned by the user who issued the command must
be changed to the new type   that is provided to the command chmod  f  . This leads
to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmod )
  |  0, f : s (l, u, ) ` u.chmod  f   : void
chmod : The command chmod  f   changes the ownership and authorisation type   of
the policies owned by the user who issues the command that exist in the label associated
with the file f . To successfully execute the command, the following constraints must be
satisfied: a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The user who issues the
command must be an owner of a policy in the label associated with the file f . c) After
executing the command, the ownership and authorisation type of the policies owned by
the user who issued the command must be changed to the new type   that is provided to
the command chmod  f  . This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmod )
  |  0, f : s (l, u,  ) ` u.chmod  f   : void
chmodp: The command chmodp f pl changes the all policies owned by the user who issues
the command that exist in the label associated with the file f . To successfully execute the
command, the following constraints must be satisfied: a) The file f must already exist
in the system. b) The user who issues the command must be an owner of a policy in the
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label associated with the file f . c) After executing the command, the policies owned by
the user who issued the command must be changed to the new policy pl that is provided
to the command chmodp f pl. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmodp)
  |  0, f : sp(l, u, pl) ` u.chmodp f pl : void
addp: The command addp f pl adds a new policy by the user who issues the command
to the label associated with the file f . To successfully execute the command, the following
constraints must be satisfied: a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The
user who issues the command must be an owner of a policy in the label associated with
the file f . c) After executing the command, the policy that is provided to the command
addp f pl must be appended to the label associated with the file f . This leads to the
following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(addp)
  |  0, f : ap(l, pl) ` u.addp f pl : void
adduser u: The command adduser f u1 adds a new authorised user to the policies
owned by the user who issues the command that exist in the label associated with the
file f . To successfully execute the command, the following constraints must be satisfied:
a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The user who issues the command must
be an owner of a policy in the label associated with the file f . c) After executing the
command, the user u1 that is provided to the command adduser f u1 must be appended
to the authorised users of the policies owned by the user who issued the command. This
leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(adduser)
  |  0, f : au(l, u,u1) ` u.adduser f u1 : void
rmuser u: The command rmuser f u1 removes an existing authorised user from the
policies owned by the user who issues the command that exist in the label associated
with the file f . To successfully execute the command, the following constraints must be
satisfied: a) The file f must already exist in the system. b) The user who issues the
command must be an owner of a policy in the label associated with the file f . c) After
executing the command, the user u1 that is provided to the command rmuser f u1 must
be removed from the authorised users of the policies owned by the user who issued the
command. This leads to the following typing rule:
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(rmuser)
  |  0, f : ru(l, u,u1) ` u.rmuser f u1 : void
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The typing rules presented above are depicted in Figure 6.5; which is an extension to
the typing rules depicted in Figure 6.4. In the next section we revise the typing algorithm
to reflect the new version of the type system shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5.
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmod↵)
  |  0, f : s↵(l, u,↵) ` u.chmod↵ f ↵ : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmod )
  |  0, f : s (l, u, ) ` u.chmod  f   : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmod )
  |  0, f : s (l, u,  ) ` u.chmod  f   : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(chmodp)
  |  0, f : sp(l, u, pl) ` u.chmodp f pl : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(addp)
  |  0, f : ap(l, pl) ` u.addp f pl : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(adduser)
  |  0, f : au(l, u,u1) ` u.adduser f u1 : void
  |  0 ` f : l u 2 o (l)
(rmuser)
  |  0, f : ru(l, u,u1) ` u.rmuser f u1 : void
Figure 6.5: Typing rules for changing policies
6.5.2 Typing algorithm
In this section we present a type inference algorithm T for typing phrases according
to the new type system depicted in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. In addition to the functions
check, less, red and dst defined in the previous typing algorithm, we define the following
functions. If ⌧ = l, then ⇡1(⌧) = ↵(l),⇡2(⌧) =  (l),⇡3(⌧) = o (l), and ⇡4(⌧) = u (l).
auth(u, ⌧) returns true if u 2 ⇡4(⌧), and own(u, ⌧) returns true if u 2 ⇡3(⌧). If ⌧ = l and
⌧ 0 = l0, then lub(⌧, ⌧ 0) = lt l0. Using these functions, we can now define the type inference
algorithm T as follows:
The Type Reconstruction Algorithm T :
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T (A, e) = (⌧, A0)
where:
1. If e is the filename f , and f : ↵ 2 A then ⌧ = ↵, A0 = Ar {f : ↵}.
2. If e is a sequence of commands, u.c;u.cs let
(↵, A1) = T (A, c)
check(↵, void)
( , A2) = T (A1, cs)
check( , void)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2.
3. If e is the cp command, u.cp f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
less(⇡1(↵),LC
n>0)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
auth(u,↵)
auth(u, )
less(⇡2( ),WO
 )
less(⇡4(↵),⇡4( ))
then if f1, f2 62 A2, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f1 : red(↵), f2 : lub(dst(↵), )}.
4. If e is the rm command, u.rm f let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1.
5. If e is the mkf command, u.mkf f ↵  , then if f 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A [ {f :
↵, , u : u}.
6. If e is the rd command, u.rd f let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
less(⇡2(↵),RO)
auth(u,↵)
then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1.
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7. If e is the cat command, u.cat f1 f2 f3 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
( , A3) = T (A2, f3)
auth(u,↵)
auth(u, )
auth(u,  )
less(⇡4(↵),⇡4( ))
less(⇡4( ),⇡4( ))
less(⇡2(↵),WO
+)
less(⇡2( ),WO
+)
less(⇡2( ),WO
 )
then if f3 62 A3, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A3 [ {f3 : lub(↵, ,  )}.
8. If e is the mv command, u.mv f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
less(⇡2( ),WO
 )
own(u,↵)
auth(u, )
less(⇡4(↵),⇡4( ))
then if f2 62 A2, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2 [ {f2 : lub(↵, )}.
9. If e is the copy command, u.copy f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
less(⇡1(↵),LC
n>0)
auth(u,↵)
then if f2 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f1 : red(↵), f2 : lub(dst(⇡1(↵),⇡2( ), u :
u), dst(↵))}.
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10. If e is the append command, u.append f1 f2 f3 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
( , A2) = T (A1, f2)
auth(u,↵)
auth(u, )
less(⇡2(↵),WO
+)
less(⇡2( ),WO
+)
then if f3 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A2[{f3 : lub((lub(⇡1(↵),⇡1( )), lub(⇡2(↵),⇡2( )), u :
u),↵, )}.
11. If e is the move command, move f1 f2 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f1)
own(u,↵)
then if f2 62 A, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f2 : ↵}.
12. if e is the chmod↵ command, u.chmod↵ f ↵ let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then if f 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f : s↵(↵, u,↵)}
13. if e is the chmod  command, u.chmod  f   let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then if f 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f : s (↵, u, )}
14. if e is the chmod  command, u.chmod  f   let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then if f 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f : s (↵, u,  )}
15. if e is the chmodp command, u.chmodp f pl let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then if f 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f : sp(↵, u, pl)}
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16. if e is the addp command, u.addp f pl let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then if f 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f : ap(↵, pl)}
17. if e is the adduser command, u.adduser f u1 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then if f 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f : au(↵, u, u1)}
18. if e is the rmuser command, u.rmuser f u1 let
(↵, A1) = T (A, f)
own(u,↵)
then if f 62 A1, then ⌧ = void, A0 = A1 [ {f : ru(↵, u, u1)}
6.6 Discussion
In the last revision of the type system where types of files are labels and the typing rules
are extended to control which operations can be performed on which label of the file and by
whom; various policies identified in Chapter 4 can be specified and enforced. Particularly,
the di↵erent types of access and propagation in a shared memory style can be enforced.
For example, a file with a label such as {NC,RO, Alice : Bob} describes a file that is
shared as OneToOne in a shared memory and the file can be read only once. While a file
with a label such as {UC,WO+, Alice : Bob, Carol,Dave} describes a file that is shared
as OneToGroup in a shared memory and the file can be appended to it only. Other types
of propagation such as Group, GroupToOne, and ManyToOne are built of atomic types.
For example, Group describes a situation where each one of the group is sharing his file as
OneToGroup. That is, if Alice,Bob, and Carol want to share their files as Group, then any
file created by each of them should specify the others as authorised users. This will make
more sense if we extend our system with directories which we aim for in future work. For
example, a directory of type GroupToOne such as {Alice,Bob, Carol}To{Dave}, should
only store files of types {Alice : Dave}, {Bob : Dave}, or {Carol : Dave}. By having
directories in the system, a distinction between publishing and sharing in static, dynamic,
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and transfer modes becomes obvious. That is copying a file from one directory to another
by cp or copy commands is publishing or sharing in a static mode, while moving a file
from one directory to another by mv or move commands is publishing or sharing in transfer
mode. Publishing or sharing in dynamic mode, which is another extension we aim for in
future work, can be achieved in the same way as in the static mode, except that a reference
to a file is copied from one directory to another rather than the file itself.
The developed type system in the previous chapter and the extensions discussed in
this chapter are focused on enforcing the di↵erent types of access and propagation in a
shared memory style, represented as a file system. Other possible future extensions are
to enforce restrictions over types of access other than limiting the number of times a file
can be read, such as limiting the period of time, the location and the specific time for a
particular access type to be exercised, and enforcing these policies in a distributed memory
style where files are moved from the owner device to the recipient device to be accessed
locally rather than stored in a particular place that must be accessed by all recipients.
The type system developed in this thesis is not confined to enforcing the policies
identified in Chapter 4. Other policies that we have not looked at in this thesis can
be enforced similarly with the basic idea of the type system which is based on resource
consumption and intercepting commands. For example, the Bell-LaPadula model of multi-
level security can be enforced by our type system if we associate users and files with security
levels such as top secret, secret, confidential, and unclassified. The simple security property
(no read up) which requires that a user at a given security level may not read a file at a
higher security level, can be achieved by extending the typing rule for u.rd f command
to check for l(f) v l(u), that is the security level of the user is at least as restrictive as
the security level of the file. The star property (no write down) which requires that a user
at a given security level may not write to file at a lower security level, can be achieved by
extending the typing rule for u.mkff l command to check for l(u) v l, that is the security
level assigned to the file to be created is at least as restrictive as the security level of the
user creating the file. The typing rules for other commands that writes to files such as
cat, mv and append, need not to be extended. This is because they change the security
level of files only to be more restrictive, and thus the star property will be satisfied.
The policies enforced by our type system are a sort of discretionary access control, in
the sense that owners can specify any policies they prefer to their files. For example, the
command u.mkf f l allows the user u to create a file f associated with label l. The typing
rule for the command u.mkf has no constraint over the label to be associated with the
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file. However, mandatory access control where system-wide policies must be enforced and
owners have no discretion over file policies might be useful in some situations. For example,
in an organisation, Alice might only be allowed to write reports and share them only with
her manager Bob who can only read them. Because these reports are confidential, the
organisation need to ensure that they cannot be shared accidentally with anyone else
except Bob. While Alice can create these reports with the label {UC,RO, Alice : Bob}
to ensure that only Bob can read them, there is a chance that Alice might accidentally
create them with another label that allows others to read them. To enforce this sort of
mandatory access control in our type system, we need to associate users in the system with
labels that are identical to the labels associated with the files. User labels represent the
maximum policy which can be associated with the files they create. Therefore, mandatory
access control can be simply enforced by extending only the typing rule for the command
u.mkf f l to check for l v u(l) which ensures that the label to be associated with the
created file is less or equal to the maximum policy the user can specify.
Our type system enforces both access control and information flow policies. Access
control is enforced by checking which operations can be performed on which file and by
whom, while information flow is enforced by tracking file policies and allowing them to be
changed only to more restrictive policies. The flow policies enforced by our type system lie
somewhere between the flow policies enforced by flow-insensitive type systems and flow-
sensitive type systems. This is because of the following two reasons. Firstly, types of files
in our system are not just security levels but they also represent permissions that dictate
which operations are allowed to be performed on them. Information flow between files in
our system can only occur by performing operations on these files and are allowed if and
only if the operations are permitted by the types of files. In flow-insensitive type systems
flow of information from f1 to f2 is allowed if and only if T (f1) v T (f2). That is, if
T (f1) = RO and T (f2) = NRW, then flow-insensitive type systems will allow information
to flow from f1 to f2 because RO v NRW. However, this will violate the policy of f2
because the type of f2 is NRW which requires that such a file cannot be read or written
into it. More interestingly, if T (f1) = NRW and T (f2) = RW
 , then flow-insensitive type
systems prevent flow of information from f1 to f2 since NRW 6v RW . However, such flow
is allowed in our type system because the type of f2 is RW
  which allows such a file to be
overwritten. Secondly, our view is that each file is associated with a policy that must be
enforced. A file must enforce its own policy and the policy of the information flowed into
it. In flow-insensitive type systems the flow of information from a source to a destination
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causes the information to acquire the policy of the destination. On the other hand, in
flow-sensitive type system the flow of information from a source to a destination causes
the destination to acquire the policy of the source of the information. However, both ways
will violate the file policies. For example, assume that T (f1) = NRW and T (f2) = RW
 
and there is information flow from f1 to f2. If we let the information flowing to acquire the
type of f2, then f1 can be read indirectly by reading f2 where the type of f1 is NRW which
requires that such a file cannot be read. Now assume that T (f1) = RO and T (f2) = WO
 
and there is information flow from f1 to f2. If we let f2 acquires the type of the source of
information, then f2 can be read where the type of f2 is WO
  which requires that such a
file can be only written into but not read.
The flow policy enforced by our type system follows the idea of flow-insensitive type
systems in that the flow of information must only result in a more restrictive type of
information; as well as the idea of flow-sensitive type systems in that information can flow
anywhere and the security types can be changed during computation. In such a way we
may benefit from the restrictiveness of flow-insensitive type systems and the permissiveness
of flow-sensitive type systems.
Our approach to extend file policies with ownership and authorisation information and
represent them as a label is inspired by the work on DLM. However, our label structure,
interpretation, and flow policy is di↵erent from DLM. In DLM, a policy in a label consists of
two components which are an owner and a reader set, whereas a policy in our label consists
of four components which are a security copy type, a security access type, an owner, and
authorised users. Labels in DLM represent policies that dictate where the information
can flow, whereas labels in our system represent permissions of files that dictate which
operations can be performed and by whom. In DLM, the flow of information from a source
to a destination causes the information to acquire the label of the destination, referred to as
information relabeling. That is, it enforces the flow policy of flow-insensitive type systems.
Such relabeling is only allowed if it is a restriction, that is the new label must only remove
readers, add owners, or both. However, in our system such flow causes the destination
label to change its label to enforce all the policies in both its label and the source label.
This is similar to how derived values are treated in DLM. Therefore, relabeling occurs
to the destination rather than to the information flowing to that destination. Unlike
DLM, relabeling in our system is only allowed if the operation that causes such relabeling
is permitted by both labels of the source and destination, and the authorised users of
the destination label is a subset of the authorised user of the source label. A major
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di↵erence between our work and the work on DLM is the idea of consumption of resource
and intercepting commands that manipulate files. In DLM, the flow of information from a
source to a destination causes a copy of the information stored in the source to be assigned
to the destination. However, in our work such a flow causes the source to be consumed
and stored in the destination unless otherwise the source is explicitly copied. DLM is a
general model that only restricts how information can flow between di↵erent parts of the
system, whereas our work is focused on file sharing that intercepts each command to be
performed on files and checks for access control requirements and enforces the information
flow requirements. In DLM, users of a label are considered either readers or writers of the
information of that label. Whereas in our work, users of a label are considered authorised
to perform operations that are specified by the label, which might not allow them to read
or write to the information of that label.
The current labels associated with files divide users into owners and authorised users.
Each label assigns the same permissions to all authorised users. This might not be desirable
in situations where di↵erent users require di↵erent permissions for the same file. For
example, if Alice needs to read the file f1 and Bob needs to write to the file f1, then our
labels cannot specify this policy. That is, our label cannot grant di↵erent permissions to
di↵erent users for the same file. In fact, in Unix-like file systems, where traditional file
permissions model is used, each file can grant di↵erent permissions to three di↵erent types
of users: owner, group, and others. Moreover, Access Control List (ACL) can be used
as an extension to traditional file permissions model to avoid its limitations, and allow
permissions to be granted to individual users or groups even if these do not correspond to
the original owner or the owning group.
However, our label is useful in situations where all authorised users need to have the
same permissions for the same file. For situations where two groups of users need to
have di↵erent permissions for the same file, then two linked copies of the file must exist
where each copy is associated with a label that specifies the permissions needed for one
group. For example, if there are two groups of users group1 and group2, where group1
need to read the file f1 and group2 need to write to the file f1. Then, a reference to the
file f1 should be copied into f2, and f1 should be associated with a label to specify the
permissions for group1, and f2 should be associated with a label to specify the permissions
for group2. In this way, any changes made to f2 will be reflected into f1, and thus, it will
have the same e↵ect as assigning di↵erent permissions to di↵erent users for the same file.
Implementing the type system developed in this thesis in a real file system is one
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thing that we are aiming for in future work. Such implementation is useful to show
the practicality of our approach to prevent accidental misuse of shared files, and also
to obtain feedback on using the system for possible improvements. Various choices for
implementation have to be made; for example, di↵erent choices available to associate
types with files. Firstly, they can be attached to files as described in the file system  .
Secondly, they can be stored along with file names in a di↵erent location internal to the
file system. Thirdly, they can be stored with file names in a di↵erent location external to
the file system. Although each of them might have advantages and disadvantages, the role
of the type system will be the same which is to intercept each command to be performed
on files and fetch the types of these files to check for access control and information flow
requirements.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter we have looked at possible future extensions to the type system presented
in Chapter 5. In particular, we showed that the type system can be easily extended
to regulate other operations than copy in order to enforce the various policies identified
in Chapter 4. We have taken a significant step towards realising these extensions. We
began by defining additional security types to control read and write operations, which
we refer to as security access types. We showed that if files were associated only with the
security access types, then the same typing rules presented in Chapter 5 with additional
constraints can be used to control the access to read and write operations and the flow
caused by all operations. Then, we defined security types of files as pairs that consist of
a security copy type and a security access type. The former type represents a policy to
control the access and flow of copy operations; and the latter type represents a policy to
control the access and flow of read and write operations. We extended the type system to
enforce these policies along with a typing algorithm. The extended type system controls
the access to copy, read and write operations and the flow caused by all operations. Next,
we defined security types of files as labels that not only consist of a security copy type and
a security access type, but also of ownership authorisation information. The ownership
and authorisation information in a label indicates the owners and the authorised users of
a file associated with the label. Such labels represent policies to specify which operations
can be performed on which types of files and by whom. Based on the definition of labels,
we extended the type system to not only control the access and flow of operations but also
control which user can perform these operations. Finally, we extended the commands in
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our language to include commands that manipulate file policies. We extended the type
system with typing rules for these commands along with a typing algorithm for typing
phrases in accordance with the last extension of the type system.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
File sharing has been a topic of interest in computer science, ever since files were created.
One of the most challenging problems researchers face is protecting the shared files from
various attacks that violate their confidentiality, integrity and availability. These attacks
can be launched by unauthorised users, referred to as external threats, or by author-
ised users, referred to as insider threats. In this thesis, we have investigated the insider
threat problem with respect to file sharing and developed a novel approach to preventing
accidental threats to the shared files.
There exists a large body of work in the literature on addressing the insider threat
problem. The problem of the insider threat is not only confined to attacks on shared
files, but rather it encompasses various types of attack that target di↵erent assets of an
organisation. As a result of the broad scope of the problem, various definitions of the
insider threat problem exist. Researchers have described the insider threat problem by
defining who the insiders are and what threats they constitute. Their definitions contradict
one another; and what is considered an insider for some researchers might be considered
an outsider for others. Also, they have generally always described insider threats based
on a definition of the insider, such that the insider threats are the damages caused to an
organisation by an insider. Due to the fact that there is no clear definition of the problem,
little progress has been made in addressing the insider threat problem. From our point
of view, better progress can be made if the problem is classified into several categories
which can be defined, studied and solved independently and which later can be combined
to solve the problem as a whole. Therefore, we proposed an approach to classifying
the insider problem into di↵erent categories and providing precise definitions of who the
insider is and what is the insider problem. Based on the proposed classification, we defined
our class of insider problem; namely, preventing confidentiality and integrity attacks on
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sensitive files by recipients during the activity of file sharing. Although the insiders and
the assets that we need to protect are clearly identified in our class of insider problem,
the attacks and the activities are still vague. Files can be shared and attacked by insiders
in di↵erent ways which must be identified. Di↵erent types of attack by insiders require
di↵erent types of protection. Claiming that a particular protection mechanism can protect
file confidentiality is not enough. Instead, one should claim that a particular protection
mechanism can protect file confidentiality under specific types of attack. Identifying these
types of attack makes it clear which protection mechanism we need to develop, and allow
us to validate it against the types of attack it claims to prevent. Therefore, we investigated
the di↵erent types of misuse of the shared files that can be performed by insiders during
the activity of file sharing, and we characterised the protection required against them.
We focused in this thesis on the protection required to prevent accidental misuse that
a↵ects the confidentiality and integrity of files by trusted insiders. This is because files
can only be entirely protected if shared with trusted insiders. System vulnerabilities and
the analogue hole problem have made protection against untrusted insider unfeasible.
Untrusted malicious insiders will always find a way to bypass the protection mechanism
in place. Also, accidental misuse of the shared files by insiders is a highly cited problem in
the literature [34, 4, 54], and if this cannot be solved, then neither can deliberate misuse.
Protecting the shared files is a topic that has been studied in two di↵erent fields with
di↵erent interests, namely, information sharing and security. The former focuses on facilit-
ating information sharing and provides sharing tools that are suitable for various sharing
tasks but not secure. The latter focuses on securing information sharing and provides
sharing tools that are secure but not suitable for every sharing task. Considering both
fields will help us to design a protection mechanism that will not only protect the shared
files against accidental misuse by insiders; but will also not interfere with people’s prac-
tices of file sharing. Therefore, in addition to identifying the misuse we need to prevent,
we investigate how the activity of file sharing can be performed. We characterised the
activity of file sharing according to how files can be propagated from owners to recipients
and how files can be accessed by the recipients after their propagation. Based on this
characterisation, we defined a framework that classifies the activity of file sharing into
di↵erent categories. Each category specifies how files should be propagated and accessed
after their propagation. We showed that these categories can be thought of as policies that,
if enforced, allow the provision of various types of protection against accidental misuse.
We enforced these policies by the use of language based techniques; and designed
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a language to manipulate files and specify their policies in a file system, and a type
system that enforces these policies. In the file system, policies are represented as security
types which are associated with files, and programs are set of operations to be performed
on files. The security types represent both access control and information flow policies.
They represent access control polices as they dictate which operations are allowed to be
performed; and represent information flow policies as they dictate where the information
can flow. The role of the type system is to intercept each command to be performed on
files, and enforce the access control and information flow policies of these files. That is,
the type system will first check whether or not the operations to be performed on files are
allowed by the types of the files, and secondly will check whether or not the information
flow between files caused by the command satisfies the flow policies of the files.
As a starting point, we focused on enforcing a particular constraint of the policies;
namely, limiting the number of times a file can be read. We achieved this by limiting the
number of copies of a file that can be produced, and by the notion of resource consumption;
that is a file is a resource which must be consumed when it is used unless if it is explicitly
copied. Therefore, we define security types to control the access to copy operations and
the flow caused by all operations including copy, such that the copy policies of files are not
violated. However, other constraints can be enforced similarly by controlling the access
to and the flow caused by other operations, as we discussed in Chapter 6. We proved the
soundness of the developed type system that enforces these policies and defined a type
reconstruction algorithm and proved its soundness and completeness.
The approach taken in this thesis to tackle accidental insider threats to file sharing is
not yet completed. However, we have developed the basic elements of the system which
are capable of showing the usefulness and practicality of our approach to tackle accidental
insider threats to file sharing, and which can be built upon easily to realise the complete
picture of our approach. Various extensions are left for future work as pointed out in
Chapter 6. Some of them are discussed in detail with minimal work left to complete
them, while others require further investigation. Implementing the system developed in
this thesis is one of the things that we aim for in future work. Such implementation is
useful to obtain feedback from users using the system about our approach that could be
used to improve and refine the current system.
In conclusion, this thesis has proposed a novel approach to prevent accidental insider
threats to file sharing. I hope that this thesis will inspire current researchers who study
insider threats, file sharing, and language-based security, to work together towards devel-
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oping a common secure language that allows secure file sharing against accidental insider
threats, by refining and extending the approach taken in this thesis to suit their purpose
and need.
190
Bibliography
[1] Abadi, M. (1999). Secrecy by typing in security protocols. J. ACM, 46(5):749–786.
48, 53
[2] Adya, A., Bolosky, W. J., Castro, M., Cermak, G., Chaiken, R., Douceur, J. R., Howell,
J., Lorch, J. R., Theimer, M., and Wattenhofer, R. P. (2002). Farsite: Federated, avail-
able, and reliable storage for an incompletely trusted environment. In PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING SYSTEMS DESIGN AND IMPLE-
MENTATION (OSDI, pages 1–14. 92
[3] Ahern, S., Eckles, D., Good, N. S., King, S., Naaman, M., and Nair, R. (2007). Over-
exposed?: privacy patterns and considerations in online and mobile photo sharing. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI
’07, pages 357–366, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 15, 16
[4] AlgoSec (2013). The state of network security 2013: Attitudes and
opinions. http://www.algosec.com/resources/files/Specials/Survey%20files/
State%20of%20Network%20Security%202013_Final%20Report.pdf. 8, 187
[5] Alhazmi, O. H., Malaiya, Y. K., and Ray, I. (2004). Vulnerabilities in major operating
systems. Technical report, Department of Computer Science, Colorado State University.
6
[6] Anderson, R. and Brackney, R. (2004). Understanding the insider threat. In Proceed-
ings of a March 2004 Workshop. Prepared for the Advanced Research and Development
Activity (ARDA). http://www. rand. org/publications/CF/CF196. 34, 35
[7] Anderson, T. E., Dahlin, M. D., Neefe, J. M., Patterson, D. A., Roselli, D. S.,
and Wang, R. Y. (1995). Serverless network file systems. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.,
29(5):109–126. 92
[8] Arnab, A. and Hutchison, A. (2007). Persistent access control: a formal model for
191
drm. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Digital Rights Management, DRM
’07, pages 41–53, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 42
[9] Arsenova, E. (n.d). Technical aspects of digital rights management. 45
[10] Baliello, C., Basso, A., Giusto, C. D., Khalil, H., and Machancoses, D. (2002). Ker-
beros protocol: an overview Distributed Systems. 31
[11] Bellovin, S. M. (2008). The Insider Attack Problem Nature and Scope. In Stolfo,
S. J., Bellovin, S. M., Keromytis, A., Hershkop, S., Smith, S. W., and Sinclair, S.,
editors, Insider Attack and Cyber Security - Beyond the Hacker, volume 39 of Advances
in Information Security. Springer. 36
[12] Bhatt, S., Sion, R., and Carbunar, B. (2009). A personal mobile drm manager for
smartphones. Computers & Security, 28(6):327–340. 6, 7
[13] Birgisson, A., Russo, A., and Sabelfeld, A. (2010). Unifying facets of information
integrity. In Jha, S. and Mathuria, A., editors, ICISS, volume 6503 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 48–65. Springer. 49
[14] Bishop, M. (2005). Position: “insider” is relative. In Proceedings of the 2005 workshop
on New security paradigms, NSPW ’05, pages 77–78, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 34
[15] Bishop, M., Engle, S., Peisert, S., Whalen, S., and Gates, C. (2009). Case studies of
an insider framework. page 817. 35
[16] Bishop, M. and Gates, C. (2008). Defining the insider threat. pages 1–3, New York,
NY, USA. ACM. 35
[17] Boudol, G. (2008). Secure information flow as a safety property. In Degano, P.,
Guttman, J. D., and Martinelli, F., editors, Formal Aspects in Security and Trust,
volume 5491 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 20–34. Springer. 50
[18] Brown, B., Sellen, A. J., and Geelhoed, E. (2001). In Proceedings of the seventh con-
ference on European Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, ECSCW’01,
pages 179–198, Norwell, MA, USA. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 15, 16
[19] CCITT (Consultative Committee on International Telegraphy and Telephony) (1991).
Recommendation X.800: Security Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for
CCITT Applications. 29
[20] CERT (2013). The CERT Insider Threat Center @ONLINE. 35
192
[21] Chaudhuri, A. and Abadi, M. (2006). Secrecy by typing and file-access control. In
Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW’06),
pages 112–123. IEEE. 53
[22] Chinchani, R., Iyer, A., Ngo, H. Q., and Upadhyaya, S. (2005). Towards a theory
of insider threat assessment. In Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on
Dependable Systems and Networks, DSN ’05, pages 108–117, Washington, DC, USA.
IEEE Computer Society. 34
[23] Chothia, T., Duggan, D., and Vitek, J. (2003). Type-based distributed access control.
In In Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 170–186. IEEE. 51
[24] Christensen, S. (Accessed on [20/8/2013]). Introduction to file sharing services: An
it-forensic examination of p2p clients. 17, 18
[25] Clark, D. D. and Wilson, D. R. (1987). A Comparison of Commercial and Military
Computer Security Policies. In 1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages
184–194. IEEE Computer Society Press. 41
[26] Dalal, B., Nelson, L., Smetters, D., Good, N., and Elliot, A. (2008). Ad-hoc guesting:
when exceptions are the rule. In Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability, Psycho-
logy, and Security, UPSEC’08, pages 9:1–9:5, Berkeley, CA, USA. USENIX Association.
15, 22, 24, 27
[27] Damas, L. and Milner, R. (1982). Principal type-schemes for functional programs. In
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Program-
ming Languages, POPL ’82, pages 207–212, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 103
[28] Denning, D. E. (1976). A lattice model of secure information flow. Commun. ACM,
19(5):236–243. 48
[29] Denning, D. E. and Denning, P. J. (1977). Certification of programs for secure in-
formation flow. Commun. ACM, 20(7):504–513. 48
[30] Dezani-Ciancaglini, M. and De’Liguoro, U. (2010). Sessions and session types: An
overview. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Web Services and
Formal Methods, WS-FM’09, pages 1–28, Berlin, Heidelberg. Springer-Verlag. 55
[31] DRM, A. http://www.adobe.com/manufacturing/resources/drm/. [Accessed:
2013-11-28]. 5
193
[32] DRM, A. F. http://www.apple.com/itunes. [Accessed: 2013-11-28]. 5
[33] Ernst, M. D. (2003). Static and dynamic analysis: Synergy and duality. In WODA
2003: ICSE Workshop on Dynamic Analysis, pages 24–27, Portland, OR. 48
[34] Europe, I. and PwC (2013). 2013 information security breaches survey. Technical
report, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills. 8, 187
[35] Ferraiolo, D. and Kuhn, R. (1992). Role-based access control. In In 15th NIST-NCSC
National Computer Security Conference. 43
[36] Freier, A. O., Kariton, P., and Kocher, P. C. (1996). The SSL protocol: Version 3.0.
Internet draft, Netscape Communications. 31
[37] Goguen, J. A. and Meseguer, J. (1982). Security policies and security models. In
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 11–20. 49
[38] Good, N. S. and Krekelberg, A. (2003). Usability and privacy: a study of kazaa p2p
file-sharing. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, CHI ’03, pages 137–144, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 15, 16
[39] Goudar, R. and More, P. (2011). Multilayer Security Mechanism in Computer Net-
work. International Journal of Computer Networks and Wireless Communications
(IJCNWC), 1(1). 31
[40] Haber, S., Horne, B., Pato, J., Sander, T., and Tarjan, R. E. (2003). If piracy is the
problem, is drm the answer? In Becker, E., Buhse, W., Gnnewig, D., and Rump, N.,
editors, Digital Rights Management, volume 2770 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 224–233. Springer. 6
[41] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G. S., Verthein, W., Taarud, J., Little, W. A., and Zorn, G. (1999).
Point-to-point tunneling protocol (PPTP). Internet RFC 2637. 31
[42] Harinarayana, N. S., Somu, C. S., and Sunil, M. V. (2009). Digital rights management
in digital libraries: An introduction totechnology, e↵ects and the available open source
tools. In 7th International CALIBER-2009, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, Feb-
ruary 25-27, 2009. 45
[43] Harris, S. (2002). Mike Meyers’ Cissp(r) Certification Passport. McGraw-Hill Prof
Med/Tech, 2002. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43
194
[44] Harrison, M. A., Ruzzo, W. L., and Ullman, J. D. (1976). Protection in operating
systems. Commun. ACM, 19(8):461–471. 47
[45] Hart, M., Johnson, R., and Stent, A. (2006). More content-less control: Access control
in the web 2.0. Control, pages 1–3. 23
[46] Hauser, T. and Wenz, C. (2003). Drm under attack: Weaknesses in existing systems.
In Becker, E., Buhse, W., Gnnewig, D., and Rump, N., editors, Digital Rights Manage-
ment, volume 2770 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 206–223. Springer. 5,
6
[47] Hedin, D. and Sabelfeld, A. (2011). A perspective on information-flow control. 49
[48] Honda, K., Vasconcelos, V. T., and Kubo, M. (1998). Language primitives and type
discipline for structured communication-based programming. In In ESOP?98, volume
1381 of LNCS, pages 122–138. Springer-Verlag. 54, 55
[49] Howard, J. H. (1988). An overview of the andrew file system. In in Winter 1988
USENIX Conference Proceedings, pages 23–26. 92
[50] Hunker, J. (2008). Taking Stock and Looking Forward - An Outsider’s Perspective
on the Insider Threat. In Stolfo, S. J., Bellovin, S. M., Keromytis, A., Hershkop, S.,
Smith, S. W., and Sinclair, S., editors, Insider Attack and Cyber Security - Beyond the
Hacker, volume 39 of Advances in Information Security. Springer. 34
[51] Hunker, J. and Probst, C. W. (2011). Insiders and insider threats: An overview of
definitions and mitigation techniques. Jounral of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous
Computing, and Dependable Applications, 2(1):4–27. 35, 36, 38, 59
[52] Hunt, S. and Sands, D. (2006). On flow-sensitive security types. SIGPLAN Not.,
41(1):79–90. 48, 50
[53] IBM (Accessed on [20/8/2013]). The floppy disk. 17
[54] Institute, P. (2012). The human factor in data protection. http:
//www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/
reports/rpt_trend-micro_ponemon-survey-2012.pdf. 8, 187
[55] Institute, S. E. (2011). 2011 CyberSecurity Watch Survey. Software Engineering
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. 34
195
[56] Karthikeyan, K. and Indra, A. (2010). Intrusion Detection Tools and Techniques – A
Survey. International Journal of Computer Theory and Engineering, 2(6). 3, 33
[57] Kent, S. and Atkinson, R. (1998). Security architecture for the internet protocol.
Internet RFC 2401. 31
[58] Ku, W. and Chi, C. H. (2004). Survey on the technological aspects of digital rights
management. In Zhang, K. and Zheng, Y., editors, ISC, volume 3225 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 391–403. Springer. 3, 6
[59] Kubiatowicz, J., Bindel, D., Chen, Y., Czerwinski, S., Eaton, P., Geels, D., Gummadi,
R., Rhea, S., Weatherspoon, H., Weimer, W., Wells, C., and Zhao, B. (2000). Ocean-
store: An architecture for global-scale persistent storage. SIGPLAN Not., 35(11):190–
201. 92
[60] Lampson, B. W. (1971). Protection. In In Proceedings of the 5th Annual Princeton
Conference on Information Sciences and Systems Princeton University, pages 437–443.
42, 43, 47
[61] Lampson, B. W. (1973). A note on the confinement problem. Commun. ACM,
16(10):613–615. 49
[62] Lee, A. (2012). The history of file-sharing. 18
[63] Li, P., Mao, Y., and Zdancewic, S. (2003). Information integrity policies. In Proceed-
ings of The Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST). 49
[64] Liu, Q., Safavi-naini, R., and Sheppard, N. P. (2003). Digital rights management for
content distribution. x, 45, 46
[65] Mazurek, M. L., Arsenault, J. P., Bresee, J., Gupta, N., Ion, I., Johns, C., Lee, D.,
Liang, Y., Olsen, J., Salmon, B., Shay, R., Vaniea, K., Bauer, L., Cranor, L. F., Ganger,
G. R., and Reiter, M. K. (2010). Access control for home data sharing: Attitudes, needs
and practices. In CHI 2010: Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI
’10, pages 645–654, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 23, 24, 27
[66] Mclean, J. (1990). Security models and information flow. In In Proc. IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, pages 180–187. IEEE Computer Society Press. 49
[67] Mendelsohn, J. and Mckenna, J. (2010). Social sharing research report: How, why,
and what content people share online. 1
196
[68] Michelle, K. and Kowalski, E. (2005). Insider Threat Study: Computer System
Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors. 34
[69] Michiels, S., Joosen, W., Truyen, E., and Verslype, K. (2005). Digital rights manage-
ment - a survey of existing technologies. CW Reports CW428, Department of Computer
Science, K.U.Leuven. 6
[70] Microsoft (2016). Microsoft smb protocol and cifs protocol overview. https://msdn.
microsoft.com/en-gb/library/windows/desktop/aa365233(v=vs.85).aspx. Ac-
cessed: 2016-6-1. 92
[71] Miller, A. D. and Edwards, W. K. (2007). Give and take: a study of consumer photo-
sharing culture and practice. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’07, pages 347–356, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
15, 16
[72] Muthitacharoen, A., Morris, R., Gil, T. M., and Chen, B. (2002). Ivy: A read/write
peer-to-peer file system. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 36(SI):31–44. 92
[73] Myers, A. C. (1999a). Jflow: Practical mostly-static information flow control. In
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Pro-
gramming Languages, POPL ’99, pages 228–241, New York, NY, USA. ACM. 50
[74] Myers, A. C. (1999b). Mostly-static decentralized information flow control. Technical
report. 50, 51, 161
[75] Myers, A. C. and Liskov, B. (1997). A decentralized model for information flow
control. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 31(5):129–142. 50, 161
[76] Myers, A. C. and Liskov, B. (1998). Complete, safe information flow with decent-
ralized labels. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 186–197. IEEE
Computer Society. 50, 161
[77] Myers, A. C. and Liskov, B. (2000). Protecting privacy using the decentralized label
model. ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol., 9(4):410–442. 50, 161
[78] Niemi, A. (2003). End-to-end web security protocols overview. 31
[79] Nistor, C. (2009). File sharing - history. 17, 18
197
[80] Northcutt, S., Zeltser, L., Winters, S., Kent, K., and Ritchey, R. W. (2005). Inside
Network Perimeter Security (2nd Edition) (Inside). Sams, Indianapolis, IN, USA. 32,
33
[81] Olson, J. S., Grudin, J., and Horvitz, E. (2004). Toward understanding preferences
for sharing and privacy. MSR Technical Report 2004–138. 19, 20, 23
[82] Olson, J. S., Grudin, J., and Horvitz, E. (2005). A study of preferences for sharing
and privacy. In Proceedings of CHI 05, pages 1985–1988. ACM Press. 19, 20, 23, 27
[83] Park, J. and Sandhu, R. (2002a). Originator control in usage control. In Proceedings
of the 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
(POLICY’02), POLICY ’02, pages 60–, Washington, DC, USA. IEEE Computer Soci-
ety. 46
[84] Park, J. and Sandhu, R. (2002b). Towards usage control models: Beyond traditional
access control. In In Proceedings of 7th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and
Technologies. 46
[85] Park, J. and Sandhu, R. (2004). The uconabc usage control model. ACM Trans. Inf.
Syst. Secur., 7(1):128–174. 46
[86] PATRICIU, V.-V., BICA, I., TOGAN, M., and GHITA, S.-V. (2011). A generalized
drm architectural framework. Advances in Electrical and Computer Engineering, 11:43–
48. 45
[87] Paxson, V. (2013). Principles for building secure systems. University of California,
Berkeley. Lecture notes. 5
[88] Predd, J., Pfleeger, S. L., Hunker, J., and Bulford, C. (2008). Insiders behaving badly.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 6(4):66–70. 34, 35
[89] Probst, C. W., Hunker, J., Bishop, M., and Gollmann, D. (2008). 08302 summary –
countering insider threats. In Bishop, M., Gollmann, D., Hunke, J., and Probst, C. W.,
editors, Countering Insider Threats, number 08302 in Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings,
Dagstuhl, Germany. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany. 34,
35, 36, 59
[90] Probst, C. W., Hunker, J. A., Gollmann, D., and .M, B. (2010). Insider threats in
cyber security. Advances in Information Security, 49. Springer US. 35, 36, 59
198
[91] Purohit, V. (2007). Authentication and access control the cornerstone of information
security. 41, 42, 43
[92] Qing-hai, B. and Ying, Z. (2011). Study on the access control model in information
security. IEEE, pages 830–834. 39, 42, 43
[93] Ramsdell, B. and Turner, S. (2004). Secure/multipurpose internet mail extensions
(s/mime) version 3.1 message specification”, rfc 3851. 31
[94] Rump, N. (2003). Digital rights management - technological, economic, legal and
political aspects. In Becker, E., Buhse, W., Gnnewig, D., and Rump, N., editors, Digital
Rights Management, volume 2770 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer. 5, 6
[95] Sabelfeld, A. and Myers, A. C. (2003). Language-based information-flow security.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 21(1):5–19. 48, 49
[96] Sabelfeld, A. and Sands, D. (2009). Declassification: Dimensions and principles. J.
Comput. Secur., 17(5):517–548. 49
[97] Safavi-Naini, R. and Sheppard, N. P. (n.d). Digital rights management. 45
[98] Salim, F., Reid, J. F., and Dawson, E. (2010). Towards authorisation models for secure
information sharing : a survey and research agenda. ISeCure, The ISC International
Journal of Information Security, 2. 42, 43, 44
[99] Sandberg, R., Goldberg, D., Kleiman, S., Walsh, D., and Lyon, B. (1985). Design
and implementation or the sun network filesystem. 92
[100] Sandhu, R. S., Coyne, E. J., Feinstein, H. L., and Youman, C. E. (1996). Role-based
access control models. Computer, 29(2):38–47. 47
[101] Sattarova, F. Y. and Kim, T. (2007). IT Security Review: Privacy, Protection,
Access Control, Assurance and System Security. International Journal of Multimedia
and Ubiquitous Engineering, 2(2). 28
[102] Satyanarayanan, M. (2002). The evolution of coda. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst.,
20(2):85–124. 92
[103] Scarfone, K. and Mell, P. (2010). The common configuration scoring system (ccss):
Metrics for software security configuration vulnerabilities. Technical Report 7502, Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology. 5, 6
199
[104] Secure Electronic Transaction LLC (1997). SET secure electronic transaction spe-
cification — version 1.0. 31
[105] SecuROM, C. P. ([Accessed: 2013-11-28]). http://www.encrypt.ro/
cd-encryption/cd-protection-securom.html. 5
[106] Shirey, R. W. (2000). Internet Security Glossary. Internet RFC 2828. 29
[107] Silowash, G., Cappelli, D., Moore, A., Trzeciak, R., Shimeall, T. J., and Flynn, L.
(2012). Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats 4th Edition. 37, 59, 60
[108] Simpson, W. A. (1994). The point-to-point protocol (PPP). Internet RFC 1661. 31
[109] Sinclair, S. and Smith, S. W. (2008). Preventative Direction For Insider Threat
Mitigation Via Access Control. In Stolfo, S. J., Bellovin, S. M., Keromytis, A., Hershkop,
S., Smith, S. W., and Sinclair, S., editors, Insider Attack and Cyber Security - Beyond
the Hacker, volume 39 of Advances in Information Security. Springer. 37, 38
[110] Smetters, D. K. and Good, N. (2009). How users use access control. SOUPS ’09.
ACM. 22, 23, 24
[111] Smith, M. S. (2011). The history of file sharing: Where did it begin? 17, 18
[112] Spiridonov, D. (2006). Digital rights management. 46
[113] Stallings, W. (2011). Network Security Essentials - Applications and Standards (4.
ed, internat. ed.). Pearson Education. 32, 33
[114] Stamp, M. (2003). Digital Rights Management: The Technology Behind the Hype.
Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 4(3):102–112. 6
[115] Stamp, M. (2005). Information security - principles and practice. Wiley. 6, 7
[116] Stamp, M. (2006). Information security - principles and practice. Wiley. 32, 33
[117] Stewart, J. M., Tittel, E., and Chapple, M. (2008). CISSP: Certified Information
Systems Security Professional Study Guide. SYBEX Inc., Alameda, CA, USA, 4th
edition. 40, 41, 42, 43
[118] Sun, S.-T. and Beznosov, K. (2009). Open problems in web 2.0 user content sharing.
1
200
[119] Takeuchi, K., Honda, K., and Kubo, M. (1994). An interaction-based language and
its typing system. In In PARLE?94, volume 817 of LNCS, pages 398–413. Springer-
Verlag. 54, 55
[120] Vacca, J. (2010). Network and System Security. Elsevier Science. 3
[121] Vasconcelos, V. T. (2009). 9th International School on Formal Methods for the
Design of Computer, Communication and Software Systems, volume 5569 of LNCS,
chapter Fundamentals of Session Types, pages 158–186. SPRINGER. 54
[122] Vaughan, J. A. and Zdancewic, S. (2007). A cryptographic decentralized label model.
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 0:192–206. 52
[123] Voida, A., Grinter, R. E., Ducheneaut, N., Edwards, W. K., and Newman, M. W.
(2005). Listening in: practices surrounding itunes music sharing. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’05, pages 191–200,
New York, NY, USA. ACM. 15, 16
[124] Voida, S., Edwards, W. K., Newman, M. W., Grinter, R. E., and Ducheneaut, N.
(2006). Share and share alike: Exploring the user interface a↵ordances of file sharing.
In In Proc. of CHI 2006 (April 2227, pages 221–230. ACM Press. 15, 19, 21, 22, 23,
24, 27
[125] Volpano, D., Irvine, C., and Smith, G. (1996). A sound type system for secure flow
analysis. J. Comput. Secur., 4(2-3):167–187. 48, 49, 50
[126] Volpano, D. M. and Smith, G. (1997). A Type-Based Approach to Program Security.
In TAPSOFT, pages 607–621. 48
[127] Wang, J. (2009). Computer Network Security - Theory and Practice. Springer
London, Limited. 31, 32
[128] Weeks, S. (2001). Understanding trust management systems. In Proceedings of the
2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’01, pages 94–, Washington, DC,
USA. IEEE Computer Society. 44
[129] Whalen, T., Smetters, D., and Churchill, E. F. (2006). User experiences with sharing
and access control. In In CHI 06: CHI 06 extended abstracts on Human factors in
computing systems, pages 1517–1522. ACM Press. 21, 22, 23, 24, 27
201
[130] Whalen, T., Toms, E., and Blustein, J. (2008a). File sharing and group information
management. Workshop on Personal Information Management (PIM 2008). 15, 16, 17,
21, 22, 23, 25, 27
[131] Whalen, T., Toms, E. G., and Blustein, J. (2008b). Information displays for man-
aging shared files. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Symposium on Computer Human
Interaction for Management of Information Technology, CHiMiT ’08, pages 5:1–5:10,
New York, NY, USA. ACM. 23, 24
[132] Whitman, M. and Mattord, H. (2011). Principles of Information Security. Course
Technology Ptr. 28
[133] Wikipedia ([Accessed: 2013-11-28]). Edward snowden. http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Edward_Snowden. 6
[134] Wikipedia (Accessed on [20/8/2013]b). Timeline of file sharing. 17, 18
[135] Wikipedia (Accessed on [22/8/2013]a). File sharing. 18
[136] windows media player DRM, M. ([Accessed: 2013-11-
28]). http://windows.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows-vista/
windows-media-player-drm-frequently-asked-questions. 5
[137] Yousendit (Accessed on [23/8/2013]). The history of file sharing. 18
[138] Zhang, X. (2011). A survey of digital rights management technologies. http://www.
cs.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-11/ftp/drm/index.html. [Accessed: 2013-11-28]. 6, 7
[139] Zheng, L. and Myers, A. C. (2007). Dynamic security labels and static information
flow control. Int. J. Inf. Sec., 6(2-3):67–84. 48
[140] Zimmermann, P. R. (1995). The O cial PGP User’s Guide. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, USA. 31
